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F. A. Hayek and the Mirage of Social Justice 
(Abstract) 
This dissertation is an examination of the social 
philosophy of F. A. Hayek, with especial reference to 
his critique of social justice. Hayek's critique is 
built upon his overall social philosophy. The first 
part of the dissertation, therefore, is an explica- 
tion of certain essential elements of that philosophy: 
to wit, the spontaneous order, rules of just conduct, 
law, justice, and lastly the critique of social 
justice itself. The second part of the dissertation 
is a critical analysis of Hayek's argument. I first 
consider whether the idea of the spontaneous order 
and Hayek's cofiqeption of justice are viable inde- 
pendently of any conflicts with social justice, con- 
cluding that there are some problems with these elements. 
Next, I examine the critique of social justice: con- 
sidering first whether social justice is inevitably 
incompatible with Hayek's social order, and then con- 
sidering whether the rejection of social justice is 
compatible with the normative premise which underlies 
Hayek's philosophy. I conclude that Hayek has problems 
on both of these fronts. I finish by presenting a 
general appraisal of the merits and value of Hayek's 




This dissertation is an exegesis and critique 
of F. A. Hayek's thoughts on social justice. However, 
while the particular concern is Hayek on social justice, 
7 
there is also a-more general concern with his overall 
social philosophy. The reason for this will be mentioned 
shortly. 
The dissertation focuses almost exclusively 
on Hayek's thought as it is explicated in his magnum 
opus, the three volume Law, Legislation and Liberty. 
The three volumes of this work, published in 1973,1976, 
1 
and 1979, represent the most comprehensive and defini- 
tive statement of Hayek's thoughts on social order. 
While I have considered his earlier writings on social 
philosophy, dating back to The Road to Serfdom (1944), 
2 
I have utilized those earlier writings only to the ex- 
tent that they proved useful in clarifying gaps or 
ambiguities found in Law, Legislation and Liberty. I 
have, however, paid no concern to any contradictions or 
discrepancies which might exist between those earlier 
writings and the magnum opus. My concern throughout 
has been an analysis of Hayek's 'final' statement on 
social philosophy and social justice, rather than an 
intellectual history of his thoughts thereon. 
1 
Even as to the magnum opus my concern has been 
selective. I have concentrated almost exclusively on 
the first two volumes: Rules and Order and The Mirage of 
Social Justice. It is primarily here that Hayek's thoughts 
on social justice are to be found. The third volume, The 
Political Order of a Free People, is essentially a utopian 
reconstruction of the democratic representative form of 
government. Whereas Hayek's serious analysis is to 
be found in the first two volumes, his speculative dream- 
ing is found in the third. Thus, the third volume added 
very little to the arguments with which I was concerned, 
aside from a change in terminology. For that reason I 
have largely ignored it herein. 
As far as the specific topic of this disserta- 
tion, Hayek's thoughts on social justice, those can be 
epitomized quite succinctly. Hayek's attitude towards 
the concept of social justice can fairly be described 
as disparaging at the very. best. He decries it as a 
meaningless par! 8,, cea, meaning all things to all men -- 
hence "the mirage of social justice". More importantly, 
he maintains that the pursuit of social justice is 
incompatible with and inimicable to the social order 
which he both describes and prescribes. This social or- 
der is, in turn, necessary for both the protection and 
fostering of individual liberty. And it is for that 
reason that Hayek vigorously castigates contemporary 
society for its obsession with and pursuit of social 
justice. 
I was initially drawn to embark on this study 
of Hayek because I felt a definite sympathy with his 
critique of social justice. Respect for individual 
liberty is perhaps the paramount value in my pantheon 
of values. And I was and am deeply disturbed by the 
threat to liberty posed by the ever expanding reach 
of central government necessitated by the growth of the 
welfare state. Hayek's critique of social justice 
appealed to me as a cogent. and pursuasive argument 
against this trend. I set out, therefore, to make a 
2 
detailed, albeit sympathetic, analysis of Hayek's 
critique. However, as I came to close grips with 
Hayek's argument I soon learned that it was far less 
convincing than it had appeared to me at first. Hence 
I found myself approaching Hayek more as a skeptic who 
wanted to believe than as an outright partisan. 
Equally importantly I discovered as I began 
to work with Hayek that the scope of my task was very 
quickly and very significantly expanding. I discovered 
that Hayek's social philosophy was a seamless web to end 
all seamless webs. The various elements of his social 
order proved to be so inextricably interconnected that 
it was impossible to consider one without at the same time 
considering each of the others. Thus, where I started 
out to consider Hayek's position on social justice, I 
soon found that I could not do this without at the same 
time considering his social philosophy in general. 
It is for that reason that the first part 
of this dissertqtion (Chapters Two through Six)' is 
a comprehensive'analysis of the basic components of 
Hayek's social system. Those components are critical 
rationalism and spontaneous order, rules of just conduct, 
law, justice, and finally the express critique of social 
justice itself. A separate chapter is devoted to each 
of these topics. The purpose of these chapters is 
primarily exegetical. Although occasionally some 
element of criticism is required to complete the exegesis, 
my intent throughout the first part is to explicate what 
Hayek says rather than to criticize the same. 
I must stress, however, that this explication 
involves considerably more than a mere paraphrasing of 
Hayek's thoughts. It also involves a substantial amount 
of rational reconstruction. While Hayek's arguments 
read well, they are quite often far from coherent when 
one tries to come to grips with the ipsissima verba. 
This is essentially for two reasons. The first is 
that the very fluency of Hayek's style obscures the 
f act that certain seemingly key concepts are of ten used 
with a variety of meanings which Hayek himself does not 
expressly tie together. As we shall see in Chapter Four 
3 
this is especially the case with justice, but it is also 
true with other concepts as well. The second reason 
is that there is a certain amount of circularity in 
Hayek's arguments: e. g. concept X cannot be understood 
without concept Y, which cannot be understood without 
concept Z, which in turn cannot be understood without 
concept X. As a result of both of these factors the 
pieces nedessary for Hayek's social system are generally 
present, but they are frequently not set forth in any 
coherent order. Hence, in order to understand the 
various components of Hayek's social philosophy it 
is not enough*-. simply to look at what he says. It is 
also necessary to meld his thoughts into a coherent and 
cohesive whole. And this I. have tried to do in the 
exegetical part of this-dissertation. 
in the second part of the dissertation (Chapters 
SdveA. through Eleven) I turntexpressly to criticism. And 
it is here that I return more precisely to my specific 
aim in writing this dissertation. The analysis here is 
focused solely on Hayek's critique of social. justice. 
This is not to say that there is no furt1jer considera- 
tion -of -the other, -components -. -of -his., social--r sys tem, 
for 
there is. However, any such consideratipn occurs only 
to the extent that it is relevant to the critique of 
social justice'. Hence, issues relating to those other 
components, which might seem to warrant consideration 
in*and of themselves, will not be dealt with herein. 
The essential concern of this dissertation remains at 
all times Hayek's critique of social justice. 
As far as the nature of my analysis, that is 
determined by the form of Hayek's critique. Although 
Hayek inveighs against the concept of social justice, 
he does not specifically confront the sorts of theories 3 
offered in support thereof by men such as John Rawls., 
Instead he propounds what might be called a counter- 
theory of social justice. He puts forward a social 
philosophy containing an involved and detailed theory 
of justice, and he maintains that consideration of 
4 
those concerns which others term a matter of social 
justice is precluded ab initio by his social philo- 
sophy. Thus, Hayek's critique of social justice does 
not tread the ground normally covered by theorists of 
social justice, but is rather very much sui generis_. 
For this reason, it seems to me that the 
most effective way to come at Hayek's critique is from 
within his system. That is to say, I do not consider 
the sort of arguments raised by theorists who advo- 
cate the pursuit of social justice. Nor do I attack 
the most basic foundations of Hayek's system. Instead, 
my approach is to focus on the aspect of internal con- 
sistence and coherence. What I attempt to do is deter- 
mine whether the counter-theory which Hayek has pro- 
pounded is able to stand on its own feet, or whether 
internal difficulties suggest that the theory may 
be unviable. Should that counter-theory prove unviable, 
then Hayek will have failed in his attempt to preclude 
ab initio any Eqnsideration of social justid. e. If, 
on the other hand, the counter-theory proves viable, 
then Hayek will have presented a major challenge to 
those who advocate the pursuit of social justice. 
5 
CHAPTER TWO 
CRITICAL RATIONALISM AND THE SPONTANEOUS ORDER 
It would be no exaggeration to say 
that social theory begins with -- 
and has an object only because of -- 
the discovery that there exist orderly 
structures which are the product of 
the action of many men but are not the 
results of human design. 1 
a 
As was noted in the Introduction to this 
dissertation, Hayek's critique of social justice is made 
within the context of his overall social philosophy. 
Viewed in the broadest light possible the task which 
Hayek has set himself in Law, Legislation and Liberty 
is to elucidate the basic principles of what he calls 
"the liberal social order". And the critique of social 
justice is, in a sense, one aspect, albeit a negative 
one, of this social order. Thus, until we have at 
least some familiarity with the various components of 
Hayek's social order we cannot hope to understand his 
critique of social justice. 
In this chapter and the next three I will 
undertake an examination of the most essential com- 
ponents of Hayek's social system. This examination 
will, of course, be less than comprehensive, inasmuch 
6 
as each of the components to be considered could by 
itself justify a full-length study. Given that 
limitation, the best that I can strive for in this 
study is a very thorough sketch of the relevant com- 
ponents. I will attempt to set forth in a rational and 
comprehensible order all of the basic points touched 
upon by Hayek. But for the most part I will not concern 
myself with answering any questions which might be 
raised by those points, except as those questions relate 
to the critique of social justice. 
In this chapter my focus will be upon what 
might be called the basic structure or skeleton of 
Hayek's social order. In the next three chapters I 
will consider the components which constitute the sub- 
stance of that order. 
13Htical Rationalism 
Before turning specifically to the structure 
of Hayek's social order we must first consider an aspect 
of his epistemology which is quite significant. This 
is the distinction between critical and constructive 
rationalism. The significance of this distinction 
lies in the fac .t that it is Hayek's espousal of critical 
rationalism which very much informs his views on the 
social order. 
2 
What Hayek dubs Vconstructive rationalism" 
is in effect the rationalism of the Enlightenment, the 
rationalism which has its genesis in the thought of 
Rene Descartes. 3 It is a belief in the primacy of the 
human intellect. To the constructivists there are 
virtually no limits to what the human mind can achieve, 
if only it concentrates its energies. The key to this 
form of rationalism lies in the use of deductive 
reasoning. Truth can only be reached by deductively 
7 
reasoning from incontestable first principles. 
Since for Descartes reason was 
defined as logical deduction from 
explicit premises, rational action 
also came to mean only such action 
as was determined entirýly by known 
and demonstrable truth. 
And this was a notion of reason which was notably dif- 
ferent from that which had preceded it. 
'Reason', which had included the capa- 
city of the mind to distinguish between 
good and evil, that is between what was 
and what was not in accordance with es- 
tablished rules, [Footnote omitted] came 
to'mean a capacity to construct such 5 rules by deduction from explicit premises. 
Concomittant with this view of reason is the 
idea which has been designated as Cartesian dualism. 
The essence of this idea, also dubbed "the ghost in 
the machine", is that the mind in some way exists inde- 
pendently of the world which the body inhabits, and that 
the mind is abl& in some way to structure the world to 
accord with its reasoning. 
The errors of constructivist'rational- 
ism are closely connected with Car- 
tesian dualism, that is with the concep- 
tion of an independently existing mind 
-substance which stands outside the 
cosmos of nature and which enabled man, 
endowed with such a mind from the begin- 
ning, to design the institutions of 6 
society and culture among which he lives. 
As the foregging passage indicates, the effects 
of critical rationalism are especially in the realm of 
social theory. To the constructivists there are only 
two possible ways in which to view society and its 
institutions. They are either natural or they are 
artificial. Such institutions can be deemed natural 
only if they exist altogether independently of any 
human action and design. 
7 This, of course, is the 
notion of natural which is thought to be the essence of 
traditional Natural Law theory. By contrast, social 
institutions are deemed artifical if they are the outcome 
of human action and/or design. 
8 Given this dichotomy, 
8 
which is considered to exhaust the field of reference, 
the constructivists deem it beyond dispute that social 
institutions must be artificial. 
[Constructivism] produced a renewed 
propensity. to ascribe the origin 'of all 
institutions of culture to-, invention 
or design. Morals, religion and law, 
language and writing, money and the 
market, were thought of as having been 
deliberately constructed by somebody, 
or at least as owing whatever per- 9 fection they possessed to such design. 
From this two conclusions follow. The first is 
that social institutions are justified only to the 
extent that they can be shown to be effective means 
towards the production of desired ends. 
CA] 11 institutions which benefit 
humanity have in the past and 
ought in the future to be invented 
in clear awareness of the. desirable 
effects that they produce; ... they 
are to be approved and respected 
only to the extent that we can 
show that the particular effects 
they will produce in any given 
situation are preferable to the 
effects another arrangement would 
produce, '..., _-. 
The second is that we should-now deliberately design, 
or redesign if necessary, our social institutions to 
insure that they are the most effective means possible 
for the pursuit of the desired ends. Thus, according 
to Hayek, the constructivists argue "that we should so 
re-design society and its institutions that all our 
actions will be wholly guided by known purposes. "" 
or, as Voltaire put it: "±f you want good laws, burn 
those you have and make new ones. [Footnote omitted] 
Of course, it goes almost without saying that, 
given this emphasis on the deliberate designing of social 
institutions, the constructivists look disparagingly 
upon tradition. Since deductive reasoning is the touch- 
stone of truth, and since as to social institutions the 
sine qua non is conduciveness . to a determinate end, 
9 
the mere fact of the long-standing existence of a 
particular institution carries very little weight. 
Either an institution is conducive to a determinate 
end or it is not; that it has existed for a long time is 
essentially irrelevant to assessing its merit. 
It is to this philosophical con- 
ception that we owe the preference 
which prevails to the present day 
for everything that is done 'con- 
sciously' or 'deliberately' 
Because of this the earlier presump- 
tion in favour of traditional or 
established institutions and usages 
became a presumption against them, 
and 'opinion' came to be thought of 
as Imerel opinion -- something not demonstrable or decidable by reason 
and therefore not to be accepted 
as a valid ground for decision. 13 
The final point to note about the proponents 
of constructive rationalism is that they have a very 
decided aversion, to the use of abstraction. Their con- 
cern is always w ith particulars: Particular means to 
particular ends. Hence, they look down upon attempts 
to deal with problems on a general level by the use of 
abstract rules. 
It is the over-estimation of the 
powers of : peason which leads to the 
revolt against the submission to ab- 
stract rules. Constructivist rational- 
ism. rejects the demand for this dis- 
cipline or reason because it deceives 
itself that reason can directly master 
all the particulars; and it is thereby 
led to a preference for the concrete 
over the abstract, the particular over 
the general, because its adherents do 
not realize how much they thereby limit 
the span of true control by reason. 14 
Hayek, as should be quite apparent from the 
various passages I have cited, is very much at odds with 
this view of rationalism. Instead, he allies himself 
with those such as David Hume who are often designated 
as anti-rationalists. However, Hayek balks at ceding 
the term 'rationalist' to the constructivists. He 
himself does not reject the use of reason, as the term 
10 
anti-rationalist might suggest. Rather, he believes 
that reason is of value, but that it is subject to very 
determinate limits. For that raason he designates his 
own position as "critical rationalism". 
15 
Hayek sees critical rationalism as beginning 
with Bernard Mandeville and really taking root in the 
Scottish Enlightenment. 16 It is with this latter group 
of thinkers that Hayek is in especial accord on most 
of his social philosophy: Adam. Smith, Adam Ferguson, and 
most especially David Hume can quite legitimately be con- 
sidered Hayek's intellectual forbears. 
Whereas constructive rationalism stresses the 
power of the human mind, critical rationalism places 
its greatest emphasis on the inevitability of human ig- 
norance. While constructivists tend to gloss over the 
fact that we are not and can never be in possession of 
all the facts which are a part of their deductive chain, 
critical rationalists consider ignorance the point from 
which all reas; ning must begin. 
There exists therefore a great 
temptation, as a first approxima- 
tion, to begin with the assumption 
that we know everything needed for 
full explanation or control. This 
provisional assumption is often 
treated as something of little con- 
sequence which can later be dropped 
without much effect on the conclu- 
sions. Yet this necessary ignorance 
of most of the particulars which 
enter the order of a Great Society 
is the source of the central problem 
of all social order and the false 
assumption by which it is provi- 
sionally put aside is mostly never 
explicitly abandoned but merely con- 
veniently forgotten. The argument 
then proceeds al if that ignorance 
did not matter. 7 
The tendency to gloss over the ever-presence 
of ignorance may arise from a failure to adequately 
consider the types of knowledge with which we must 
deal. There is, of course, general knowledge which 
can be expressed in rules and theorems, and trends, and 
11 
the like. In this realm there is, admittedly, con- 
stant advancement; although even here we can never 
hope to 'master' the field. But even more importantly 
there is the knowledge that deals with particulars. 
In the first instance, the incur- 
able ignorance of everyone of whom 
I am speaking is the ignorance 
of particular facts which are or 
will become known to somebody and 
thereby affect the whole structure 
of society. This structure of 
human activities constantly adapts 
itself, and functions through adapt- 
ing itself, to millions of facts 
which in their enqrety are not 
known to anybody. lu 
Given the vast multiplicity of such particular facts, 
it is laughably naive to presume that there could ever 
be a single source which would be in possession of all 
of these facts. Such a possibility is no possibility 
at all. 
The characteristic error of the 
constrUctivist rationalists in this 
respect is that they tend to base 
their argument on what has been 
called the synoptic delusion, that 
is, on the fiction that all-the 
relevant facts are known to some 
one mind ... . They seem completely 
unaware that this dream simply as- 
sumes away the central problem 
which any effort towards the under- 
standing or shaping of the order of 
society raises: our incapacity 
to assemble as a surveyable whole 
all the data which enter into the 
social order. 19 
Now some might argue that the steady growth 
of scientific knowledge must minimize the sway of 
ignorance. But science is no real help. It too deals 
with knowledge at a general level. And any advances 
made therein will in no way diminish the multiplicity 
of facts with which individuals come to grips in 
their daily lives. 
The limitation of knowledge with 
which we are concerned is there- 
fore not a limitation which science 
12 
can overcome. 'Contrary to a widely 
. 
held belief, science consists not 
of the knowledge of particular 
facts; and in the case of very com- 
plex phenomena the powers of science 
are also limited by the practical 
impossibility of ascertaining all 
the particular facts which we would 
have to know if its theories were 
to give us the pM er of predicting 
specific events. 
And, Hayek goes on to add: 
[N]either science nor any known 
technique [Footnote omitted) 
enables us to overcome the fact 
that no mind, and therefore also 
no deliberately directed action, 
can take account of all the par- 
ticular facts which are known to 
some men but not as a 'wbole to 
any particular person. 
ZT 
In short, for the critical rationalists ignorance is a 
factor which, try as we might, we cannot hope to avoid. 
And so, rather than ignoring it, we must ins tead learn to 
take it into account in our reasoning processes. 
Given the stress on the inevitability of 
ignorance it should come as no 'surprise that the way in 
i which i c=itica: 1.: rational: Lsm'. approaý_hes - social -theory- 
is 
quite different from the way in which constructive ra- 
tionalism approaches it. At the very outset the critical 
rationalists reject the idea that the mind in some way 
stands outwith society and culture. Insi--ead they see 
the human mind as inter-acting with social institutions, 
as something which both affects 
*and is affected by these 
institutions. 
The fact is, of course, that this mind 
is an adaptation to'the natural and 
social surroundings in which man 
lives and that it has developed 
in constant. interaction with the 
institutions which determine the 
structure of society. Mind is as 
much the product of the social 
environment in which it has grown up 
and which it has not made as something 
that has in turn acted upon and altered 
these institutions. 22 
13 
Critical rationalism also differs from con- 
structive rationalism in its view of what might be 
called the 'function' of society. The constructivists, 
as we have seen, believe that society must be judged 
in terms of its efficiency in achieving pre-determined 
ends. The critical rationalists, on the other hand, 
do not think society should be viewed as an instrument- 
ality to some determinate end. Instead they think of 
it as a never-ending process by which men are able to 
utilize the vast stores of knowledge possessed by their 
fellows but of which they themselves are ignorant. 
[Clivilization rests on the fact 
that we all benefit from knowledge 
which we do not possess. And one of 
the ways inýýHfch civilization helps us 
to overcome that limitation on the 
extent of individual knowledge is by 
conquering ignorance, not by the acqui- 
sition of more knowledge, but by the 
utilization of knowledge which is and 
remains widely dispersed among 
indivýduals. 2-3 
While it is difficult to single out any one 
aspect of the position of the critical rationalists as 
the most significant, were one to do so it would have to 
be their response to the constructivists' natural- 
artificial dichotomy. The constructivists saw this 
distinction as turning on whether the social institution 
existed independently of human action. and design. And 
under this distinction social institutions were patently 
artificial. But-the critical rationalists turned this 
dichotomy into a tri-partite division. To them the 
alternatives were existence 1) wholly independent of 
human action, 2) dependent upon human action and human 
design, and 3) dependent upon human action but not upon 
design. 24 They saw social institutions as falling pri- 
marily into this third category, being neither natural 
nor artificial, but rather evolutionary. And it is 
this notion of evolutionary development which explains 
how complex social institutions could ever have arisen, 
given the limitations which unavoidable ignorance sets 
14 
to our reasoning processes. And of course, it also 
justifies the value of tradition, for the traditional 
institutions are in fact those which have evolved over 
the ages. 
The final way in which the critical rational- 
ists differ from the constructivists is in the importance 
they attach to abstraction. We have already seen that 
the constructivists reject the use of abstraction and 
favor instead dealing with particulars. By contrast 
the critical rationalists willingly utilize abstrac- 
tions, recognizing them as a means for working around 
our unavoidable ignorance as to particulars. 
Abstractness will here be regarded, 
therefore, ... (as] an adaptation to [man's] ignorance of most of 
the particular facts of his sur- 
roundings. ... We never act, and 
could never act, in full considera- 
tion of all the facts of a parti- 
cular situation, but always by 
singling out as rel ant only some 
aspects of it ... . 
2Y 
Thus, rather tli4n. being a hindrance to the reasoning 
process, abstractions are in fact an essential element 
thereof. They are "the indispensable means of the mind 
which enable it to deal with a reality it cannot fully 
comprehend. , 
26 The value of the abstract is something 
to which we will recur in the next chapter. 
To sum up, Hayek considers himself to be a 
critical rationalist. As such he maintains that, while 
reason should not be undervalued, neither must it be 
overvalued. 
True rational insight into the 
role of conscious reason seems 
indeed to indicate that one of the 
most important uses is the recog- 
nition of the pro27r limits of 
rational control. 
And the proper limits of reason are what I have 
attempted to sketch in this section. 
15 
B. The Spontaneous Order 
The nature of Hayek's social order is directly 
dependent upon his critical rationalism. Given the 
limits of rational thought, Hayek maintains that it is 
naive to assume that society is a deliberate develop- 
ment. The complexities of even the simplest society 
are far too involved to be the result of any deli- 
berate planning. The powers of reason are simply not 
that great. No, the only way in which to explain the 
existence of societies is, as we have already noted, 
by use of the notion of evolutionary development. 
Society is, in the words of Adam Ferguson, "the result 
of human action but'not of human design" . 
28 It is, 
in short, a spontaneous order. 
(It should be noted in. passing that "spon- 
taneous order"-is for Hayek a very general concept 
which can be applicable to a variety of situations in 
both the social and natural world. However, Hayek's 
primary concern, and my sole concern, is with that type 
of overall social order which can be designated as a 
spontaneous order. Accordingly, all discussion of 
spontaneous orders in this dissertation should be 
understood to pertain to that context. ) 
The evolution of social institutions and 
society in general is for Hayek the result of an un- 
witting process of trial and error, with survival as 
the touchstone of success. 
29 The process was un- 
witting in that the initiator of a course of action 
seldom intended, or even foresaw, the ultimate outcome 
of his actions. Rather, his aim was probably narrower 
than, if not altogether different from, the ultimate 
result. However, to the extent his innovation was 
conducive to the survival of the group of which he was 
a member or at the very least not adverse to such 
survival the innovation itself survived and became 
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an established practice or institution. As an estab- 
lished practice or institution it became a part of 
the context within which subsequent innovation would 
occur. And each subsequent innovation which survived 
became in turn a part of the established order. Thus, 
the process continued -- and still continues -- produc- 
ing results far removed from anything intended by the 
individual innovators, and, of course, in the process 
producing a social order. 
The spontaneous order resulting from this 
evolutionary process is designated by Hayek as a 
COSMOS. 
30 This cosmos results from the unintended and 
unforeseen results of unknown people rea6ting to un- 
known or unforeseen circumstances. No one intends to 
establish a cosmos. Rather, each individual is intent 
upon pursuing his own interests. However, in the 
process of many, many such individuals each pursuing his 
own interests, _a spontaneous order 
does in fact arise. 
And it is thus'ýhat Hayek can speak of society being 
the result of human action but not of human design. 
This spontaneous order functions through a 
system of abstract rules, or if you prefer, patterns of 
behavior. These rules determine what sort of behavior is 
appropriate in what sort of situations. Such rules not 
only allow individuals an optimal opportunity to pursue 
their own interests, but they also allow different indi- 
viduals an opportunity to pursue their different interests, 
while at the same time providing a means to utilize know- 
ledge possessed by others. The function of these rules 
is so important that it is worth quoting Hayek at length. 
(Iln a social order the parti- 
cular circumstances to which each 
individual will react will be 
those known to him. But the indi- 
vidual responses to particular 
circumstances will result in an 
overall order only if the indivi- 
duals obey such rules as will 
produce an order. Even a very 
limited similarity in their be- 
haviour may be sufficient if the 
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rules which they all obey are 
such as to produce an order. 
Such an order will always consti- 
tute an adaptation to the multi- 
tude of circumstances which are 
known to all the members of that 
society taken together but which 
are not knon as a whole to any 
one person. 
Thus, the spontaneous order can not only be said to 
function through the use of abstract rules, it can 
also be said in effect to be constituted by such rules. 
And these rules are the rules of just conduct, to which 
the next chapter is devoted. 
Before we go any further it is important to 
note here an ambiguity in the term"spontaneous order" 
The primary meaning of this term is that the cosmos 
has originated spontaneously, through the process of 
experimentation which we have already discussed. In 
this. sense it fs, from a backward looking point of view 
that the order is considered spontaneous. However, 
the order is also spontaneous in that it functions 
spontaneously; that is, it allows opportunity for con- 
tinued experimentation and hence evolutionary or spon- 
taneous development. In this sense it is from a 
forward looking point of view that the order is 
considered spontaneous. The importance of this two- 
fold meaning of spontaneous is that it is possible for 
an order which functions spontaneously to be deliber- 
ately refined and developed. 
At the moment our concern must be 
to make clear that while the rules 
on which a spontaneous order rests, 
may also be of spontaneous origin, 
this need not always be the case. 
Although undoubtedly an order ori- 
ginally formed itself spontaneously 
because the individuals followed 
rules which had not been deliber- 
ately made , 
but had arisen sponta- 
neously, people gradually learned 
to improve those rules; and it is 
at least conceivable that the 
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formation of a spontaneous order 
relies entirely on 3yules that were deliberately made. 
The significance of this possibility will become ap- 
parent in the next chapter when we discuss the develop- 
ment of the rules of just conduct. 
Now, the cosmos or spontaneous order stands 
in very sharp contrast to another type of order. - This 
other type of order is what Hayek designates as a 
taxis. - A taxis is an order which is very deliberately 
constructed. It occurs not through any spontaneous 
development, -but rather because someone intends to bring 
it about. 
33 A corporation would be a very good example 
of a taxis. Aside from its origin there are two other 
very basic ways-in which a taxis differs from a cosmos. 
. The first is that it is maintained by means 
of what. Hayek calls rules of organization. These are 
rules which aim at the performance of specific tasks by 
specific'individuals. 
34 And these rules are quite 
different from the rules of just conduct through which 
a spontaneous-order functions. . -Inasmuch as-the iiext 
chapter deals specifically with rules of just conduct, 
and also. considers the contrast with rules bf organiza- 
tion, I will say no more about this topic here 
The other way in which a taxis differs from a 
cosmos pertains to the question of purpose. In that a 
taxis is deliberately constructed, it is constructed with 
a particular purpose in mind. 
35 It is to achieve this 
particular purpose, whatever it may be, that a taxis is 
established in the, first place. By contrast, the cosmos 
has no particular purpose. How could it, since it is 
not a deliberate construction? Rather than having a 
particular purpose, the cosmos is a device whereby it 
has proved possible for individuals to pursue diverse 
purposes in mutual harmony. 
And not having been made it cannot 
legitimately be said to have 
-a particular purpose, althougS our 
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awareness of its existence may 
be extremely important for our 
successful pursuit of a great 
variety of different purposes. 36 
And this is an achievement of no small significance, 
for in addition to the unavoidable fact of ignorance, 
we must also face up to the fact that individuals 
have different purposes in life. Thus, were social 
organization to be dependent upon congruity of purpose, 
then the size of social groups would be very severely 
limited indeed. It is by permitting a social group 
to coalesce independently of any shared purpose that 
the cosmos allows societies to form which are far 
beyond the scope of the family or tribal group. 
One tremendous advantage which a spontaneous 
order has over a taxis, or deliberately constructed 
order, is that it is able to achieve a vastly greater 
degree of complexity than could be achieved by any 
deliberate devdlbpment. By utilizing abstract rules, 
and by allowing individuals the opportunity to pursue 
their own ends, the spontaneous order is able to deal 
in an orderly fashion with a much greater degree of 
knowledge than can any taxis. 
This means that, though the use of 
spontaneous ordering forces enables 
us to induce the formation of an order 
of such a degree of complexity (namely 
comprising elements of such numbers, 
diversity and variety of conditions) 
as we could never master intellect- 
ually, or deliberately arrange, we 
will have less power over the details 
of such an order than we would 057 one 
which we produce by arrangement. 
Hayek's caveat is important, though not vitiating. What 
it means is that because we are dealing with abstrac- 
tions we must of necessity lose something in the realm 
of particulars. In what it does a taxis will be far 
more precise than a. cosmos, this because its concern is 
particular ends and means. However, because its scope 
will be limited to particulars, that scope will be 
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considerably smaller than that of a cosmos which deals 
in abstractions and generalities. 
38 Thus, while the 
cosmos loses something'in the detail with which it deals, 
it more than makes up for that loss in the breadth of 
its scope. 
To this point our concern has been with the 
spontaneous order at its most general level, to wit 
as a sort of genus. However, in order to fully grasp 
the ways in which Hayek utilizes the spontaneous order 
we must also give some thought to two more particular 
versions of it, versions which might be thought of 
as species. The first of these can be dispensed with 
quite quickly. It is what Hayek calls the Great 
Society, or sometimes the Open Society. 
The Great Society is simply a spontaneous 
order which has expanded in size far beyond that of a 
tribal or closed society. 
39 Contemporary western 
societies such as the U. S. A. and the U. K. constitute 
Great Societie`sý, or would so constitute to the extent 
that they remained spontaneous orders. Because of the 
vast size of a Great Society it has an enormous, 
albeit greatly fragmented, pool of knowledge with which 
to deal. And it is this expanded pool of knowledge 
which "constitutes the distinctive feature of all 
advanced civilizations. ,40 The other distinguishing 
feature of the Great Society is its extension of equal 
respect to all human beings within its physical 
jurisdiction. 
41 Whereas the tribal society considered 
blood the key to membership, the Great Society treats 
membership in the human race as the key. The Great 
Society is, in short, Hayek's utopia. While he 
admits that it is always open to improvement, he yet 
considers it at the pinnacle of human achievements. 
It is only if we accept such a 
universal order as an aim, that is, 
if we want to continue on the path 
which since the ancient Stoics 
and Christianity has been character- 
istic of Western civilization, that 
we can defend this moral system as 
superior to others -- and at the 





The other particular type of spontaneous order 
to which we must devote some attention is what Hayek 
calls the catallaxy. The catallaxy is simply a spon- 
taneous order which takes the form of a market economy. 
From this we can form an English 
term 
, 
catallaxy which we shall use 
to describe the order brought about 
by the mutual adjustment of many 
individual economies in a market. 
A catallaxy is thus the special 
kind of spontaneous order produced 
by the market through people acting 
within the rules of the law of pro- 
perty, tort and contract. 
Now, it is not my intent to engage in any in depth 
analysis of Hayek's economic theory. That is a topic 
unto itself, and, one quite distinct from his critique of 
social justice. Nonetheless, if we are to have even 
a general understanding of Hayek's social system it is 
necessary to at least note the major points he makes 
concerning the catallaxy. 
The first point to be noted is that, while we 
speak of a market economy, the catallaxy is not in fact 
a genuine economy. A true economy aims at some par- 
ticular end, and this a catallaxy, as a spontaneous order, 
does not do. Instead, "it serves the multiplicity of 
separate and incommensurable ends of all its separate 
members. " 
44 In fact, rather than concentrating on any 
single end, the catallaxy is ideally suited for allowing 
different ends to become compatible with each other. 
It is indeed characteristic of such 
acts of exchange that they serve 
different and independent purposes 
of each partner in the transaction, 
and that they thus assist the parties 
as means for different ends. The 
parties are in fact the more likely 
to benefit from exchange the more 
their needs differ. While within 
an organization the several members 
will assist each other to the extent 
that they are made to aim at the 
same purposes, in a catallaxy they 
are induced to contribute to the 
needs of others without ýgring or 
even knowing about them. 
This last point is particularly worth stressing, In 
the catallaxy men further the interests of others by 
pursuing their own ends. 
46 Hence, rather than having 
any one end, the catallaxy might be said to have as 
many ends as there are members of the catallaxy. 
The easiest way to understand the way in which 
the catallaxy functions is to think of it 'as a wealth 
producing game. 
47 The game is. played through a combina- 
tion of skill and luck. And the role of the latter in 
particular must not be under-estimated. "The element 
of luck is as inseparable f, rom the operation of the 
market as the element of skill. "48 The significance 
of the element7o. f luck is that it explains why disap- 
pointments are i. nevitable in the catallaxy. 
49 No 
matter how well someone plays the game, his skill can 
always be offset by bad luck. 
What the catallaxy attempts to achieve is 
to apportion the limited resources of a society in the 
most efficient way possible. 
50 Given that there is 
no single end in the catallaxy, this task is both 
especially important and especially difficult. 
What it tends to bring about is 
merely a state of affairs in which no 
need is served at the cost of with- 
drawing a greater amount of means 
from the use for other needs than is 
necessary to satisfy it. The market 
is the only known method by which 
this can be achieved without an 
agreement on the relative importance 
of the different ultimate ends, and 
solely on the basis of a principle 
of reciprocity through which the 
opportunities of any person are 




One important and frequently misunderstood aspect of 
the catallaxy is the role of prices. In the task of 
apportioning limited resources prices serve the role of 
a signal as to what ought to be done, rather than the 
role of a reward for what has been done. 
52 A rise or 
fall in prices is an indication of where the limited 
resources of a society should be directed, rather than 
a reward or sanction for the way one has played the 
game. Thus, prices must be seen as forward looking 
rather than. backward looking. 
Just as the catallaxy does not aim at any 
particular end, neither can it be said to produce any 
particular result. What it does produce is a maxi- 
mization of the chances of any particular individual 
having his expectations fulfilled. 
A policy making use of the sponta- 
neously ordering forces therefore 
cannot aim at a known maximum of 
particular results, but must aim 
at increasing, for any person picked 
out at random, the prospects that the 
overall effect of all changes re- 
quired by that order will be to 
increase his chances of attaining 
his ends. 53 
Thus, while the catallaxy can be said to benefit no 
one in particular, it can equally be said to benefit 
everyone in general. 
The final point to be noted about the 
catallaxy is one which is of especial importance for 
the critique of social justice. In the catallaxy 
there is no deliberate distribution of wealth. 
Though income and wealth are produced by the catallaxy, 
they are not subject to any specific distribution. 
Rather, they are apportioned in accord with the results 
of the catallaxy game. 
There is no need morally to justify 
specific distributions (of income 
or wealth) which have not been 
brought about deliberately but 
are the outcome of a game that is 
played because it improves the 
chances of all. In such a game 
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nobody 'treats' people differently 
and it is entirely consistent with 
respecting all people equally that 
the outcome of the game for dif- 
ferent 
* 
people is very different. 54 
As we shall see in a later chapter this element of the 
catallaxy is crucial to Hayek's rejection of the demand 
for distributive justice. 
Now, one very brief point remains to be made 
about the spontaneous order in general. And that is 
the. relationship between liberty and the spontaneous 
order. Hayek is a great champion of respect for indi- 
vidual. liberty. The entire first part of The Constitution 
of Liberty 
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is a polemic-on the value of liberty. And, 
while Hayek's championing of liberty is a fact of which 
we must be aware in this work, his actual defense of 
liberty is a separate and distinct topic far beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. For our purposes it is 
here sufficient merely to note the following. First, 
Hayek places great value on respect for liberty. Second, 
the spontaneous order needs a wide scope of liberty in 
order to function. This is because the spontaneous 
order depends on unknown people in unforeseen situa- 
tions being able to act on the basis of the knowledge 
which they possess. Third, liberty in turn needs the 
spontaneous order if it is to flourish. Liberty is 
meaningful only if people know the extent to which they 
are free and are secure in the realm of freedom allotted 
to them. And this, as we shall soon see, is accomplished 
by the rules of just conduct which constitute the spon- 
taneous order. 
The only thing which remains to be done in 
this analysis of the spontaneous order is to draw 
certain conclusions from what we have discussed. And 
those conclusions can be stated very succinctly. 
Beware of tinkering with the spontaneous order. According 
to Hayek deliberate tinkering with the spontaneous order 
should be undertaken only rarely and only with extreme 
caution. The problems presented by interference with 
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the spontaneous order are twofold. First, because 
society has gradually evolved in a piecemeal and un- 
directed fashion, it may often be the case that the 
raison d'etre of existing institutions has long since 
been lost to living memory. But this does not necesý 
sarily mean that the institution no longer serves an 
important function. Hence, any change may threaten an 
institution which serves a critical function in society. 
The second source of problems presented by deliberate 
interference with the spontaneous order is tied in to 
Hayek's espousal of critical rationalism. Given the 
limits of human knowledge envisioned by critical rational- 
ism, it is impossible to foresee all of the ramifica- 
tions of any proposed change in the spontaneous order. 
Hence, any grandiose attempts to improve the spontaneous 
order may very well have adverse consequences in the 
long run. Thus, Hayek is of the opinion that, in light. 
of these two problem areas, any interference with the spon- 
taneous order should be undertaken only after careful 
consideration anS only with great caution, and should, 
moreover, be quite limited in scope. 
And with that we have touched upon all of 
the major aspects of the spontaneous order. It must 
be emphasized that the discussion has of necessity been 
quite superficial. The idea of the spontaneous order is 
very involved and it could not possibly be comprehensively 
analyzed in a single chapter. And yet a single chapter 
is all that I can afford in this work. What I have tried 
to do, therefore, is to present a sufficiently accurate 
picture of the spontaneous order to allow us to consider 
the other aspects of Hayek's social system. And with 
the next chapter we shall begin our examination of the 
first of those aspects. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RnES OF JUST CONDUCT 
We have chosen the term 'rules of 
just conduct' to describe those end- 
independent rules which serve the 
formation of a spontaneous order 
If the spontaneous order can be said to 
constitute the basic structure of Hayek's social 
system, the rul7es of just conduct can be considered 
the building blocks from which the body of that system 
is constructed. Until we have come to understand the 
idea of rules of just conduct, we can have no hope 
of understanding Hayek on Law and Justice. Yet sur- 
prisingly, given the fundamental position of rules of 
just conduct in his social system, Hayek provides no com- 
prehensive statement on the meaning of this concept. He 
apparently relies instead on our being able to garner 
the essence of this concept from the varied and mul- 
tiple uses he makes of it in his argument. But that 
is no easy task. For that reason I have in this chapter 
attempted to bring together all of the disparate ele- 
ments which comprise rules of just conduct so as to 
produce a comprehensive and coherent picture of that 
concept. 
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The Basic Nature and Function of the Rules. 
When Hayek speaks of rules he means "simply a 
propensity to act or not act in a certain manner, which 
will manifest itself in what we call a practice or 
custom. ,2 The rules of just conduct are those propen- 
sities to action/inaction which serve as the cement 
which joins individuals into a society. Thus, 
The cultural heritage into which 
man is born consists of a complex 
of practices or rules of conduct 
which have prevailed because they 
have made a group of men success- 
ful but which were not adopted 
because it was known that thgy would 
bring about desired effects. 
In addition t07the fact that such rules are not adopted 
with any particular purpose in mind, another basic 
characteristic is that initially, at least, they are 
manifested solely in patterns of behavior and not in 
any verbal formulation. 
4 That is to say, while indivi- 
duals act in accordance with such rules, they do not, 
and perhaps could not, articulate the rules which they 
observe. 
The general form of the rules of just conduct 
can be best understood by comparing them to two quite 
different concepts: commands (specific directives) 
and rules of organization. The difference between the 
rules of just conduct and commands can be readily 
grasped and obviously turns on the very idea of a 'rule'. 
Rules of just conduct establish an abstract pattern of 
behavior. They provide that in a certain type of situa- 
tion a certain type of behavior is required or pro- 
hibited. By contrast, commands deal with very specific 
situations. A command requires that in this particular 
situation this particular behavior is required or 
prohibited. 
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The difference between rules of just conduct and 
rules of organization turns on the fact that, as we 
have seen in the preceding chapter, the spontaneous 
order has no determinate purpose. It is instead an 
order in which individuals with diverse purposes are 
able to co-exist. As the building blocks of such an 
order the rules of just conduct are , 
ipso facto purpose- 
independent. As noted above, they "were not adopted 
because it was known that they would bring about desired 
effects. " 
5 And since they have no determinate purpose, 
these rules must deal with general situations in a general 
way - 
[Rules of just conduct] must be 
independent of purpose and be the 
same ... at least for whole classes 
of members not individually de- 
signated by name. They must ... be rules applicable to an unknown 
and undeterminable num er of 
persons and instances. 
t 
Rules of organi: zation, on the other hand, are tied to a 
particular organization (such as government), and they 
exist to carry out the specific purposes of that 
organization. 
In an organization there must be 
rules for the performance of assigned 
tasks. The rules will thus regulate 
merely the detail of the action of 
appointed functionaries or agencies 
of government... Rules of organiza- 
tion are thus necessarily subsi- 
diary to commands, filling in the 
gaps left by commands. 7 
In stressing the purpose-independent nature 
of the rules of just conduct, however, it is essential to 
understand what Hayek means by purpose. Speaking of' 
law, Hayek refers to "the usual sense of purpose, namely 
the anticipation of a particular, foreseeable event 
it is in this sense that rules of just conduct are purpose- 
independent. But there is also another sense of the word 
"purpose": "the aiming at conditions which will assist 
the formation of an abstract order, the particular con- 
tents of which are unpredictable ... 11 
9 In this latter 
sense of the word, the rules of just conduct are not 
purpose-independent, but rather multi-purpose. 
The rules of conduct which prevail 
in a Great Society are thus not 
designed to produce particular 
foreseen benefits for particular 
people, but are multi-purpose 
instruments developed as adaptations 
to certain kinds of environment 
because the7y -help to deal W3. h 
certain kinds of situations. 
iO 
It is as such multi-purpose instruments that the rules of 
just conduct are ideally suited to serving their function. 
Viewed in the broadest sense possible the func- 
tion of the rules of just conduct is to govern the 
actions of a group or society. Or, to be more accurate, 
their function is to so direct the actions of indivi- 
duals that the individuals come to constitute a group 
or society. To quote again a passage cited above: 
"The cultural heritage into which man is born consists 
of a complex oý, practices or rules of conduct 
Phrasing this idea yet another way, we could say that 
the function of the rules of just conduct is to allow the 
actions of different individuals to form an order. 
Of course, it is not sufficient to speak only 
of "an order". The order produced must be conducive to 
a viable form of social life. 
[Nlot every regularity in the be- 
havior of the elements does secure 
an overall order. Some rules 
governing individual behavior might 
clearly make altogether impossible 
the formation of an overall order. 
Our problem is what kind of rules 
of conduct will produce an order 
of society and what kind of ordy 
particular rules will produce. 1 
To illustrate this point Hayek offers the example of 
a 'society' which had a rule providing that any indivi- 
dual who met another must either attempt to kill the 
other or flee from him. 
13 Such an order would more 
appropriately be called disorder, and it could hardly 
be said to produce a viable society. 
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Society can thus exist only if by 
a process of selection rules have 
evolved which lead individuals to 
behave in a manner which makes 
social life possible. 14 
Hence, the basic function of rules of just conduct is 
to so direct the actions of individuals that a viable 
social order is formed. 
Such rules of just conduct also have another 
essential function. They constitute the only legiti- 
mate restraint allowed on the actions of any individual. 
Even the government in the exercise of its coercive 
powers may restrain the actions of individuals only in 
accord wit *h 
the rules of just conduct. This restric- 
tion on government is central to Hayek's social 
philosophy. 
The thesis of this book is that a 
condition of liberty in which all 
are allowed to use their knowledge 
for fheir purposes, restrained only 
by rules of just conduct of universal 
application, is likely to produce for 
them the best condition of achieving 
their aims; and that such a system 
is likely to be achieved and main- 
tained only if all authority, 
including that of the majority of 
the people, is limited in the exer- 
cise of coercive powers by general 
principles to which the community 
has committed itself. 15 
In this sense the function of the rules of just conduct 
is similar to, if not synonymous with, the function of 
the Rule of Law. 
Of course, having said that the rules of just 
conduct function as the only legitimate restraint on 
individual action, we must also consider how it is that 
they perform this function. Several different issues 
are involved in regard to this point. The first is 
the question of what types of individual action are 
subject to the rules of just conduct. In one sense 
the answer to this question is easy. Hayek tells us -- 
in a passage in which he slides back and forth between 
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rules of just conduct and law --: "only such actions 
of individuals as affect other persons ... will give 
rise to legal rules. . 
16 This seems clear enough. Un- 
fortunately, as Hayek himself goes on to recognize, 
this ostensibly black-white distinction in fact con- 
tains a rather large grey area. Thus, it readily slides 
into the often discussed question of the extent to which 
'private' actions are a matter of public concern. Not- 
withstanding this large grey area, it seems to me that 
the distinction Hayek draws is still useful. While people 
may argue about what constitutes truly 'private' action, 
there does seem to be a consensus that whatever is truly 
'private' is not a matter for public concern. Hence, 
we can know in theory when the rules of just conduct 
should come into play, although in particular cases 
their applicability may be moot. 
Now, given that rules of just conduct are 
meant to'applypnly to those actions of an individual 
which affect others, the next question is specifcally 
how do they apply to such actions. The answer is that 
they are, for the most part, negative in character. 
Only inrare instances -- usually occurring through 
choice or an especial situation in which the individual 
finds himself, e. g. the parent-child relationship -- 
do they prescribe specifically what the individual must 
do. Instead, they generally tell the individual only 
what he cannot do. They are, if you will, proscriptive 
rather than prescriptive. As Hayek says: 
[T]hey normally impose no positive 
duties on any one, unless he has 
incurred such duties by his own 
actions ... . 
17 
The reason for this prescriptive-proscriptive dichotomy 
is tied to the fact that the rules of just conduct are 
purpose-independent, or, if you prefer, multi-purpose 
instruments. Since 
they are not confined to those 
following particular designated 
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purposes, (they] can also never 
fully determine a particular action 
but only limit the range of permit- 
ted kinds of action and leave the 
decision on particular action to 
be taken by e actor in the light 
of his ends. 
iý 
Thus it is that the rules of just conduct do not specify 
the action which must be taken by an individual, but 
instead merely limit his range of choice. 
They do this by defining a protected sphere 
of responsibility within which each individual is 
supreme. This protected sphere is concerned with all 
aspects which affect an individual's freedom of action, 
and not just the possession of material things. 
The chief function of rules of just 
conduct is thus to tell each what 
he can count upon, what material 
objects or services he can use for his purposes, and what is the range 
of actions open to him. 19 
. 
Naturally, not everything a particular individual may 
desire will be included within the protected sphere of 
responsibility. And it is by expanding or possibly 
contracting the protected sphere that social change is 
taken into account. 
The scope of the protected sphere of respon- 
sibility is delineated by identifying certain types of 
action which are or are not acceptable in certain types 
of situation. Because the rules of just conduct func- 
tion on an abstract level (as we shall discuss in more 
detail infra), they are quite limited in what they are 
able to achieve. They can guarantee a certain frame- 
work within which an individual can act. But they 
cannot guarantee how that framework will be filled 
in. 
[RIules of just conduct can enable us 
merely to determine which particular 
things belong to particular persons, 
but not what these things will be 
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worth, or what benefit they will 
confer on those to whom they belong. 
The rules serve to provide informa- 
tion for the decision of individuals, 
and thus help to reduce uncertainty. 
They tell each individual only 
what are the particular things he 
can count on being able to use, but 
not what the results of his use will 
be so far as these depend on the 
exchange of the product of their 
[sic] efforts with others. 20 
Despite this limitation on what the rules of 
just conduct are able to accomplish, their significance 
must not be underestimated. By delineating a protected 
sphere of responsibility the rules of just conduct, in 
effect, serve to define the realm of individual liberty. 
By telling an individual when and where he can act and 
when and where he must refrain from acting, they elimi- 
nate considerable uncertainty and go a long way towards 
preventing confl-ict and facilitating cooperation. 
21 And, 
by delineating a protected sphere of responsibility, 
the rules of just conduct also serve to establish very 
concrete rights and duties for individuals. 
There is a sense of the noun 
'right' in which every rule of just 
individual conduct creates a corres- 
ponding right of individuals. So 
far as rules of conduct delimit 
individual domains, the indivi- 
dual will have a right to his 
domain, and in defense of it will 
have the sympathy and support of 
his fellows. ... Such claims, however, can be 
claims in justice, or rights, only 
in so far as they are directed 
towards a person or organization 
(such as government) which can act, 
and which is bound in its action 
by rules of just conduct ... In such circumstances the rules of just 
conduct will confer on some person 
rights and oq other corresponding 2_2 obligations. 
There still remains much to be said about the 
rules of just conduct. However, at this point we have 
34 
concluded our survey of the basic nature and function 
of those rules. That being the case, a summary seems 
in order. And Hayek himself provides an adequate one. 
The law will consist of purpose- 
independent rules which govern the 
conduct of individuals towards each 
other, are intended to apply to an 
unknown number of further instances, 
and by defining a protected domain 
of each, enable an order of actions 
to form itself wherein the indivi- 
duals can make feasible plans. It is 
usual to refer to these rules as 
abstract rules of conduct ... . 
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B. The Origin of the Rules 
The rules of just conduct are the result 
initially of spontaneous or evolutionary development, 
rather than deliberate development. They did not ori- 
ginate because someone set out to establish a rule. 
Rather, they arose because someone acted in a partic- 
ular manner which, when adopted by the relevant group 
as a pattern of behavior, proved conducive to the sur- 
vival of the group. The pattern in question need not 
have been, and in all likelihood was not, deliberately 
adopted because it was known that it would have bene- 
ficial effects. Instead, it simply happened. that the 
group which adopted the pattern of behavior for whatever 
reason in fact survived. Because the group survived, so 
too did the pattern of behavior. To repeat a passage 
previously cited: 
The cultural heritage into which 
man is born consists of a complex 
of practices or rules of conduct 
which have prevailed because they 
have made a group of men success- 
ful but which were not adopted 
because it was known they wouýd 
bring about desired effects. 2 
35 
In short, the rules of just. conduct were not deliberately 
made, they just happened. Though they are the products 
of human action, they are not the products of human 
design. 
. 
The contention that the -rules of just conduct 
are of spontaneous origin is for Hayek both an empir- 
ical and a theoretical argument. It is empirical in 
that he maintains that both historical study of contem- 
porary 'developed' societies and anthropological study 
of contemporary 'primitive' societies demonstrate that 




25 It is theoretical in that the notion 
of spontaneous development is fully compatible with, 
and actually demanded by, his belief in critical 
rationalism.. 
As was'discussed in the preceding chapter, 
Hayek maintains that the human mind is not omniscient 
and that there are very definite limits to what can be 
accomplished by human knowledge alone. -The vast multi- 
tude-of factors which can be relevant to any particular 
problem is such that no single mind,, nor even any pool- 
i-ng of mi-nds, ' can possibly-9fasp them-all. --- 7or this 
reason it would be naive to contend that the complex 
of rules which govern the actions of individuais in any 
particular society was deliberately constructed. Such 
a contention would assume a degree of foresight far 
greater -than that attainable by the human mind. 
By contrast, the argument that the rules 
of just conduct are of spontaneous origin does not 
rely on any naive notion of omniscience. Instead, it 
relies on'the simple test of time: only those patterns 
of behavior which have proved conducive to the survival 
of the group have persevered. Not only does this 
explanation not conflict with Hayek's critical rational- 
ism, but in fact it demonstrates how, given the stric- 
tures of that epistemology, societies were able to 
develop. 
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Most of the rules of conduct which 
govern our actions, and most of the insti- 
tutions which arise out of this regularity 
are adaptions to the impossibility of 
anyone taking conscious account of all 
the particulartfags which enter into the 
order of socie y. 
One interesting off-shoot of the idea that 
the rules of just conduct originate from spontaneous 
development is the following. As we shall see in detail 
in the next two chapters, the rules of just conduct are 
the basic building blocks for Hayek's theories of Law 
and Justice. Because these rules originate from a 
spontaneous or evolutionary development, Hayek is 
able to set forth a sort of tertium quid in opposition 
to traditional natural law theory and to positivist 
theory. The rules of-his theories of Law and Justice 
are distinct from those of natural law in that they are 
not in any sense claimed to be innate to the nature 
of man or the wo'rld in general. But they also are 
distinct from the rules of legal positivism, for they 
have not been deliberately posited by men; in fact, 
they are prior to any form of positive law. The rules 
of just conduct, are the result of human action -- and 
hence are likely to vary from group to group --, but 
they are not the result of human design. And it is 
this which makes them altogether separate and distinct 
from both natural law and legal positivism. 
Concommitant with the spontaneous origin of 
the rules of just conduct is the fact that in their 
nascent form they are unarticulated. That is to say, 
because no one has deliberately constructed these 
rules, initially there is no verbal formulation of 
them, authoritative or otherwise. Instead, they are 
merely patterns of behavior which the members of a 
group observe; patterns which they have not attempted 
to verbalize, and probably could not verbalize even 
if they wished to. 
37 
[TIhey are observed in action without being known to the acting person in 
articulated ('verbalized'or explicit) form. 27 
That-these rules are initially unarticulated 
is explained by Hayek's theory of how the human mind 
functions. This theory is developed at length in "The 28 
Primacy of the Abstract" . To very briefly summarize 
that argument, Hayek maintains that the mind, rather 
than beginning with the particular and moving by induc- 
tion to the abstract, in fact begins with broad cate- 
gories of actions or situations, and 
* 
it is able to grasp 
partic ulars only by f itting them into one or more of these 
categories. 
Whenever a, type of situation evokes 
in an individual a disposition 
towards a certain p'attern of response, 
that basic relation which-is described 
as 'abstract' is present. 4v 
The rules of just conduct present just such an abstract 
relation. They identify types of situations in which 
the members of a group have a disposition towards 
certain patterns of response. A3ýd it is-this abstract 
nature of the rules of just conduct which is. respons- 
ible for their originally being unarticulated. 
[T]he fact that language is often 
insufficient to express what the mind 
is fully capable of taking into 
account in determining action, 
or that we will often not be able 
to co=unidate in words what 
we well know how to practice has 
been clearly established in many 
fields. [Footnote'omitted] It 
is closely connected with the fact 
that rules that govern action will 
often be much more general and 
abstract than anything language 
can yet express. -: M 
However, while the rules Of i4st conduct are originally 
in an ýinarticulated form, they do not remain forever 
in this form. As the rules develop over time, they 
also pass into articulated form. And it is to this 
topic that the next section of this chapter is devoted. 
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C. The Articulation and Development of the Rules 
- Whereas the genesis of the rules of just con- 
duct is a matter of spontaneous development, their sub- 
sequent articulation and development is not. It is, 
instead, a matter of quite deliberate action. 
Thus, although rules of just conduct 
like the order of actions they make 
possible, will in this first instance 
be the product of spontaneous growth, 
their gradual perfection will re- 
quire the deliberate efforts of 
judges (or others learned in the law) 
who will improve the existing system 
by laying down new rules. 31 
it is this "gradual perfection" of the rules of just 
conduct by judges or "others learned in the law" to 
which we now turn. For @ýase of discussion I will speak 
throughout only of judges and will presuppose a formal 
legal system. But, Hayek's argument is equally applic- 
able to a 'pre-legal' society in which a sage, headman, 
or the like is entrusted with the interpretation of the 
rules of just conduct. 
At the-outset let me-draw attention to an 
important point to which we will recur several times 
herein. Despite the reference in the passage just 
cited to "laying down new rules", the judges do not 
actually create genuinely new rules of just conduct. 
Rather, what they do is articulate and develop the 
existing rules and the existing system of rules. 
This latter point is important and must not be for- 
gotten. When we are concerned with rules of just conduct 
we are concerned not merely with individual rules stand- 
ing in isolation from each other, bAt also with a co- 
herent system of rules. 
The need for judges to perfect the existing 
rules of just conduct is directly related to the fact 
that these rules are initially'absbract and unartic- 
ulated. Because of this these rules are at first merely 
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intuitive feelings that certain conduct is appropriate 
to certain situations. People will normally know how 
to act in accordance with the rules of just conduct 
without consciously knowing what those rules are. When, 
however, unusual or even novel situations arise the in- 
tuitive feelings may prove inadequate to guide conduct. 
And it is here that recourse must be had to judges. 
[Iln more unusual situations the 
intuitive certainty about what 
expectations are legitimate will 
be absent. It will be in [these] 
situations that there will be 
necessity to appeal to men who are 
supposed to know more about the 
established rules if peace is to 
be preserved and quarrels to be 
prevented. 32 
To resolve the problems presented by such 
situations, the judge attempts to articulate the appli- 
cable rules of just conduct. His task is to tell those 
involved 
what ought to have guided their 
expectations, not because. anyone 
had told'them before that tlýis-was 
the applicable rule, but because 
this was the established custom 
which they ought to have known. 33 
Thus, the judge's task is really one of discovery and 
not of creation. To wit, he does not create a rule 
which he personally deems best, or which he deems con- 
ducive to any particular, pre-ordained policy. 
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Rather, he attempts to discover that rule which, once it 
is articulated, will be considered by the parties involved 
to be applicable to and controlling of the matter at 
hand. 
The explicit statement of the 
established practice or custom as 
a verbal rule would aim at ob- 
taining consent about its exis- 
tence and not at making a new 
rule ... . 
35 
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Of course, the very fact that there is need 
to articulate the applicable rule means that it will 
not be easy to discover that rule. Moreover, articula- 
tion will also be complicated by the fact that since 
the applicable rule is abstract, it will not readily 
transmute into verbal form. "The unarticulated rules 
will therefore usually contain both more and less 
than what the verbal formula succeeds in expressing.. 
36 
Naturally enough, error in either direction will even- 
tually necessitate re-articulation of the applicable 
rule in order to bring it into line with the abstract 
patterns of behavior which are observed in fact. 
The rules by which men try to. de- 
fine kinds of actions as just or 
unjust may be correct or incorrect; 
and it is established usage to 
describe as unjust a rule which 
describes as just a kind of action 
which is unjust. But though this 
is a usage that is so general 
that. ýt must be accepted as legi- 
timate, it is not without danger. 
What we really mean when we say, 
e. g., that a rule which we all thought 
to be just proves to be unjust when 
applied to a particular case, is that 
it is a wrong rule which does not 
adequately define what we regard 
as just, or that the verbal formu- 
lation of the rule does not ade- 
quately express the rule which 
guides our judgment. 37 
Another difficulty which the judge faces 
in the process of articulating the applicable rule 
of just conduct is that he may sometimes be con- 
fronted with a genuinely novel situation. When this 
happens, it may very well be that there is no estab- 
lished pattern of behavior; how can there be if the 
situation has never arisen* before. It is in such 
instances that the judge can, in a sense, be said to 
make new rules of just conduct. But it is especially 
in such situations that we must remember that we are 
6oncerned not with isolated rules, but rather with a 
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coherent system of rules. Hence, evenhere the judge 
is not free literally to create whatever rule he will. 
He must instead discover that rule which is compatible 
with the existing system of rules of just conduct. 
This [i. e. the judge's role as 
discoverer rather than creator] 
remains true even where, as is 
undoubtedly often the case, those 
called upon to decide are driven 
to formulate rules on which nobody 
has acted before. They are con- 
cerned not only with a body of rules 
but also with an order of the 
actions resulting from the observance 
of these rules, which men find in 
an ongoing process and the preserva- 
tion of the existing order of actions 
towards which all the recognized 
rules are directed may well be seen 
to require some other rule for the 
decision of disputes for - :, 
which the recognized rules supply 
no answer. In this sense a rule 
not existing in any sense may yet 
appear to be 'implicit' in the body 
of the existing rules, not in the 
sense that it is logically deriv- 
able from them, but in the sense that 
if the other rules are to achieve 
their aim an additional rule is 
requireD8 
To summarize to this point, the subsequent 
articulation and development of the rules of just 
conduct is achieved my means of deliberate action by 
the judiciary. The concern of the judiciary is, 
however, the development of an existing system of 
rules, andnot a de novo creation of new rules. This 
is achieved through the slow process of articulating 
existing -- in the sense of observed -- patterns of 
behavior, and, when necessary, articulating new 
patterns of behavior which will be compatible with the 
system formed by the existing patterns. This process 
of gradual judicial development of the rules of just 
conduct is designated by Hayek as nomos. It should be 
noted that at times Hayek speaks as if nomos designates 
the outcome of this process of judicial development. 
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However, it is more in accord with. his argument to limit 
the term to the process itself. 
in addition to this nomos there is another 
process by which the rules of just conduct can be de- 
veloped. This is the process which Hayek designates as 
thesis. Thesis refers to any "prescription which has 
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been made,. or 'set' or 'posited' by authority" . From 
" contemporary viewpoint it refers to enactments by 
" legislative body. But, while the process of thesis 
can be utilized to develop rules of just conduct, it need 
not always be so utilized. In fact, in most instances 
it is not. Instead its more usual function. is to produce 
either specific directives (1. e. commands) or rules of 
organization. Whether in-any particular instance thesis 
has produced rules of just conduct is basically a. ques- 
tion of fact. It is answered. by determining whether 
what was produced manifests the characteristics of rules 
of just conduct. The relationship between nomos and 
thesis is a topic to which I will return in greater 
detail in the chapter on Law. Acco-. edingly, I-will defer 
until then any further discussion of the. thesis process. 
For our present -purposes . -: Lt. -is - sufficient to- note--that 
while thesis is a possible way of developing the rules 
of just conduct it is not always utilized for this 
purpose. 
Regardless of how the original rules of just 
conduct are subsequently developed, whether through nomos 
or thesis, there are certain restrictions on-this de- 
velopment wýich must always be kept in mind. The first is 
one we have already noted at some length. That 'is, our 
concern Is not with isolated rulýs but rather with a 
coherent system. of -ý2. ules. Hence, in developing and/or 
criticizing any particular rule of just conduct we must 
always move within the scope of-the overall system of 
rules. In developing and/or criticizing any single 
part of that system, we m- ust always accept the remainder 
of that system -as a given . This process is what Hayek 
describes as "immanent criticism". 
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If we are to make full use of all 
the experience which has been trans- 
mitted only in the form of tradi- 
tional rules, all criticism and 
efforts at improvement of particular 
rules must proceed within a framework 
of given values which for the pur-- 
poses in hand must be accepted as 
not requiring justification. We shall 
call 'immanent criticism' this sort 
of criticism that moves within a 
given system of rules and judges 
particular rules in terms of their 
consistency or compatibility with 
all other recognized rules in 
inducing the formation of certain 
kind of order of actions. 4T 
Hayek does not specifically address the question of 
how much of the system can be criticized at'any one 
time. However, given his belief in critical rational- 
ism with its stress on the limited capabilities of the 
human mind, it is probably safe to say that he would 
advocate that criticism be kept within very narrow 
limits. 
The second restriction on the development 
of the rules of just conduct is closely related to the 
concept of immanent criticism. This is the idea that 
any development of the rules of just conduct must rest 
upon a general coincidence of opinion as to what the 
rules are in fact. It will be recalled that in ar- 
ticulating the rules of just conduct the judge's function 
is to tell people what "was the established custom 
which they ought to have known. , 
42 Thus, whether the 
judge has succeeded in articulating the appropriate 
rule will be determined in part by whether the people 
consent to his articulation. He aims "at obtaining 
consent about its existence and not at making a new 
rule ... ." 
43 This consent is a sine qua non for the 
successful development of the rules of just conduct. 
No group is likely to agree on 
articulated rules unless its 
members already hold opinions 
that coincide in some degree. 
Such coincidence of opinion 
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will thus have to precede explicit 
agreement on articýlated rules. of 
just conduct ... .4 
in fact, coincidence of opinion is really just another 
facet of the requirement that the judge's concern be 
always with*existing rules and an existing system of 
rules, and that his function be that of discoverer 
and not of creator. 
D. Factors Affecting the Form of the Rules 
In the first section of this chapter we 
considered in a-very general manner the nature and form 
of the rules of just conduct. Now, in this section and 
the next I wish to consider in much-greater detail the 
form which those rules must take. The next section will 
be specifically devoted to the actual form of the rules 
of just conduct- In this section--I will consider--. at 
length- certain factors: wýich have a very. defini"te' 
effect on the form the rules take. 
The first of the factors with which we are 
here concerned is the inescapable fact of human ignorance. 
Actually, this factor affects. not so much the form of 
the rules of just conduct as it does the very fact 
that we must deal with rules of just conduct. In the 
last chapter we examined the-distinction Hayek draws 
between critical rationalism and-constructive rational- 
ism. it is that distinction with which we are really 
concerned here. Specifically, we are concerned with 
Hayek's contention that human reason is only of the 
critical variety. As we have seen several times 
already, be argues that there are very definite limits 
to the scope of human reason. The factors which can be 
relevant to any particular situation or course of action 
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are far too varied and uncertain to be grasped by any 
single mind, or even by a pooling of minds. Hence, to 
speak and act as if we could ever know all the relevant 
information is naive. We must, instead, realize that 
a large degree of ignorance is an unavoidable aspect of 
all rational activity. And that being so, the fact of 
ignorance cannot help but have a strong influence on 
all of our social institutions and conceptions. 
The fact of our irremediable ignor- 
ance of most of the particular 
facts which determine the processes 
of society is, however, the reason 
why most social institutions have 
taken the form they actually have. 
To talk about a society about which 
either the observer or any of its 
members knows all the particular 
facts is to talk about something 
wholly different from anything 
which has ever existed -- a society in which most of what we find in 
our society would not and could 
not exist and which, if it ever 
occurred, would possess properties, 
we cannot even imagine. 45 
As far as our present concern, human ignorance 
is the raison d'etre for the existence of rules of just 
conduct. 
To judge actions by rules, not 
by particular results ... is the device man has tumbled upon to 
overcome the ignorance of every 
individual of most of the particular 
facts which must determine the con- 
crete order of a Great Society. 46 
The connection between rules and ignorance is as follows. 
We can never know all the facts which are pertinent to 
any one situation, nor can we ever know the relative 
importance of those few facts which we do know. Hence, 
were we to attempt to act solely on the basis of what 
we know at any particular time, our actions would be 
likely to have wholly unexpected if not disastrous 
consequences. 
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However, by relying on the rules of just 
conduct we are able to significantly lessen the likeli- 
hood of such adverse consequences. This is because, 
given their gradual evolution and development, the rules 
of just conduct are able to. take into account factors 
which have proven relevant in the past and are, there- 
fore, likely to prove relevant again, even if their 
relevance is not apparent at the precise moment of 
action. If, mirabile dictu, we were able to comprehend 
all the pertinent facts as well as their relative im- 
portance, then there would be no need for the rules of 
just conduct. The following passage, although it 
speaks in terms of justice, is precisely on point, inas- 
much as Hayek'. s conception of justice is (as we shall 
see) built upon the rules of just conduct. 
[Iln a society of omniscient per- 
sons there would be no room for a 
conception of justice: every action 
would. have to be judged as a means of 
bringihg about known effects, and 
omniscience would presumably include 
knowledge of the relative importance 
of the different effects. Like all 
abstractions, justice is an adaption 
to our ignorance -- to our permanent ignorance of particular facts which 
no scientific advance can wholly 
remove. It is as much because we 
lack the knowledge of a common hier- 
archy of the importance of the par- 
ticular ends of different individuals 
as because we lack knowledge of 
particular facts, that the order of 
the Great Society must be brought 
about by the observance of abstract 
and end-independent rules. 47 
The second factor which affects the form which 
the rules of just conduct take is the scope of what 
Hayek calls the Great or Open Society. When men 
lived in small tribal or clan societies it was quite 
feasible for each individual to know a great many of 
the other individuals in that society very well. In 
such a society an individual could know well the 
needs and desires, merits and demerits, abilities and 
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deficiencies of his fellows. Because an individual 
could reasonably be expected to be familiar with such 
aspects of his neighbors' personalities, the rules 
which evolved in-such a society, could take such aspects 
into account. That is, they could impose duties 
which were integrally related to another's needs, merits, 
abilities, etc. 
However, as societies developed their scope 
expanded greatly.. Because of the vast numbers of 
individuals making up any contemporary Western Society 
and such are the , 
focus of Hayek's concern -- it is no 
longer possible for an individual to know the majority 
or even a significant minority of his fellows inti- 
mately. In fact, an individual will know well, i. e. 
in the sense of a tribal society, only a relatively 
few others. Given this-, it will be necessary for the 
rules of just conduct to be divorced from all of those 
particulars about his fellows which an individual 
cannot reas'onatrly be expected to know. Hence, if an 
individual cannot be expected to know. -the needs, 
merits, abilities, etc. of his fellows, the rules of 
just conduct cannot impose upon him duties which relate 
to such factors. 
If a person's legal duties are 
to be the same towards all, in- 
cluding the stranger and even the 
foreigner (and greater only where 
he has voluntarily entered into 
obligations, or is connected by 
physical ties as between parents 
and children), the legally en- 
forceable duties to neighbor and 
friend must not be more than those 
towards the stranger. That is, all 
those duties which are based on 
personal acquaintance and familiar- 
ity with individual circumstances 
must cease to be enforceable. 48 
In short, as a society develops from a tribal into a 
Great Society, the rules of just conduct "must pro- 
gressively shed their dependence on concrete ends, and 
by passing this test become gradually abstract and 
negative ... - 
'1 49 
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The third and final factor which affects the form of 
the rules of just conduct is Hayek's belief that society 
is a cosmos or spontaneous order. As such it has 
evolved gradually through the actions of many indivi- 
duals, each acting on the basis of his own knowledge'' 
and his own ends. ' Given that the cosmos is an adapta- 
tion to limited human knowledge, and given that limited 
knowledge is a problem which can never be surmounted, - 
it is essential in order for society to continue to 
develop favorably that it continue as a cosmos. And 
this it can do only if unknown individuals retain the 
ability to react as they think appropriate to unfore- 
seen and unforeseeable-circumstances. For this reason 
the rules of just conduct must be such a's to facili- 
tate this spontaneous development of. society. To do 
this they must maximize the scope of individual liberty 
so that an optimal opportunity is provided for'the 
utilization of. -individual knowledge. And this they 
accomplish by detfining and guaranteeing a protected 
sphere of responsibility within which the individual 
is able to act, secure from the interference of others. 
- And with that we are now ready to move on to 
a consideration of the specific form which the rules 
of just conduct must take. 
E. The Form of the Rules 
The purpose of this section is twofold. 
The first is to examine the form which Hayek maintains 
that the rules of just conduct must take. However, 
concomit ant with that purpose is a second one. That 
is to show that, given the restrictions on the form 
which the rules of just conduct must take, the charge 
that Hayek is concerned purely with the form of the 
rules to the exclusion of any concern with substance is 
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unwarranted. As will be seen shortly, there are a 
number of factors which help to circumscribe the form 
of the rules. Hence, while Hayek might, in the opinion 
of some, place undue stress on the need for rules 
per se, it is wrong to say that he gives absolutely no 
concern to the content of those rules. On the contrary, 
the parameters of the rules of just conduct are such 
that the possible content of those rules is indeed to 
some degree limited. 
Let us begin with a point to which we have 
already referred on several occasions. The rules of 
just conduct should be abstract in form. 
We have seen earlier ... how from the process-of gradual extension 
of rules of just conduct to circles 
of. persons who neither share, nor 
are aware of, the same particular 
ends, a type of rule has developed 
which is usually described as 
'abstract'. 50 
But precisely what is meant by "abstract"? Hayek con- 
tinues: "What is meant by the term abstract is expressed 
in a classical juridical formula that states that the 
rule must apply to an unknown number of future instances. 
[Footnote omitted] ,51 The notion of abstract is fur- 
ther elucidated in the footnote to this sentence which 
reads in part as follows: 
In a general way this idea 
has been expressed especially by 
William Paley in his PrEincipples 
10 Phi of Moral and Politicai cilosophy 
(1785, new ed. Londoii-18-24), p. 348: 
'generallaws are made ... without foreseeing whom they might affect' 
and recurs in its modern form in 
C. K. Allen I Law in the Making (6th ed., London, 1958) p. 367: 
'a legal rule, like every kind of 
rule, aims at establishing a general- 
isation for an indefinite n er of 
cases of a certain kind., 5 
What Hayek means by abstract is closely re- 
lated to, if not synonymous with, an idea which we 
50 1 
considered in the first section of this chapter: to 
wit, rules of just conduct 
, 
must be purpose-independent. 
That is, they are not directed to any "particular fore- 
seeable evene, 
53 but instead aim "at conditions which 
will assist the formation of an abstract order, the 
particular contents of which are unpredictable ... . , 
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To assist the formation of such an abstract order, the 
rules must "apply to an unknown number of future 
instances. " 55 
The need for the rules of just conduct to be 
abstract is directly related to Hayek's view of society 
as a. cosmos. Only rules which are abstract in the 
sense just described will allow the continued sponta- 
neous functioning of society.. If the rules did not 
apply to unknown 
, 
future instances, then logically they 
would have to apply to specifically foreseen situa- 
tions. But if that were so, they would be more akin to 
commands and directives than to rules. And, in that 
case they wout4 seriously limit the opportunity for 
unknown individuals toýembark on untried courses of 
action in unforeseen circumstances, thereby signi- 
ficantly interfering with the spontaneous functioning 
of society. In short, the rules of just conduct must 
be abstract if society is to continue to develop 
spontaneously. 
In addition to requiring that they be abstract, 
Hayek also says that the rules of just conduct must be 
general. However, by "general" he appears to intend at 
least three different ideas. In one sense "general" 
seems to be synonymous with the notion of abstract, 
which we have just considered. For example, shortly 
after the last passage referred to above, Hayek says: 
In the terms we have adopted this 
means that the general rules of 
law that a spontaneous order rests 
on aim at an abstract order, the 
particular or concrete content of 
which is not know or foreseen 




In this sense, to require that the* rules Of just conduct 
be general means only that they'apply to an unknown 
number of future instances. 
Another sense 'in which Hayek uses general is 
as a synonym for universal. For instance, in The Mirage 
of Social Justice he has a section in Chapter Seven 
headed "'Generalization' and the test of universaliz-. 
ability". Therein he states: 
In fact, used as a test of the 
app; opriateness of a rule, the 
possibility of its generaliza- 
tion oý: -universalization amounts 
to a test of consistency or com- 
patibility with the rest of the 
accepted system of rules or 
values. 57 1 
This sense of generality we have already discussed in 
connee'tion with-the nomos process. As a synonym for 
universal, general Can also mean simply that the 
rule must be applied to all situations which come within 
its scope. But this notion is inherent in the very idea 
of rule, -and so adds little to our understanding of what 
Hayek requires-for the rules- of Just -conduct. - 
Probably the most important sense in which 
Hayek uses general is that in which-general can be 
distinguished from universal. To call a -rule universal 
is to'do no more than say that it applies to all situa- 
tions which fallwithin its scope. But to call a -rule 
general is to say something about the breadth of its 
scope. Thus, a rule can be universal and yet not 
be very general. Consider, a ruIe-.. which prohibits all 
employment discrimination against blacks would, if 
properly applied, be universal. However, it would not be 
nearly as general as a rule which prohibited employment 
discrimination on the basis of race or-national origin., 
From this example it should be clear that-- 
universality is an absolute criterion -- a rule is 
either universal or it is not, there are no degrees of 
universality. By contrast,. generality is a relative 
criterion -- a rule is more general or less general, but- 
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it is hard to see how it could be simply general. In 
this sense, when Hayek contends that the rules of just 
conduct should be general, he often means that they 
should have a very broad scope, i. e. that they should 
-be more general. 
The evident difficulty with applying this 
criterion is to determine what constitutes more general. 
"When is a rule general in this sense and when is it not? 
There is no clear answer. Certainly if the scope of 
a rule were so narrow as to allow ready identification 
of those individuals affected thereby, Hayek. would say 
that it was not general. But it appears that he would 
also condemn as not general rules which are not defec- 
tive in this sense. For instance-, in The Constitution-. -. 
of Liberty he attacks the policy of progressive taxa- 
tion in part because it is not a general rule. 
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would prefer instead proportional taxation by which 
everyone was taxed at the same rate. This example sug- 
gests that for 
r Hayek*a rule is not'general unless its 
scope encompasses literally everyone. This approach 
seems extreme to say the least, yet it is arguable that 
it is what Hayek intends. Certainly he intends that 
the rules of just conduct must have a broad scope, but 
precisely how broad a scope he requires must remain a 
moot point. 
The final criterion which Hayek prescribes 
for the rules of just conduct is of a much more speci- 
fic nature than those we have heretofore considered. 
The criteria we have considered so far have all been 
generic in nature. They most certainly affect the 
content of the rules, but they do so only indirectly. 
However, the criterion we are about to consider is 
directly concerned with the content of the rules of 
just conduct. 
Specifically, Hayek maintains that in any 
Great Society the rules of just conduct must establish 
certain indispensable concepts: i. e. what might be 
called property, contract, and tort. 
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It would seem that wherever a Great 
Society has arisen, it has been 
made possible by a system of rules 
of just conduct which included 
what David Hume called 'the three 
fundamental laws of nature, that of 
stability_of possession, of _Tt__s 
transterence bV consent, d of the 
performance of promises', (Footnote 
omitted] or, as a modern author 
sums up the-essential content of all 
contemporary systems of private law, 
'freedom of contract, the inviola- 
bility of property, and the duty to 
compensate another for damage due 
to his fault. ' [Footnote omitted] 59 
Or, as Hayek more succinctly puts it: "Law, liberty, 
and property are an inseparable trinity. ,60 However, 
to merely tell us that the rules of just conduct must 
establish these concepts really tells us very little, 
for each of these concepts is open to a very wide range 
of interpretations. Nonetheless, that is all that 
Hayek tells us. tHence, while we can be certain that 
the rules of just conduct must establish the concepts 
of property, contract, and tort, we can only speculate 
as to what Hayek intends by these concepts. 
To sum up. We have seen that,, the rules of 
just conduct must be gbstract, in that they apply to 
unknown numbers of future instances. We have seen that 
they must be general, in that they are abstract, in that 
they are universal, and in that they have a broad scope 
of application. Finally, we have seen that they must 
establish the concepts of property, contract, and tort, 
whatever those concepts might mean. Taken together, 
these factors quite clearly do not dictate what the 
content of the rules of just conduct must be. On 
the other hand, they do circumscribe to some extent 
the range of possible rules. Thus, while Hayek is not 
specifically concerned with the rules of just conduct, 




And with that we come to the conclusion of this 
survey of the concept of rules of just conduct. As 
have already indicated they are the basic building 
block of Hayek's social system, and we shall have much 
recourse to them in the next two chapters which deal 





"The law will consist of purpose- 
independent rules which govern the 
conduct of individuals towards 
each other, are intended to apply to 
an unknown number of further instances, 
and by defining a protected domain of 
each enable an order of actions to 
form itself wherein the individuals 
can make feasible plans. " 1 
A. An Ideological Theory 
in examining Hayek's thoughts on law 
there is a threshhold question which must be con- 
sidered at the outset: and that is, whether what. 
Hayek says is descriptive or normative or both. From 
the general tenor of the argument there seems little 
doubt that in Hayek's own mind what he says is both 
descriptive and normative. Or perhaps it is more 
accurate to say that Hayek sees no distinction. What 
be describes is what is ent4iled by the concept of 
law. And, therefore, if a society is to have law, it 
Inust have what Hayek 
describes. 
The difficulty with this all or nothing 




attributed (wrongly according to John 
Finnis) to classical Natural Law theory. There it is 
frequently claimed that an unJust law is no law at 
all. With Hayek the comparable statement would be 
that' a society which does not have law as he des- 
cribes it does not have law at all. Of course, I 
strongly suspect that Hayek would not consider this 
a dilemma. Rather, he would say it is a tautology, 
it is an analytic statement about the meaning of law. 
However, this approach is, in fact, incom- 
patible with one of Hayek's own arguments. In The 
Mirage of Social Justice Hayek considers at some 
length Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law. 
3 He 
concludes: 
Legal positivism is in this respect 
simply the ideqlogy of socialism ... 
and of the omnipotence-of the 
legislative power. It is an ideol- 
ogy born out of the desire to 
achieve complete c ntrol over the 
social order 
Recognizing that this conclusion contradicts Kelsen's 
claim-to-have. formulated a -value-free. theory-of jaw., 
Hayek goes on -to say: 
The char acterization of Kelsen's 
pure theo3ýy of law as an Ideology 
is here not meant as a reproach, 
though its defenders are bound to 
regard it as such. Since every 
social order rests on an ideology, 
every statement of the criteria by 
which we can determine what is 
appropriate law in such an order 
must also be an ideology. The 
only reason-why it is important to 
show that this is also true of the 
pure theory of law is that its author 
prides himself on being able to 
'unmask' all other theories of law 
as ideologies [Footnote omitted] 
and to have provided the only theory 
which is not an ideology.. ... Yet, 
since every cultural order can be 
maintained only by an ideology, 
Kelsen succeeds only in replacing 
one ideology with another that 
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postulates that all orders main- 
ta: Lned by force are orders of the 
same kind, deserving the descrip- 
tion (and dignity) of an order. of 
law, the term which before was used 
to describe a particular kind of 
order valued because it secured 
individual freedom. Though within 
his system of thought his assertion 
is tautologically true, he has no 
right to assert, as he constantly 
does, that other statements in. 
which, as he knows JFootnote omitted], 
the term 'law' is used in a different 
sense, are not true. What 'law' 
is to mean we can ascertain only 
from what those who used the word 
in shaping our social order intended 
it to mean, not by attaching to it 
some meaning which covers all the 
uses ever made of it. 5 
The point is, this passage is equally 'applic- 
able to Hayek's own theory of law. But where Kelsen's 
theory of law is interlocked with socialism, Hayek's 
is interlocked with liberalism. The. above passage 
admits as much where it speaks of law as "the term which 
before -was used to 
describd a particular kind of order 
-valued because it secured individual freedom. * Why 
. then belabor' the point? 
I do so because it seems to me that at times 
Hayek himself either forgets or at least glosses over 
the fact that his theory of law. is ideologically based. 
In criticizing various aspects of contemporary society, 
particularly aspects relating to government and the wel- 
fate. state, he often seems to take the ideology as a 
-given and then criticizes actions. as 
incompatible with 
that ideology. For instance, as we shall see later,. a 
major part of his critique of social justice rests on. 
its alleged incompatibility with respect for liberty. 
To the extent that such an argument recog- 
nizes that the ideology 
it presupposes is in a sense 
optionali in that there is no logical requirement that 
any particular person espouse it, all well and good. 
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However, to the extent that the argument fails to recog- 
nize that the ideology it presupposes may not and need 
not be the dominant ideology in the society in question, 
it is misleading. It misleads in ignoring its own 
hypothetical aspect -ý- if You value X, then you must 
do Y --; it suggests a categoricalness or necessity to 
its conclusions which is not in fact present or justified. 
To be more specific, in ekamining Hayek's 
theory of law there is one point which we must keep in 
mind at all times. It is a point which Hayek would 
undoubtedly readily grant if specifically asked, and yet 
one which he often allows to fade into the background 
in the course of his arguments. That point is: the 
theory of law which Hayek explicates is one which is 
or so Hayek argues -- entailed by liberalism. It is a 
(the? ) Liberal Theory of Law. If one accepts the 
ideology of liberalism, then Hayek's theory is tauto- 
logical; if one accepts the ideology, then a society 
which does not'have law in the sense that Hayek describes 
does not have law at all. (This assumes, of course, 
that independent of the ideology Hayek's argument is 
persuasive and viable. ) But that "if" must always 
be kept in mind. Many of the problems which Hayek sees 
in contemporary society may well result, not because 
people have forgotten what is required by liberal- 
ism, but rather because they no longer espouse 
liberalism as an ideology. And the latter problem is 
quite different from the former. 
To a certain extent I may be going to great 
lengths to state the obvious. Since at least The Road 
to Serfdom Hayek has been issuing a jeremiad about the 
abandonment of liberalism by western societies. And, 
both The Constitution of Liberty and the early chapters 
of Law, Legislation and Liberty are concerned with 
demonstrating why the ideology of liberalism should be 
espoused. Nonetheless, I know from experience that 
it is far too easy when one comes to grips with the 
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details of Hayek's positions on law, justice, and social 
justice to forget the ideological basis presupposed by 
his argument. This not least because Hayek himself 
allows his ideological basis to disappear into the 
background. - 
Consider, for example, the end of the 
passage quote-above. 
What 'law' is to mean we can 
ascertain only from what those who 
used the word in shaping our social 
order intended it to mean ... .7 
I would say, rather, what those who shaped out social 
order meant by law is relevant to what we mean by it 
only if we espouse the same ideology as they. The 
theory cannot be divorced from the ideology: "every 
statement of the criteria by which we can determine 
what is appropriate law in such an order must also 
be an ideology. 
j 
In sam, Hayek's, theory of law, though it .f 
may be descriptive in part, is primarily normative. 
It is not a value-free theory of law, but rather a 
statement of what must be meant by law in a liberal 
society. It is for this reason that Hayek can say: 
"Liberalism is therefore the same as the demand for 
the Rule of Law ... . 119 
B. The Nature of Law 
The essence of Hayek's conception of law 
can be found in three contrasting pairs of ideas. The 
three are: 
rules of just conduct v rules of 
organization 
2. nomos v. thesis 
3. law v. morality 
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Once these three sets of distinctions have been 
analysed, we can then consider the function of law in 
a liberal society. 
Inasmuch as the preceding chapter. dealt 
specifically with the contrast between rules of just 
conduct and rules of organization, I. will not here go 
into that contrast in any great detail. Instead I 
will merely recount the highlights of that distinc- 
tion. Rules of organization are'relatively specific, 
both in what they prescribe and in whom it is they 
prescribe to. They are purpose-dependent, that is 
their function can be understood only in regard to 
a pre-ordained end. They are closely related to com- 
mands and serve primarily to fill in gaps left by a 
hierarchy of commands. Lastly, they are inevitably 
the result of deliberate positing. 
By contrast, rules of just conduct are 
general, purpose-independent rules, usually negative 
in form. Theyýqre the cement which holds individuals 
together. in a social order. They do so by delineat- 
ing a protected sphere of responsibility within which 
the individual is supreme, thereby providing maximum 
opportunity for the pursuit of a variety of ends. 
Rather than being deliberately established, they 
evolve, consisting initially of unarticulated, abstract 
patterns of behavior. Over time they are articulated, 
usually by men considered particularly familiar with 
the rules and skilled in the technique of articulation. 
But they can also be articulated by what we would 
today call legislative bodies. 
The distinction between rules of just 
conduct and rules of organization is important to 
Hayek's conception of law because the former are a 
necessary though not sufficient component of that 
conception, while the latter are expressly excluded 
from that conception. Thus, for Hayek all law 
consists of rules of just conduct. However, as we 
shall see shortly, not all rules of just conduct are 
law. 
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Another aspect of Hayek's conception of 
law is found by comparing nomos with thesis. Now we 
did consider nomos and thesis in the preceding chapter, 
but additional consideration is nonetheless warranted 
here. Although there will of necessity be some overlap 
between the two discussions, repetition Fill be kept 
to a minimum. 
While the rules of just conduct-rules of 
organization distinction deals with the form the 
rules in a social order take, the nomos-thesis dis- 
tinction deals with the procedure by which those 
rules are articulated. It is essential to keep in 
mind that at heart the nomos-thesis distinction is 
one of procedure. I stress this because at times 
Hayek himself blurs thýs fact. 
At times one is given the impression 
that nomos is synonymous with rules of just conduct. 
For instance, ±, R speaking of early legislative bodies 
Hayek says: "They were not primarily concerned with 
the rules of just conduct or the nomos ... . "lot 
and the context makes it clear that the "or" is 
conjunctive. But if nomos and rules of just conduct 
are one and the same, then the nomos-thesis distinc- 
tion would appear to be simply the rules of just 
conduct-rules of organization distinction. 
That this can be the essence of that latter 
distinction seems dubious when we consider Hayek's 
quite explicit definition of thesis: 
There is no single term in English 
which clearly and unambiguously 
distinguishes any prescription 
which has been made, or 'set' or 
'posited' by authority from one 
which is generally accepted without 
awareness of its source. ... When 
we need a precise single term we 
shall occasionally employ the Greek 
word thesis to describe such 'set' 
1 aw. TI- 
Clearly the emphasis here is on the procedure from which 
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a prescription (rule) results rather than on the form 
which the prescription takes. That this analysis is 
correct is confirmed in the following passage. 
A statute (thesis) passed by a 
legislature7may have all of the 
attributes of a nomos, and is 
likely to have t-hem if deliber- 
ately modelled after the nomos. 
But it need not and in most of the 
cases where legislation is wanted it 
cannot have this character. In 
this chapter we shall consider 
further only those contents of 
enactments or thesis which are not 
rules of just conduct. 12 
Thus, thesis can result in rules of just conduct, and 
there is no way that this could be the case if the 
nomos-thesis distinction were the same as the rules 
of just conduct-rules of organization distinction. 
No, the distinction must hinge on the procedure from 
which the rules result. 
In the last chapter we discussed at great 
length the essence of the nomos procedure and there 
is certainly no need to repeat that discussion again. 
Suffice it here to simply summarize the highpoints 
of that discussion. Nomos is the process of gradual 
articulation and development of the rules of just 
conduct by the judges or others learned in the law. 
it is a process of discovery rather than creation, 
whereby the judge attempts to articulate the under- 
lying pattern of behavior which should have guided 
the conduct of the parties before him. In those rare 
cases where there is in fact no underlying pattern of 
behavior which is applicable, the judge attempts to 
articulate a rule which is compatible with the overall' 
system of rules with which he is working, a rule which 
can be said to be implicit in that system. In short, 
for Hayek the essence of nomos is judge-made law and 
its exemplar is the English Common Law. 
13 
63 
Inasmuch as rules of -just conduct are an aspect of 
Hayek's conception of law, so too is nomos, for we 
cannot truly understand the notion of rules of. just 
conduct without understanding how they develop. 
- Now, while understanding nomos is a very 
important part of understanding rulles of just conduct, 
and hence of understanding law, we cannot altogether 
ignore the role of thesis. 'Thesis too has a part to 
play in understanding Hayek's conception of law. 
Compared to the multi-layered nomos process, the 
thesis process, as we have already seen, is rela- 
tiiiely straightforward. Thesis denotes prescrip- 
tions which have "been made, or 'set' or 'posited. ' by 
,, 14 authority Or, to maintain a symmetry with 
nomos, it might be better to think of thesis as the 
process by which rules are made or set or posited by 
authority. 
When I spoke of thesis Just now, I spoke 
only of rules. At that point in my argument it was 
acceptable to ignore any distinction between types of 
rules. But a. distinction must now be made, for it is 
crucial -not only-tp Hayek-s -conception-of law, -. but to 
his general political theory as well. 
Let us consider "prescription" as a generic 
name for what results from the thesis process. Pre- 
scriptions can then be ýubdivided into two categories: 
rules of just conduct and rules of organization. 
When the thesis process results in rules of just con- 
duct, its outcome will be the same as that of the 
nomos process. And it is to that extent that Hayek 
can talk of a thesis which has "all of the attributes 
of a nomos". 
15 Like'nomos, the outcome of. such thesis 
is law -- holding aside for the moment one further 
aspect which remains to be considered. 
The essential point here is that the thesis 
process does not necessarily result in rules of just 
conduct. In fact, more often than not., it results in 
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rules of organization. Why this is so is not difficult 
to explain. In a democracy the legislature, the repre- 
sentative body which engages in the thesis process 
the only body which engages in the thesis process 
is the primary administrator of government. And govern- 
ment is an organization, a taxis not a cosmos, and 
naturally it functions as an organization. 
Government, by contrast, is a 
deliberate(' contrivance 
[I)t will require distinct rules 
of its own which determine its 
structure, aims, and functions. 
... They will be rules of organiza- tion designed to achieve particular 
ends, to supplenent positive 
orders that something should be done 
or that particular results should 
be achieved, and to set up for these 
purposes the various agencies through 
which government operates. 16 
Because thesis can result in either rules 
of just conducE, or rules of organization, and because 
it is more likely to result in the latter than in the 
former, a problem arises which manifests itself in two 
related ways. The first is, given that a single body 
is responsible for both rules of just conduct and rules 
of organization, there is a tendency to confound the 
two, to describe both as law, and to confer on both 
the status due properly only to law. 
But since the &nforcement of the 
law was regarded as the primary 
task of government, it was 
natural that all the rules which 
governed its activities came to 
be called by the same name. This 
tendency was probably assisted by a 
desire of governments to confer on 
its (sic] rules of organization 
the same dignity and respect which 
the law commanded. 17 
The second way in which the problem manifests 
itself is that a representative body, primarily con- 
cerned with running the government, and to that end 
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issuing rules of organization, can readily become 
accustomed to the practice of running an organization 
and come to think of its function as including the 
running of society. 
Increasingly and inevitably an 
assembly occupied in the former 
way [i. e. directing government] 
tends to think of itself as a body 
that not merely provides some 
services for an independently 
functioning order but 'runs the 
country' as one runs a fact 
or any other organization. 
YEY 
In short, there is a strong tendency for the represent- 
ative body to treat the cosmos as a, taxis, and in so 
doing to actually convert it into one. 
Under either manifestation the heart of the 
problem is the blurring of the distinction between 
rules of just conduct and rules of organization. It 
is the tendency to treat any prescription which results 
from the thesis process as having "all of the attri- 
butes of nomos". And the reason this is a problem 
is that it renders meaningless a basic principle of a 
liberal society, namely "limiting all coercion to the 
enforcement of rules of just conduct. "19 This relation- 
ship between law and coercion will be further discussed 
below. For now, it is sufficient to note that the 
ambiguous nature of the thesis process can lead to the 
coercive enforcement not only of rules of just conduct, 
but of rules of organization as well. 
Given this problem inherent in the thesis 
process, it might be wondered why thesis is ever 
utilized to develop the rules of just conduct. Might it 
not be better to limit thesis , 
solely to the promulga- 
tion of rules of organization and to rely solely on 
nomos to develop the rules of just conduct. The answer 
is quite simply "no". Notwithstanding the problem 
which results from the ambiguity inherent in thesis, 
there are good reasons to utilize thesis in the de- 
velopment of rules of just conduct. 
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As the rules of just conduct develop from 
an unarticulated to an articulated form two types of 
situations can arise in which thesis is necessary'to 
assist nomos in the process of development. Occasional- 
ly, over a period of time the rules of just conduct may 
develop in such a way that they suddenly seem to be 
20 leading in a wrong direction, or even to a dead end. 
This situation may result from a simple error in the 
21 
nomos process at some stage. Or, it may result 
from a more general error, in that a concern with the 
interests of some particular group or class in a society 
has resulted in rules, which are not in fact general, 
purpose-independent rules, being treated as rules of 
just conduct. 
22 The adage"what's good for General 
Motors is good for the country"comes to mind, although 
Hayek would probably not agree with that example. 
The other situation which necessitates re- 
course to thesis occurs when "wholly new circum- 
stancesil arise. 
E3 
Such circumstances might be a major 
change in the physical environment or they might be 
a major change in the technology of a society. More 
generally, they represent a change so radical or so 
basic that the existing rules of just conduct cannot 
cope. Genetic engineering and computer technology 
are good examples of areas which today are presenting 
just such problems. 
In neither of these situations is the nomos 
process suitable for adapting the rules of just con- 
duct. This for two reasons. First, nomos is by 
nature a slow, gradual process, proceeding on a case 
by case basis. 
24 This very gradualness is, in fact, 
one of its positive qualities, for it allows time to 
test by experience the soundness of each step in the 
process of development. But because it moves slowly, 
because it always deals with particular cases, nomos 
is not well suited to making radical changes in 
direction. 
67 
The second reason why nomos is ill-suited to 
adapting the rules of just conduct to the situations 
described above is more a function of the role nomos 
plays in the social order than of the nature of nomos 
itself. As has already been noted, in resolving a 
dispute the judge's task is to tell the parties 
What ought to have guided their 
expectations, not because anyone 
had told them before that this was 
the applicable rule, but because 
this was the established custom 
which they ought to have known. 25 
Now, once a rule has been articulated by a judge it is 
not merely reasonable, but in fact demanded, that 
henceforth that rule be one factor which guides parties' 
expectations. And for that reason any major change in 
the direction of the rules of just conduct is virtually 
certain to disappoint someone's expectations. And 
this the judge should not do, for he "is not perform- 
ing his functi6rt if he disappoints reasonable expecta- 
tions created by earlier decisions .,, 
26 
But if change must be made and yet the change 
must not be made by nomos, then thesis is the only way 
to proceed. 
In such situations it is desir- 
able that the new rule should be- 
come known before it is enforced; 
and this can be effected only by 
promulgating a new rule which is 
to be applied only in the future. 
Where a real change in the law is 
required, the new law can properly 
fulfill the proper function of 
all law, namely that of guiding 
expectations, only if it becomes 
known before it is applied. 27 
And this prospective change of the rules can be accom- 
plished only by thesis. Thus, despite the problems 
associated therewith, the thesis process does serve a 
useful and even necessary function in Hayek's con- 
ception of law. 
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At this. point it would be well to recall yet 
again that for thesis to produce law it must "have 
all of the attributes of a nomos". In. other words, 
even in those situatfl: ovs In which the thesis process 
is to be preferred to'the, nomos process, the thesis 
must still be like-nomos. But what does this entail, 
in what sense can a thesis "have all of the attributes 
of a nomos"? 
To begin with the most obvious, the thesis 
must produce a rule of just conduct. That is to say, 
it must produce a general, purpose-independent rule. 
No matter how radical the change which is required 
may be, it must take the form of a general, purpose- 
independent rule. 
Eqqally important, the rule which is produced 
must fit with the other -rules which are already re- 
cognized and accepted in the society. As we have 
already seen when considering nomos, though a rule 
may in one-sense be said to be novel, in another sense 
it must always be inherent in the existing system of 
rules. 
The task of developing a system of 
law is thus an intellectual task 
of great difficulty which cannot 
be performed without taking cer- 
tain rules as given and moving 
within the system. determined 
by them. 28 
Thus, like the judge the legislator must function as 
a discoverer and not a creator. Whatevet-the rules'. -. the 
legislator enacts through the thesis process, they 
must ultimately be anchored in týe existing rules of the 
society. In sum, thesis will "have all-of the attri- 
butes of a nomos" when it produces a general, purpose- 
independent rule which is "'implicit, in the body of 
it 29 the existing rules 
There is one final point to be considered 
about the relationship between nomos and thesis. For 
want of a better term we might refer to that point as the 
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hierarchical relationship between the two, for 
it concerns situations in which nomos and thesis 
might be said to be in conflict. There are two ways 
in which such situations might arise. One is when the 
legislature attempts to treat as a rule of just conduct 
what is in fact a rule of organization. The other is 
when the legislature and courts both articulate rules 
of just conduct, but the rules so articulated are not 
compatible. That is to say, the legislature and the 
courts are in disagreement as to the proper way to 
articulate a previously unarticulated rule. In both of 
thesesituations the crucial question is who has the 
final word. 
The initial point to note about this question 
is that the answer itself is not a matter of legal 
theory. Legal theory can only tell us what the attri- 
butes are of something which will constitute law. But 
whether in a given situation those attributes are 
present is a matter of humanjudgement. Some individual 
or some group of individuals must make that judgement, 
for it cannot make itself. And who is to make that 
judgement is a matter of political theory. 
How then does Hayek answer this question? In 
his model constitution he argues. that a special court 
should be created to deal with situations in which there 
is question as to wh6ther something is or is not law. 
30 
But this is only a proposal for a new and different 
structure. As things actually are, Hayek recognizes 
that it is the legislature which has the final say. 
Any decision of the legislature 
which touches on matters regul- 
ated by the nomos will, at least 
for the case7-1-nhand, alter and 
supercede that law. As a governing 
body the legislature is not bound 
by any law, and what it says con- 
cerning particular matters has the 
same force as a general rule and 
will supercede any such existing 
rule. 
31 
But, categorical as this statement is, there is still some 
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leeway. It is always possible for a court to attempt 
to construe a statute so as to avoid an apparent con- 
flict with judge-made law. And, in some societies 
judicial review of certain legislative enactments is 
also possible. The fact remains, however, that under 
liberal political theory thesis generally has preced- 
ence over nomos. 
The last of the three-contrasting pairs of 
ideas which form the essence of Hayek's conception of 
law is law and morality.. So far we have seen that an 
essential component of Hayek's conception of law is 
rules of just conduct. In fact, one might be'tempted 
to conclude that law is rules of just conduct. But 
that would be an overbroad generalization,. as Hayek 
himself makes clear: 
We are not contending that all 
rules of just conduct which are 
in fact obser-ý2d in a society 
are law... . 
only some rules of just conduct are law, the rest are 
what we would call morality. 
The question -then is-, how d(ý-you- distinguish--'- 
law from morality? The notion of-enforcement. seems to 
be the answer, for we find Hayek speaking of "law 




when we-consider what Hayek understands by enforcement 
the distinction seems to slip from our grasp. 
Though most people would hesitate 
to give this name [i. e. law] 
to a rule of just conduct which, 
though usually obeyed, was in, no 
way enforced, it seems difficult 
to deny it to rules which are 
enforced by a largely effective 
though unorganized social pres- 
sure, or the exclusion of the 
breaker of a rule frým the group. 
[Footnote omittedl 3 
This passage is rather troubling to say the least. it 
states quite clearly that unorganized social pressure 
constitutes sufficient enforcement to warrant treating 
e 
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a rule of just conduct as law. The problem which this 
causes is that it is difficult to imagine how something 
could ever be called a rule of just conduct if it were 
not coupled with this broad notion of enforcement. 
Absent some pressure to conform, a rule of just conduct 
35 
would not be a rule at all. But, if all rules of 
just conduct are enforced, the distinction which seemed 
to exist between law and morality has become empty. 
Fortunately, 'there is another passage in 
which Hayek draws a clear and unequivocal distinction 
between those rules of just conduct which constitute 
law and those which constitute morality. 
[TIhe difference between moral 
and legal rules ... is a dis- tinction between rules to which 
the recognized procedure of en- 
forcement by appointed authority 
ought to apply and those to which 
it should not, and therefore a 
disti. nction which would lose all 
meaning if all recognized rules 
of conduct, including all the rules 
which the community regards as 
moral rules were to be enforced. 36 
Hence, the distinguishing factor between law and 
morality is whether the rules are enforced by an 
"organized authority". 
What then are we to make of the earlier pas- 
sage in which even rules of just conduct enforced 
by "unorganized social pressure" are considered to 
be law? I see two possibilities. The simplest, and 
therefore perhaps the best, is to treat the earlier 
passage as an aberration. Hayek cannot have meant 
what he said. The passage is merely an example of 
careless writing and thought. Admittedly, it is dis- 
turbing to come to such a conclusion. But being 
realistic, it is a rare book which has no inconsis- 
tencies in it. 
There is, however, a way in which the earlier 
passage might be read so as to be not wholly incompatible 
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with the latter. This earlier passage has appended to 
it a footnote which refers to H. L. A. Hart's distinc- 
tion between primary and secondary rules. 
37 Hart, it 
will be recalled, argues that it is the addition of 
secondary rules, including secondary rules of enforce- 
ment -- i. e. organized enforcement --, to the primary 
rules of obligation which marks the transition from 
a pre-legal to a legal world. In the footnote Hayek 
grants that Hart's argument is of the "greatest 
importance" and yet rejects the conclusion-*-Hart 
draws. 38 
It may just be that what Hayek is concerned 
about in the passage in question is to reject the 
idea that there can be a pre-legal society. And in 
fact, Hayek elsewhere makes just this point. "Law 
in the sense of enforced rules of conduct is un- 
doubtedly coeval with society... . , 
39 Prior to the 
existence of an organized authority for enforcing 
rules of just conduct, there is no distinction be- 
tween law and morality. But this is not to say that 
there is no law. There is both law and morality, 
or better law-morality, or even better yet there are 
simply rules of just conduct. The nascence of an 
organized authority for enforcement is of the "greatest 
importance" because it marks the separation of law and 
morality. But to say that rules of just conduct can 
. now 
be separated into two types is not to maintain 
that the essence of either of those two types did 
not previously exist. 
It must be stressed that this argument is 
entirely a reconstruction. There is no evidence to 
support it other than the passages and the footnote 
to which I have referred. What the argument is is 
an attempt to avoid the conclusion that the first 
paý-s-sa: gýe cited is total nonsense. It is a matter of 
indifference to me whether the reader accepts this 
argument or simply chooses to disregard the passage 
in question. But the reader has to do one or the other, 
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for the later passage must be treated as definitive. 
The distinction between law and morality is a dis- 
tinction between enforcement by an organized authority 
and enforcement by unorganized social pressure. 
Granting that the distinction between law 
and morality depends upon enforcement by an organized 
authority, one might be tempted to question the need 
to make this distinction. That is, one might wonder 
why, once the organized authority is in existence, 
all rules of just conduct are not enforced thereby'. 
Phrased this way the question may not seem to warrant 
serious consideration. The sheer number of rules of 
just conduct in any society would make it impractical 
to attempt formal enforcement of them all. But even 
were the scope of the question narrowed in such a way 
as to avoid the problem of practicality, there are 
still good reasons why only a limited range of rules 
of just conduct-should be subject to formal enforcement. 
Recall that Hayek's theory of law is an 
ideological theory and that the ideology upon which 
it rests is liberalism. Liberalism entails respect 
for individual liberty, and to that end it aims to 
keep at a minimum the coercion to which individuals 
are subjected. Now, while even enforcement by un- 
organized social pressure is coercive to an extent, it 
is generally not nearly as coercive as enforcement by 
an organized authority. Thus, liberalism aims to keep 
the latter type of coer6ion to a minimum. And for that 
reason it treats as law -- i. e. as subject to formal 
enforcement -- only those rules of just conduct which 
are absolutely necessary for the maintenance of a 
spontaneous order. 
But which rules ought to be enforced 
and are therefore to be regarded 
as law is determined not only by 
specific designation of some rules 
as enforceable by authority, but 
often follows from the interdepen- 
dence of some groups of rules where 
the observation of every one of them 
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is required for the achievement of 
what those already designated as 
enforceable serve: namely, the 
preservation of an ongoing overall 
order of actions. 40 
Moreover, while a great many -rules may be necessary 
for the maintenance 
' 
of a spontaneous order, formal 
enforcement will be needed only for those which are 
not generally observed on a voluntary basis. 
In some instances it would be nec- 
essary, for the smooth-running of 
society to secure a similar uni- 
formity [of observation] by coer- 
cion, if such conventions or rules 
were not observed often enough. 
Coercion, then, may sometimes be 
avoidable-only because a high degree 
of conformity exists, which means 
that voluntary conformity may be 
a condition of a beneficial working 
of freedom. 41 
In aýdition to this ideological aversion to 
extending the sc'bpe of law and thereby of coercion, 
there is an additional reason why the number of rules 
of just conduct treated as law should be kept to a 
minimum. As a spontaneous order society functions 
and develops through a process of trial and error. 
And this process can succeed only if there is oppor- 
tunity for individuals to experiment with ways of 
behaviour different from the norm. 
There is an advantage in obedience 
to such rules not being coerced, 
not only because coercion as 
such is bad, but because it is, 
in fact, often desirable that 
rules should be observed only 
in most instances and that the 
individual should be able to 
transgress them when it seems to him 
worthwhile to incur the odium which 
this will cause. ... It is this flexibility of voluntary rules 
which in the field of morals makes 
gradual evolution and spontaneous 
growth possible, which allows 
further experience to lead the 
modifications and improvements ... 
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The existence of individuals and 
groups simultaneously observing 
partially different rules pro- 
vides the opportunity for the selec- 
tion of the more effective ones. 42 
Thus, keeping to a minimum the rules Of just conduct 
which are treated as law, and thereby subjected to 
enforcement by organized authority, is essential if 
a spontaneous order is to be allowed to continue to 
develop. In a short while we will consider from 
another angle the relationship between law and enforce- 
ment, that is when we consider the function of law 
in a liberal society. 
However, before doing that I would first 
like to consider briefly two problems I see in the way 
Hayek distinguishes law from morality. The first is 
that I think Hayek is guilty of a reductionism similar 
to that of Hans Kelsen and others of the so-called 
school of Legal Positivism. In viewing law as rules 
of just conducE enforced by an organized authority, 
he sees all law on the model of criminal or tort law. 
Certainly it is meaningful to speak of that type of 
law as enforced by an organized authority. But what 
of most non-tortious, non-criminal law? What of the 
law of contract, the law of property, the law of 
estates and succession? These are not so much laws 
which are enforced, but rather (to borrow a term 
from H. L. A. Hart) laws which confer powers. 
43 
Only by taking a Kelsenian point of view and 
reducing such laws ultimately to a command to an 
official to apply a sanction when certain conditions 
are or are not fulfilled can we think of such laws as 
being enforced by an organized authority. But as 
Hart has argued, such a reductionist position grossly 
44 
distorts the way law actually functions in society . 
More than that, it is actually incompatible with 
Hayek's own thoughts on the difference between rules 
of just conduct and rules of organization. 
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A rule of conduct cannot be 
'carried out' or 'executed' as one 
carries out an instruction. One 
can obey the former [i. e. a rule 
of organization] or enforce obe- 
dience to it; but, a rule of con- 
duct merely limits the range of 
permitted action and usually does 
not determine a particular action; 
and what it prescribes is never 
accomplished but remains a standing 
obligation on all. 45 
Notwithstanding any of the foregoing, I think the 
essence of the distinction Hayek draws can be maintained, 
vis-a-vis both his own system and the Hartian argument 
against reductionism. The problem is not the essence of 
Hayek's distinction, but rather the terminology used to 
express it. I would suggest the following as a way 
around the problem. Law is distinguished from 
, 
morality 
in that the scope and import of the rules of just 
conduct which constitute the former are determined by an 
organized authority. This terminology makes clear that 
the essende of the distinction between law and morality 
is the role of an organized authority, without confining 
that role to the limited concept of enforcement. For 
ease of discussion I will hereinafter continue to speak 
of law as those rules of just conduct which are enforced 
by organized authority. However, I do think the terminol- 
ogy I have suggested is preferable. 
The other problem I see with the law-morality 
distinction arises in so-called 'gap' situations', that is 
in cases in which there is no rule of just conduct, 
articulated or unarticulated, specifically on point. In 
such cases the function. of the judge is twofold. He is 
to articulate a rule which both resolves the problem at 
hand and at the same time is compatible with the system 
of rules which is already recognized to exist. 
In this sense a rule not existing 
in any sense may yet appear to be 
, implicit' in the body of the 
existing rules, not in the sense 
that it is logically derivable 
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from them, but in the sense that 
if the other rules are to achieve 
their aim, an additional rule is 
required. 46 
The problem I see is this. In attempting to fill such 
gaps the judge may obliterate the distinction between 
law and morality. 
In seeking a rule which is implicit in the 
existing system of rules it would seem that the judge 
would have to, or at least be allowed to, consider both 
moral and legal rules. And, to the extent that the 
rule he articulates is informed by moral rules will it 
not itself be a moral rule: except, that is, that 
it will be enforced by the organized authority. What 
we seem to have is a bit of a circle. Only those rules 
which are enforced by organized authority are legal 
rules. But in 'gap' situations it is the organized 
authority which itself determines what rules will', b; e 
enforced. In such situations it would appear that the 
distinction Hayek draws between law and morality may in 
fact break down. Of course, it may be that in 'gap' 
situations judges are to be concerned only with that 
system of rules which comprise enforced rules of just 
conduct. ýBut if that is the case, Hayek has nowhere 
told us so. 
And with that we complete our examination of 
the three pairs of ideas which are indispensable to an 
understanding of Hayek's conception of law. These three 
pairs -- rules of just conduct and rules of organization, 
nomos and thesis, and law and morality -- serve to de- 
1-ifieate the parameters of Hayek's conception of law. 
But our examination of that conception is not yet com- 
plete, for while we have established its parameters, 
we have yet to consider its substance. That is to say, 
we have yet to consider the definitive function of law 
in a liberal society. It is to that task that the 
remainder of this chapter will be devoted. 
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C. The Function of Law 
According to Hayek law has two related 
functions in a liberal society. One is to delineate 
and ensure a protected sphere within which the indi- 
Vidual is free to act at his own discretion. The other 
is to delineate those areas in which the government may 
properly exercise coercion against the individual. It 
is thus that Hayek can speak of 
those limits to the coercive powers 
of government which is one of the 
chief purposes of law (the other 
being protection against violence 
or coercion of people by their 
fellows). 47 
Let us now consider each of these purposes in detail. 
The notion of the protected sphere of res- 
ponsibility has already been discussed in the chapter 
on rules of just conduct. Hence for our present pur- 
poses it willbe sufficient to merely recap the high- 
lights of that discussion. Three basic ideas are 
involved in the notion of a protected sphere of 
responsibility. The first and most obvious is to 
provide an area within which the individual is genuinely 
autonomous, an area within which the individual is 
free from coercion by other people. 
The chief function of the rules 
of just conduct is thus to tell 
each what he can count upon, 
what material objects or services! ýhe 
can use for his purposes, and what 
is the range of actions open to 
him. 48 
only if an individual has such a defined area within 
which he can act with reasonable security against out- 
side interference can he be said to be at all free. 
And of course, Hayek's theory of law is a part of 
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an ideology which puts great value on individual 
freedom 
The second point to be noted about the pro- 
tected sphere is that it is established primarily by 
negative rules. It is established not by telling an 
individual what he may do, but rather by telling him 
what his fellows may not do. 
[Rules of just conduct] normally 
impose no positive duties on any 
one, unless he has incurred such 
duties by his own actions ... . 
49 
Thus, negative duties (duties of forbearance) are 
the norm. Positive duties (duties of action) gener- 
ally occur only-because of some action by the duty- 
bearer (e. g. contractual relationships) or because 
of some existing relationship in which the duty- 
bearer stands (e. g. parent/child). And it is these 
primarily negative duties imposed on one's fellows 
(and one's self as well) which serve to delineate the 
individual's protected sphere of responsibility. 
The final point to note about this protected 
sphere is that its essence is the harm principle. 
That is, the limits of this sphere are determined 
in accord with the principle of proscribing actions 
which harm others. "[01nly such actions of individuals 
as affect other persons ... will give rise to legal 
rules. " 
50 Admittedly, there will at times be con- 
troversy whether the effects of a particular action 
are public or private. But that does not negate the 
value of the basic principle that an individual should 
be free to act as he chooses, so long only as his 
actions do not deleteriously affect others. 
51 
When we turn to the relation between law and 
the limits of government coercion Hayek's position 
appears at first blush to be quite clear and quite 
simple. The government may coerce individuals only 
to enforce rules of just conduct. Thus, he fre- 
quently speaks of "the basic principle of limiting 
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all coercion to the enforcement of rules of just 
conduct. , 
52 And, as we have just seen, the primary 
function of those rules of just conduct which con- 
stitute law is to prevent the coercion of the individual 
by his fellows. Hence, it follows that: 
Within a spontaneous order the use 
of-coercion can be justified only 
where this is necessary to secure 
the private domain of the indivi- 
dual against interference by 
others, but that coercion should 
not be used to interfere in that 
private sphere where this is not 
necessary to protect others. 53 
To this point Hayek's position seems very similar to 
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that of Robert Nozick. The government should be 
limited in its coercive function to the role of a 
night watchman. 
However, there are other passages in which 
Hayek appears to soften his position on government 
coercion. Consider, for instance, the following: 
It is one of the axioms of the 
tradition of freedom that coer- 
cion of individuals is permissible 
only where it is necessary in the 
service of the general welfare or 
the public good. 55 
But this seeming bow in the direction of the welfare 
state disappears upon closer inspection. Very shortly 
after the passage cited we are told that the general 
welfare is to be equated with "the securing of con- 
ditions in which the individuals and smaller groups 
will have favourable opportunities of mutually pro- 
viding for their respective needs.,, 
56 And so, the 
general welfare which is the justification for govern- 
ment coercion is really no more than the enforcement 
of the rules of just conduct. 
Coercion can assist free men in the 
pursuit of their ends only by the 
enforcement of universal rules 
which do not direct them to parti- 
cular ends, but by enabling them to 
81 
create a domain protected against 
unpredictable disturbance caused by 
other men including agents of 
government to pursue their own 
ends. 57 
Having disposed of this seeming exception 
to Hayek's basic position on government coercion, we 
now come up against an exception which cannot be 
disposed of: taxation. The coercive taxation we 
are here concerned with is obviously not that needed 
to secure the enforcement of the rules of just conduct, 
for such taxation is merely a necessary means to a 
justified end. Rather, the taxation here is that needed 
to provide 'public goods'. Hayek clearly grants that 
government coercion may be utilized to collect taxes. 
In fact, he takes pains to disassociate himself from 
Nozick and the night watchman state. 
Far from advocating such a 
1minipal state' [Footnote to 
Nozick], we find it unquestionable 
that in an advanced society govern- 
ment ought to use its power of 
raising funds by taxation to provide 
a number of services which for various 
reasons cannot be provided, or can- 
not be provided adequately, by the 
market. 58 
And this passage is no aberration, for the legitimacy 
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as well. 
Now, we have seen that the justification for 
the coercive enforcement of rules of just conduct is 
to provide a protected sphere of responsibility within 
which the individual is free from coercion by his 
fellows. But what is the justification for coercive 
taxation? Hayek sees it as essentially a process of 
give and take, a contribution to a common pool from 
which each gets something he wants. 
The morality of this kind of 
coercion to positive action is, 
perhaps, not as obvious as the 
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morality of the rules which merely 
prevent the individual from in- 
fringing the protected domain of 
others. Particularly where the 
collective*good in question is not 
wanted by all or at least 73y a con- 
siderable majority, this does raise 
seribus problems. Yet it will 
clearly be in the interest of the 
different individuals to agree that 
the compulsory levying of means to 
be used also for purposes for which 
they do not care so long as others 
are similarly made to contribute to 
ends which they desire but others- 
do not.. ... So long as each may 
expect to get from this common pool 
services which are worth more to him 
than what he is made to contribute, 
it will be in his inte. rest to. submit 
to the coercion. 61 
This defense is to my mind somewhat half- 
'hearted. It seems to reduce the moral dilemma to one 
of simple expediency'. Interestingly, Hayek himself 
recognized this in an earlier work. 
[I]t'is at least not obvious that 
coercing people to contribute 
to the achievement of ends in 
which-they-are not interested -can 
be morally justified. Up to a 
point, most of us find it expe- 
dient, however, to make such contri- 
butions on the understanding that 
we w' ill in turn profit from similar 
contributions of others toward the 
realization of our own ends. 62 
What of those who are not willing'to make such contri- 
butions, expedient or not? Wherein lies the justifica- 
tion for coercing their contribution? On this'Hayek is 
silent. 
However, notwithstanding any inadequacy in 
the justification for this type of coerdion, the fact 
remains that Hayek does allow for c, , 
oercive taxation. 
But this is the only exception which he recognizes to 
"the basic principles of limiting all coercion to the 
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enforcement of rules of just conduct. To sum up 
then, those rules of just conduct which constitute law 
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have a dual function. On the one hand they define a 
protected sphere within which the individual is secure 
from coercion by his fellows. On the other hand, they 
provide the only legitimate (save for taxation) occa- 
sion for the use of coercion against the individual by 
the government. 
And with that we come to the end of our survey 
of Hayek's conception of law. It has probably been 
noticed, however, that we have of yet said nothing of a 
topic which appears quite closely related to law: i. e. 





"Justice is, of course, not a 
question of the aims of an action 
but of its obedience to rules 
which it obeys. " 1 
Hayek's thoughts on justice are at the very 
best muddled, and it may even be that they are not 
altogether consistent. This is both surprising and 
disturbing in that the subject of justice is a major 
focus of Law, Legislation and Liberty. That being the 
case, one would expect a coherent and precise dis- 
cussion. However, one will search in vain for any 
such a discussion. 
To a large extent the difficulty experi- 
enced in trying to come to grips with Hayek's thoughts 
on justice results from the fact that he does not have 
a single idea of justice. Or better, he does not use 
the word"3ustice"to denote one single idea. Rather, 
there are two (or possibly three, see below) primary 
ways in which he uses the word'justice': These dif- 
ferent uses are related, but not in the sense that any 
one can be said to be derived from another. However, 
while Hayek uses the word'justice"in several senses, 
he never explicitly acknowledges the multiplicity of 
meanings he attaches to it. Instead, he continually 
slides from one use to another, glossing over, or per- 
baps oblivious to, the fact that he is using a single 
word to talk about different, albeit related, ideas. 
The confusion is exacerbated by the occasional use 
of the word"justice! 
'in what might be termed a layman's 
sense, i. e. some amorphous notion of fairness. The 
result of all this is, as I have already noted, a 
rather muddled discussion of justice. 
My intent in this chapter is to bring some 
coherence to that muddled discussion, to present an 
explication of Hayek's thoughts on justice which is 
clearer than the explication he himself presents. To 
this end, I have divided this chapter into three 
sections: The Nature of Justice, The Subject Matter 
of justice, and Exegetical Criticism. No great store 
should be attached to the titles of these sections, 
for no clear-cut distinction is possible between any 
of the three. The sections are simply intended to 
impose some order on the discussion. If the reader 
finds fault with-the way I-have approached the topic, 
1 hope that he will keep in mind that it I's not easy 
to discuss coherently something which is itself 
incoherent. 
A. The Nature of Justice 
The element which is common to the different 
ways in which Hayek uses the word"justice"is the notion 
of rules. 
To speak of justice always implies 
that some person or persons ought, 
or ought not, to have performed 
some action; and this "ought" in 
turn presupposes the recognition 
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of -rules which define a set of 
circumstances wherein a certain 
kind of conduct is prohibited or 
required. 2 
When we speak of justice we speak of rules. Absent some 
reference to rules, there can be no discussion of 
justice. The question then is how does justice relate 
to rules. 
, 
The following are the ways in which that 
relation can be said to exist. 
1) justice is the principle of applying 
the same rules to all. 
2) justice is the principle of applying 
those rules which are part of the 
system of rules which constitute a 
society; in those situations in which 
there is no existing applicable rule, 
the rule to be formulated must fit with 
the existing system of rules. 
3) justice is the principle of applying 
only rules of just conduct 
The first sense of justice which I have iden- 
tified finds expression in one of the most clear and 
concise statemLts Hayek makes about justice. Thus, 
he speaks of "[t1he co nception of justice as we under- 
stand it, that is, the principle of treating all under 
the same rules" .3 In-. considering this sense it is well 
to recall the broad manner in which Hayek uses the word 
rule. He does not mean thereby a formally articulated 
norm, but "simply a propensity to act or not act in a 
certain manner, which will manifest itself in what we 
call a practice or custom.,, 
4 Hence, when Hayek asserts 
a necessary connection between justice and rules he 
means only that justice presupposes some established 
pattern of behavior: 
We know by now that the 'existence' 
of a recognized rule does not in 
this context necessarily mean that 
the rule has been stated in words. 
It requires only that a rule can 
be found which distinguishes be- 
tween different kinds of conduct 
on lines which people in fact 
recognize as just or unjust. 5 
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The idea of justice as the principle of apply- 
ing the same rules to all is very similar to what might 
be called legal justice. It is similar to what we have 
in mind when we say that a judge must do justice to 
the parties before him. He can be no respecter of 
particular persons, but must apply to. both parties the 
applicable rule or rules. This legalistic emphasis 
in Hayek's thoughts on justice is something to which 
we will return in the last section of this chapter. 
Another way to approach this sense of 
justice is by means of the concept of universalizability. 
To universalize a rule of conduct means to apply that 
rule to each and every situation which meets the condi- 
tions specified in the rule. Hence, a rule which pro- 
vides "all X's shall do V means precisely that. If 
any X is not required to do Y, then the rule has not 
been universalized, unless that particular X falls 
within some exception to the rule. And in that event the 
rule would more properly be formulated as "all Xs, 
except those meeting criterion A, shall do V. And 
then the rule has, in fact, been complied with. 
Hayek's first sense of justice is, in effect, nothing 
more than the requirement that rules of conduct be 
universalized. 
All ultimate power should, in other 
words, be subject to the test of 
justice, and be free to do what it 
desires only in so far as it is 
prepared to commit itself to a 
principle that is to be agplied 
in all similar instances. 
The relationship between the second sense 
in which Hayek speaks of justice and the first is 
patent. While the first requires that whatever rules 
are to be applied be applied equally to all, the second 
is concerned with the identity of the rules which are 
to be applied. The key here is that justice is con- 
cerned not with a variety of individual rules standing 
in isolation one from another. Rather, it is concerned 
with a system of rules, a system which is living and 
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thus growing. Hence, in determining what rule is to be 
applied in a given situation, the decision is not made 
within a vacuum, but within a given context. 
The task of developing a system 
of law is thus an intellectual task 
of great difficulty which cannot 
be performed without taking certain 
rules as given and moving within the 
system determined by them. 7 
Because the decision which rule to apply 
occurs within the confines of an existing system of 
rules, the decision making process is a matter of 
reason and not will. Thus, the mere fact that it is 
desired that something be just is not enough. Only if a 
-rule can be rationally drawn from the existing system of 
rules can it be said to be a rule of justice. 
Indeed it would seem that as little 
as we can believe what we will, or 
hold to be true what we will, can 
we regard as just what we will. 
Though our desire that something 
should be regarded as just may long 
overrule our reason, there are neces- 
sities of thought against which such 
desire is powerless. While I may 
possibly convince myself by spurious 
reasoning that something I would 
wish to be just was really just, whether 
it is so clearly is not a matter of 
will but of reason. It will not merely 
be the contrary view of others which 
will prevent me from regarding as just 
what is in fact not so, nor some 
strong sentiment which the particular 
question at issue arouses in me, but 
the necessity of consistency without 
which thought would become impossible. 
This will drive me to test my belief 
in the justice of the particular act 
by the compatibility of the rule by 
which I judge it with all the other 
rules in which I also believe. 8 
And, as we have already seen in a previous chapter 
when discussing nomos, the primacy of reason over 
will holds even when situations arise in which 
there is no pre-existing rule. In such situations the 
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rule which is articulated must be compatible with the 
existing system of rules. 
In this sense a rule not existing in 
any sense 
I 
may yet appear to be 
'implicit in the body of the exist- ing rules, not in the sense that it 
is logically derivable from them, but 
in the sense that if the other rules 
are to achieve their aim , an addi- tional rule is required. 9 
According to Hayek it is justice which 
requires that the rules which are to be applied equally 
to' all be identified and formulated in this way. Fail- 
ure to proceed in this way, even if inadvertent, re- 
sults in a rule which is unjust. The rule is unjust 
not in its content but rather in that by failing to 
be compatible with the existing system of rules it is 
inappropriate for application in the first sense of 
justice. 
What T, ýe really mean when we say, 
e. g. that a rule which we all thought 
to be just proves to be unjust when 
applied to a particular case, is that 
it is a wrong rule which does not 
adequately define what we regard as just, or that the verbal formulation 
of the rule does not adequately ex- 
press the rule which guides our 
judgement. 10 
The final sense in which Hayek uses the word 
justice needs little elaboration. The system of rules 
which are to be developed in the second sense of justice 
and applied equally to all in the first sense are the 
rules of just conduct. And the rules of just conduct, 
as we have already seen, are the general, purpose- 
independent rules, spontaneous in origin, which form the 
framework which constitutes a society. In this third 
sense in which Hayek uses the word, to speak of justice 
is to speak of rules of just conduct. 
Only those aspects of the order of human actions which can be deter- 
mined by rules of just conduct do 
therefore raise problems of justice. 11 
90 
Now in fact this third sense of justice may 
be a part of the second sense. The argument for 
this interpretation would be that, given Hayek's con- 
tention that society is a spontaneous order or 
, 
cosmos, 
the rules which constitute it must of necessity be 
rules of just conduct. On the other hand, because 
Hayek's discussion is confined exclusively to spon- 
taneous orders, there is no ready way to tell whether 
the rules of justice are necessarily or contingently 
rules of just conduct. Certainly in a directed 
society (a taxis), which utilized primarily rules 
of organization, the first two meanings of justice 
would still make some sense. It is for that reason 
that I have chosen to list the third sense of justice 
as a distinct sense. Having belaboured this point, 
I must add that the distinction is not terribly import- 
ant for our purposes since Hayek is concerned solely 
with spontaneous orders and therefore justice will 
involve rules Zf just conduct. 
Before moving on to consider other facets of 
Hayek's conception of justice there is one additional 
issue relating to these three senses of justice which 
should be considered. And that issue is the question 
of who it is to w17fL&h each of these senses of justice 
is directed. 
The first sense of justice, the obligation 
to apply the same rules to all, seems to be equally 
directed to both individuals and to authorities. As 
to the latter, we have already seen how applying the 
same rules to all suggests the judicial obligation 
of fairness, to disregard persons and to apply the 
pertinent rule wherever and whenever it applies. 
As to individuals, this sense of justice suggests 
Kant's first formulation of the Categorical Impera- 
tive: "act only on that maxim through which you 
can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal'law. " . 
12 Of course Hayek does not intend 
that the individual utilize this principle to 
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establish the rules of conduct. But by requiring 
that a rule be applied to all, there is a tacit re- 
quirement that it be a rule such that it can be 
applied to all. In any event, even if one disputes 
any similarity to the Categorical Imperative, it does 
seem beyond dispute that this sense of justice is 
one which is applicable to individuals as well as 
to authorities. 
Not so with the second sense of justice: 
applying rules which are part of a mutually con- 
sistent system of rules. This sense clearly seems to 
presuppose some authority which is doing the applying. 
And, in fact, any discussion of this sense of justice 
almost always occurs in the context of the judicial 
authorities engaging in the nomos process. It is the 
judges (or other legal authorities) who decide which 
rule is to be applied to a dispute before them. It 
is the judges who decide which of the existing rules 
is appropriate, or if need be what new rule will be 
compatible with the existing system. Thus, this 
sense of justice would appear to be directed solely, 
or at least primarily, to authorities. Any pertinence 
to individuals is not apparent on its face. 
The third sense of justice, the requirement 
that the rules of justice be the rules of just conduct, 
would appear to be directed equally to individuals and 
to authorities. To the extent this sense is viewed as 
a subordinate. part of the second sense its concern 
would seem to be limited to the authorities, for it 
is the authorities who must articulate and develop the 
rules of just conduct. However, as to those rules of 
just conduct which have been articulated and are commonly 
known, these could be drawn in by the first sense of 
justice which requires that the same rules be applied 
to all. And to this extent the third sense of 
justice would be directed at both individuals and 
authorities. 
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One absolutely essential point to note about 
all three of the senses in which Hayek uses the word 
justice is that the real emphasis is on injustice, not 
justice. It is injustice which wears the trousers. 
This follows from the fact that the test for justice in 
each of the three senses is negative. Thus, in the 
first sense what we must determine is whether the 
same rule has been applied to all. In the second 
sense we must determine whether the rule to be applied 
exists as part of, or is compatible with, an existing 
system of rules. And in the third sense our concern 
is with whether the rule to be applied is a rule of 
just conduct. A negative answer in any of these 
senses indicates the presence of injustice. Similarly, 
a positive answer indicates that there is no injustice. 
Of course, to a certain extent the absence of in- 
justice will indicate the presence of justice. But the 
fact remains that what we have found in each case is 
not the positive presence of some element, but rather 
the absence of an element. 
Moreover, while we can always be certain 
when we have found injustice, e. g. in that the rule 
to be. applied is incompatible with the existing system 
of rules, we cannot be so certainýthat we have found 
justice. Thus, reconsideration of a rule previously 
applied may, in light of subsequent developments, in- 
dicate that the rule was not, in fact, compatible with 
the existing system of rules. Hayek himself compares 
this emphasis on injustice with Karl Popper's test 
of scientific truth. 
The positions in the two fields are 
analogous also in that we can always 
only endeavour to approach truth, 
or justice, by persistently elimin- 
ating the false or unjust, but can 
never be sure that we ha e achieved 
final truth or justice. 
Y3
Another sense in which injustice rather than 
justice is the primary concept stems from the fact 
that we are operating within a given system of rules. 
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It is not justice which determines which rules shall 
be applicable. Rather, it is injustice which deter- 
mines which rules cannot be applicable. The rules are 
already there, our task is only to determine whether 
we are in compliance with them. It is interesting 
to note in this vein that Hayek sees considerable 
similarity between his own essentially negative test 
of justice and Kant's Categorical Imperative, at 
least as far as the latter is applied to law as 
distinct from morality. 
So far as his philosophy of law is 
concerned, Kant was fully aware 
that the categorical imperative 
provided only a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition of justice, or 
only what we have called a negative 
test which enables us progressively 
to eliminate what is unjust, namely 
the test of universalizability. 14 
Again, I do no-t mean to overstress any putative re- 
lation between Hayek and Kant, for it is certainly not 
my intent to be drawn into the fields of Kantian 
scholarship. But, at the very least, the foregoing 
quotation does make quite clear that in Hayek's own 
mind it is the negative test, the test of injustice, 
which is of primary importance. 
It is useful to keep in mind this stress 
on the negative element when we come to consider the 
status which Hayek accords to justice. Probably the 
most commonly assigned status for justice is as a 
virtue. Though the precise nature of a virtue is a 
matter of considerable debate, there can be no real 
doubt as to the essence of what is meant when someone 
describes justice as a virtue. So, rather than risk 
a debate on an issue wholly extraneous to the subject 
matter of this chapter, I will not offer any defini- 
tion of virtue.. Instead, I will simply take for 
granted that the reader understands in general terms 
what is meant when justice is described as a virtue. 
As I say, the point is not terribly important here, 
for Hayek does not treat justice as a virtue. 
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Nor does he treat it as some sort of deter- 
minate ideal end-state, realizable in theory if not 
in practice. No, for Hayek the appropriate status 
of justice is as a value. To speak of a value is to 
evince an interest in a certain state of affairs. 
And a state of affairs denotes, not some end-state 
which it is possible to realize in its entirety, 
but rather something more indeterminate, something 
which can never be said to be fully achieved. Whereas 
we can achieve an end-state, we can only instantiate 
a state of affairs. 
To better grasp this, consider the way John 
Finnis defines value: "a general form of good that 
can be participated in or realized in indefinitely 
many ways on indefinitely many occasions". 
15 Or 
better yet, consider Hayek's own definition of 
value: 
[WIhirch term we shall understand to 
refer to generic classes of events, 
defined by certain attributes and 
generally regarded as desirable. 
By 'desirable' in this connection 
we thus mean more than a particular 
action is in fact desired by some- 
body on a particular occasion; 
it is used to describe a lasting 
attitude of one or more persons to 
a kind of event. 16 
Surely this definition fits to aT the various senses 
in which Hayek speaks of justice. Justice is a lasting 
attitude of one or more persons to a kind of event, 
viz. compliance with the negative test of justice. And, 
as we have just seen, this negative test cannot lead 
us once and for all to a determinate goal. It can only 
point us continuously in the direction of an ideal 
towards which we can strive, but can never hope to 
achieve. As Hayek says, "we can hope to approach 
justice without ever--- finally realizing it.,, 
17 
Taken together the emphasis on the negative 
aspect and the status of justice as a value yield 
what is one of the most significant claims which Hayek 
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makes about his conception of justice. It is an' 
objective standard of judgement for any given society. 
The claim to have presented an objective conception 
of justice immediately suggests an affinity with 
Natural Law theory. But no such affinity is present. 
Hayek does not see himself as a Natural Lawyer, 
, 
nor 
dbes he see himself as a Legal Positivist. Rather 
he sees himself as offering a third alternative. It is 
thus that he can say of hisýtheory: 
It does not stand in any sense 
between legal positivism and most 
natural law theories, but differs 
from either in a dimension different 
from that in*which they differ 
from each other. 18 
His theory stands distinct from the other two alterna- 
tives in that it offers an historical or evolutionary 
explanation for the origin and development of the 
rules of conduct upon which it relies. This aspect 
we have already examined in d' etail in previous chapters. 
- In defending his claim to have set forth an 
objective standard Of justice, Hayek sets his defenses 
almost--entirely--against the yiews-ýof: ---the legalýposi- 
tivists, and those of Hans Kelsen in particular. He 
sees the essence of their position on justice to be 
the following: 
that justice can in no sense be a 
determinant of what is in fact 
law but that it is rather the law 
which determines what is just. ... [T]he contention that the lawgiver 
was the creator of justice became 
the most-characteristic tenet of 
legal positivism. 19 
The error of the Positivists was, however, to concern 
themselves solely with seeking a Positive conception 
of justice. 
Hayek is quite willing to grant that they 
have succeeded "in demonstrating that there are no 20 
positive criteria of justice". But a positive 
criterionis not the only possibility if we are seeking 
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an objective standard. 
The positivist conclusion was, 
however, reached only through the 
tacit but erroneous assumption 
that objective criteria of justice 
must be positive criteria, i. e. 
premises fromwhich the whole system 
of rules could be logically deduced. 
But if we do not insist that the 
test of justice must enable us to 
build up a whole system of new rules 
of just conduct, but are content per- 
sistently to apply the negative test 
of injustice to the parts of an 
inherited system, the greater part 
of whose rules are universally 
accepted, we may accept the con- 
tention of positivism that there 
are no positive criteria of justice; 
yet we can still maintain that the 
further development of the rules of 
just conduct is not a matter of 
arbitrary will but of inner neces- 
sity, and that solutions to open 
problems of justice are discovered, 
not arbitrarily decreed. The fact 
that there are no positive criteria 
of justice does not leave unfettered 
will as the only alternative. We 
may still be bound by justice to 
develop the existing system in a 
particular way, and be able to demon- 
strate that we must alter particular 
rules in a certain way to eliminate 
injustice. 21 
Thus, by identifying and eliminating what is 
unjust we move continually towards the ideal of justice. 
And this ideal, while it does not allow us to construct 
from scratch a system of rules, does dictate the de- 
cisions we must make, given the system of rules within 
which we are operating. Inasmuch as such an ideal is 
a matter of reason and not will, it can fairly be 
described as objective. 
In such an effort towards the de- 
velopment of a body of rules, most 
of which are accepted by the members 
of society, there will also exist an 
'objective' (in the sense of being 
inter-personally valid, but not 
universal -- because it will be 
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valid only for those other members 
of the society who accept most of 
its other rules) test of what is 
unjust. 22 
There is one qualification of a sort which 
should be noted about this objective standard of justice. 
In that it is a negative standard, there is no cer- 
tainty that therewill be but a single correct route 
in which the rules of the system should develop. 
Remember, the standard will only tell us what may not 
be done. But to recognize this does not detract from 
the fact that the standard does provide an objective 
test of what may not be done. 
It is thus at least conceivable 
that several different systems 
of rules of just conduct may sat- 
isfy this test. The fact that there 
exist different ideas of what is 
just does not preclude the possib- 
ility that the negative test of 
injifstice may be an objective 
test which several different but 
not all systems of such rules can 
satisfy. /--J 
One point remains to be made before leaving 
this topic. In theory Hayek's conception of justice 
does provide an objective standard for judging the 
rules of a system. However, in practice there is a 
real question as to just how objective this standard 
is. It is one thing to say that the system provides 
the standard against which a rule which it is pro- 
posed to apply must be judged. But it must be kept in 
mind that this standard will not apply itself. One 
or more persons will have to determine whether the 
proposed rule is or is not compatible with the exist- 
ing system of rules. And this determination cannot 
help but have a certain amount of discretion involved 
in its making. The crucial question is how much 
discretion is-ifivolved. The wider the discretion, 
the less objective the standard becomes. The wider 
the discretion, the more subjective the standard 
becomes, the more the standard becomes identified 
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with the personal judgement (opinion, belief, prejudice) 
of the decision maker. What all this comes down to is 
that what is needed before Hayek's standard of justice 
can be deemed objective in practice is a theory, at 
least in outline, of legal reasoning. But this is 
something which is explicitly lacking in Hayek's work. 
We will recur to this problem again in a later chapter. 
By now the reader may very well have drawn 
a conclusion about Hayek's conception of justice which 
seems begging to be drawn. That is, Hayek's conception 
of justice emphasizes form to the virtual exclusion of 
substance. Consider again the three primary ways in 
which a judgement of injustice can be made. First, it 
is unjust if the same rule is not applied to all. 
Second, it is unjust if the rule applied is not a 
part of or implicit in the existing system of rules. 
Finally, it is unjust if the rule applied is not a rule 
of just conduct. Not one of these judgements has anything 
to do with the actual content of the rule to be applied. 
In fact, it would be difficult to say that these judge- 
ments have anything to do with the form of the rules 
either. The fact is, the rules are already expressly 
or at least implicitly existing. The judgements are 
purely formalistic, dealing with the way the appro- 
priate rule is to be identified and with its 
universalization. 
Given all this, it seems hard to resist the 
conclusion that Hayek's conception of justice is 
totally divorced from any concern with the way people 
actually behave. So long as a rule exists in a 
society, be that rule what it may, justice requires 
that it be complied with and enforced. To a cer- 
tain extent I am afraid that such a conclusion is 
warranted. And such a conclusion seems intuitively 
most unpalatable. But before thinking the worst, 
before characterizing Hayek as some kind of immoralist, 
let us reconsider the position. There may be some- 
thing to be said in his defense after all. 
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To this end it might help to recall that a 
similar charge has been levied against Lon Fuller and 
his theory of the inner morality of law. The charge 
there is that by concentrating on the inner morality 
of law i. e. certain procedural requirements which 
must be met for something to be properly designated as 
. 
law -- Fuller is totally indifferent to the external 
morality of law -- i. e. the substance of law. In short 
order Fuller's reply to that charge is as follows: 
In presenting my analysis of the 
law's internal morality I have 
insisted that it is, over a wide 
range of issues, indifferent towards 
the substantive aims of law and is 
ready to serve a variety of such 
aims with equal efficacy. ... But 
a recognition that the internal 
morality of law may support and give 
efficacy to a wide variety of sub- 
stantive aims should not mislead 
us into believing that any sub- 
stantive aim may be adopted without 
compromise of legality. 24 
Hayek would, I believe, respond similarly to the charge' 
that he is indifferent to the substance of the rules 
of justice. And there would be some merit to such a 
response. 
To begin, the requirement of universaliz- 
ability, the principle of applying the same rules to 
all, puts a substantial check on the application*of 
rules the substance of which might commonly be con- 
sidered 'unjust'. Certainly rules of a particularly 
egregious nature are not apt to be applied, not if 
they will be equally applicable to the person applying 
the -rule. 
Then too, it must be recalled that there are 
a number of limitations, albeit formal ones, which 
affect the substance of rules of just conduct. And, 
in a-spontaneous order, which is all that Hayek is 
really concerned with, the rules of justice are of 
necessity rules of just conduct. I will not here repeat 
the detailed discussion of rules of just conduct 
found in an earlier chapter, but will instead merely 
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highlight the factors which appear relevant. Rules of 
just conduct are abstract, that is, their concern is 
with establishing patterns of behaviour, and they are 
intended to apply to an unknown number of future 
indeterminate instances. They are also purpose- 
independent, aiming at an order which allows the maximal 
opportunity for individuals to pursue their own aims. 
And, they are general; the classifications they draw 
should be as broad as possible rather than being so 
narrow as to allow ready identification of the people 
to be affected by the rule. 
Taken together, these factors will impose 
some limit on the content which the rules of justice 
may have. This is not to claim that they will by any 
means totally control the content of the rules. Nor 
will they even control that content to the extent that 
the theories of writers such as Rawls, Galston, and 
and Ackerman do, 
25 The theories of such writers 
identify specific substantive areas (including a realm 
of social justice) with which justice must be con- 
cerned. Clearly Hayek's theory identifies no such areas. 
Nevertheless, the fact is that Hayek's theory does 
impose some control over the content of the rules of 
justice, and any control at all is more than one is 
initially likely to believe present. And, to those 
who claim that this is not enough, I suspect that 
Hayek would reply that we must not confuse justice 
with the whole of morality. Other aspects of morality 
may very well determine how we are to interact with our 
fellows. Well and good. But justice is a determinate 
concept, and one cannot ask it to do more than is 
appropriate to it. 
Another criticism which is likely to be 
leveled at Hayek's conception of justice is related to 
the one with which we have just dealt. That is, 
that the thrust of the conception is predominantly, if 
not exclusively, conservative. To repeat for the 
umpteenth time, justice works within a system of 
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pre-existing rules. Its function, if one can so speak, 
is to maintain and facilitate the working of that system 
of rules. Justice is, if you will, the preserver of 
the status quo. Even when correction of the system 
is required, such correction always takes place within 
the existing structure of the overall system of rules. 
This process, it will be recalled, Hayek designates as 
immanent criticism. - 
We shall call 'immanent criticism' 
this sort of criticism that moves 
within a given system of rules and 
judges particular rules in terms of 
their consistency or compatibility 
with all other recognized rules in 
inducing the formation of a certain 
kind of order of actions. 26 
Now compare this conservative idea of justice 
with what D. D. Raphael calls prosthetic justice. 
"Prosthetic justice adds further rights, rights to bene- 
fits which were-not formerly counted due as a matter 
of right. . 
27 It would appear that there is no place 
for such ideas within Hayek's conception of justice. 
As we have already seen, justice cannot create something 
which is not there; it dan only lead us to discover 
what is already there. 
This criticism, like the previous one, I 
think too blunt and too indiscriminate. It would be 
wholly accurate if, and only if, the system of rules 
with which we were concerned were altogether internally 
consistent. )ýes, in such a case there would be no 
changes to be made, no new rights to be added. But 
what are the chances that there is, ever has been, 
or ever will be a system of rules which is altogether 
internally consistent? Moreover, there will always 
be the need to adapt the rules to changing circumstances. 
Once we grant that there are internal flaws 
in a system of rules, then there is room for Hayek's 
conception of justice to work. By applying the three 
tests of justice, by utilizing the process of immanent 
criticism, new rights will in a sense be created. 
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Such rights will not be altogether new, for they will 
of necessity have been implicit in the system. They 
will have been existing rights; but they will have 
existed onlý. in theory, not in practice. It is the 
application of the requirements of justice which will 
bring such rights into practice. One need not look 
far to find examples of such "newly" created rights. 
There can be no doubt that in such 
fields as the law on the relations 
between master and servant, [Footnote 
omitted] landlord and tenant, creditor 
and debtor, and in modern times between 
organized business and its customers, 
the rules have been shaped largely 
by the views of one of the parties and 
their particular interests -- es- 
pecially where, as used to be true 
in the first two of the instances 
given, it was one of the groups 
concerned which almost exclusively 
supplied the judges. 28 
In such circumstances justice functions conservatively 
in that: ft-sconcern is to maintain an existing system 
of rules. But it also functions prosthetically in 
that it brings to life rights which, though implicit 
in the system, had not heretofore been recognized 
in practice. 
Of course, a conception of justice which 
confines itself to the maintenance of an existing 
system of rules by means of immanent criticism cannot 
be as activist as a conception which purports to 
stand outside the system of rules which it judges. 
But then again, one must wonder if there can be a 
conception of justice which stands wholly outside 
the system of social rules which it purports to judge. 
It is a trite observation, made in many contexts, 
that the critic must always stand somewhere. And, 
given the broad meaning which Hayek assigns to the 
notion of rules, it is difficult to conceive how 
the critic of a society could ever--- stand altogether 
outside the rules of that society. Will not he always 
be embarked upon immanent criticism, criticizing 
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part of the system in terms of other parts. Only one 
such as the eskimo who criticizes a contemporary 
western society will be truly outwith the system of 
rules which he criticizes. And surely it is not 
such a situation which Raphael has in mind when he 
contrasts prosthetic with conservative justice. 
Yes, Hayek's conception of justice is con- 
servative, if by conservative is meant the maintenance 
and facilitation of an existing system of rules. But 
if by conservative is meant reactionary, then his 
conception of justice is most certainly not conserva- 
tive. It is instead prosthetic in that it adds 
"rights to benefits which were not formerly counted 
due as a matter of right. " 
There remains one final point to be made 
about the nature of Hayek's conception of justice, 
and that has to do with the very basis of this con- 
ception. What is it that is necessary for this 
conception of justice to exist and function? Recall 
yet again that justice presupposes a pre-existing 
system of rules. Recall also that Hayek's notion of 
a rule is broad enough to encompass not only rules 
in the ordinary sense but also what we would be more 
apt to call principles as distinct from rules. 
These rules are spontaneous in origin, and initially 
are abstract, unarticulated norms of behaviour. 
The search for justice goes hand in hand with the 
articulation of these heretofore unarticulated rules. 
But this process of articulation can succeed only 
to the extent that it remains faithful to the under- 
lying unarticulated norms. 
No group is likely to agree on 
articulated rules unless its 
members already hold opinions 
that coincide in some degree. 
Such coincidence of opinion will 
thus have to precede explicit 
agreement on articulated rules 
of just conduct ... . 
29 
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It is this underlying agreement which is the 
key to Hayek's conception of justice. Justice cannot 
play off against a system of rules unless there is in 
fact agreement as to the essence of that system. 
Our whole conception of justice 
rests on the belief that dif- 
ferent views about particulars 
are capable of being settled by the 
discovery of rules that, once they 
are stated, command general assent. 
If it were not for the fact that we 
often can discover that we do agree 
on general principles which are 
applicable, even though we at first 
disagree on the merits of the par- 
ticular case, the very idea of 
justice would lose its meaning. 30 
Thus, for Hayek justice presupposes a deep-seated, 
underlying agreement on basic values. Absent such 
agreement, it is meaningless to speak of justice. 
There are two closely related difficulties 
raised by this-position. The first is, exactly what 
constitutes agreement? Is it actual agreement, such 
that when confronted with principle X the average 
citizen would say, "oh yes, I hold that principle. " 
Or, is it more of a tacit agreement, such that it may 
have to be demonstrated dialogically to the average 
citizen that, know it or not, he does hold the principle 
in question. If the agreement required is to the latter 
alternative, then the way is open for some elite to tell 
the rest of us what it is which we really believe. 
Much of the criticism of the U. S. Supreme Court under 
Chief Justice Warren was that it was acting in this 
manner. If, on the other hand, the agreement required 
is actual agreement, we may find, at least in societies 
such as the United Kingdom and the United States, that 
Hayek is overly sanguine about the extent of the 
agreement on basic values. 
And that leads into the second difficulty 
which is precisely how much agreement is necessary 
to constitute agreement. Assuming, as seems 
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eminently reasonable, that unanimity is out of the 
question, what portion of the population of a society 
must agree on basic values in order for there to be 
agreement on those values? Moreover, when the point is 
reached at which it must be admitted that there is no 
agreement, what then? Does justice really go out of the 
window as Hayek maintains. I do not intend to attempt 
to answer these questions here. For now I pose them 
only to show that there are difficulties in maintaining 
that justice has meaning only where there is agreement 
on basic values. In a later chapter I intend to return 
to these issues, with especial reference to the way 
they affect Hayek's critique of social justice. 
To conclude this section, I can think of no 
better way than to quote at length what is probably 
the most detailed and comprehensive statement Hayek 
gives of his conception of justice. 
The essential points of this con- 
ception of justice are (a) that 
justice can be meaningfully attrib- 
uted only to human action and not 
to any state of affairs as such, 
without reference to the question 
whether it has been, or could have 
been, deliberately brought about 
by somebody; (b) that the rules 
of justice have essentially the 
nature of prohibitions, or, in 
other words, that injustice is really 
the primary concept and the aim of 
rules of just conduct is to prevent 
unjust action; (c) that the in- 
justice to be prevented is the infringe- 
ment of the protected domain of one's 
fellow men, a domain which is to 
be ascertained by means of these 
-rules of justice; and (d) that 
these rules of just conduct which 
are themselves negative can be 
developed by consistently applying 
to whatever such rules a society 
has inherited the equally negative 
test of universal applicability -- 
a test which in the last resort, 
is nothing else than the self- 
consistency of the actions which 
these rules allow if applied to 
the circumstances of the real world. 31 
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B. The Subject Matter of Justice 
Of the points which we have just seen Hayek 
to consider essential to his conception of justice, 
the first is one about which we have so far said 
nothing: 
that justice can be meaningfully 
attributed only to human action and 
not to any state of affairs as such, 
without reference to the question 
whether it has been, or could have 
been, deliberately brought 
about by somebody. 32 
This section will deal with that aspect. 
A threshold question to be considered is how 
this aspect of justice relates' to the three senses of 
justice which we discussed in the preceding section. 
To be honest, iE does not seem to me that there is a 
terribly close relationship between this aspect of 
justice and the three senses of justice. These two 
facets appear to represent quite different concerns 
of Hayek, which he never expressly bothers to tie 
together other than by denoting both as justice. 
Nevertheless, in an attempt to present a unified 
theory of justice, I would suggest that, the following 
is a way in which these two facets can be connected. 
The three senses of justice, taken together, 
deal with the identification and application of an 
existing system of rules. The requirement that 
justice apply only to human action provides a sort of 
generic limitation upon the rules of that system. I 
say generic, because the limitation is totally 
divorced from the content of those rules. It is 
concerned solely with the basic subject matter of those 
rules, saying nothing about how that subject matter 
is to be treated. What then is the nature of that 
generic limitation? 
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To go right to the heart of the matter, 
Hayek maintains that justice is concerned with human 
conduct alone. "Strictly speaking, only human conduct 
can be called just or unjust. . 
33 At first glance this 
position seems neither controversial, nor terribly in- 
formative. It seems patently obvious that only human 
beings can act justly or unjustly. Just conduct has 
no meaning when we speak of animals, vegetables, or 
minerals. However, the difficulty with this approach 
is that it confuses two distinct ideas. To say that 
only human beings can act justly or unjustly is not 
the same as to say that only human conduct can be 
called just or unjust. The latter is a broader claim, 
and it is one which is disputable. 
To see this we need only to consider some 
alternative positions which have been posited. For 
instance, David Miller maintains that the primary use 
of justice is in the sense of "just states of affairs". 
34 
John Rawls maintains that "justice is the first virtue 
of social institutions ... .,, 
35 And Lars Ericsson 
maintains that it is proper to speak of justice "as 
it applies to the patterns of distributions of values 
and disvalues that constitute the distributive effects 
of social cooperation and social conflicts of interest. 
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Taken at face value, each of these propositions attri- 
butes justice to something other than human conduct. 
Now, in order to better grasp the sense in 
which Hayek's position is distinct from views such as 
the above, let us take a closer look at the difference 
between Hayek and Miller. Perhaps it might be argued 
that Hayek has overstated his case in maintaining that 
only human conduct can be called just or unjust. If 
presented with a position such as Miller's he might 
readily admit that it was compatible with what he 
understands by justice. But any such supposition can 
be readily quashed. 
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Justice is thus emphatically not 
a balancing of particular interest 
at stake in a concrete case, or even 
of the interests of determinable 
classes of person, nor does it aim 
at bringing about a particular 
state of affairs which is regarded 
as just. 37 
No, there can be no doubt that Hayek rejects Miller's 
views on the appropriate subject matter of justice. 
But what is it about attributing justice. to 
states of affairs which Hayek finds so objectionable? 
What is the difference between calling a particular 
instance of human conduct unjust and calling the state 
of affairs which that conduct produces unjust? In 
fact, there does not appear to be any. So wherein 
lies the problem? 
Consider, while all human conduct will pro- 
duce some state of affairs, not all states of affairs 
are produced by human conduct. A great many states of 
affairs come about wholly independently of any human 
conduct; they simply happen. Whether we say that 
nature, chance, God, or something else has brought 
tilem. about,, the fact remains that is is, not : 
human-conduct 
which has done so. Hayek is quite willing to call some 
states of affairs just. But when he does so what he is 
really talking about is the underlying human conduct. ' 
if we apply the. terms [just or 
unjust] to a state of affairs, 
they have meaning only in so far 
as we hold someone responsible 
for bringing it about or allowing 
it to come about. A bare fact or 
a state of affairs which nobody 
can change, may be good or bad, 
but not just or unjust. EFootnote 
omitted) To apply the term 'just' 
to circumstances other than human 
actions or the rules governing 
them is a category mistake. 3 
What Hayek objects to is the attribution of justice 
to states of affairs which have not been produced by 
human conduct. Thus, the above quotation continues: 
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Only if we mean to blame a personal 
creator does it make sense to describe 
it as unjust that somebody has been 
born with a physical defect, or been 
stricken with a disease, or has 
suffered the loss of a loved one. 
Nature can be neither just nor. 
unjust. 39 
Miller, on the other hand, is prepared to treat 
a broader range of states of affairs as appropriate for 
judgements of justice. Nonetheless, even his position 
has limits. And, to see precisely where he differs 
from Hayek it is necessary to quote him at length. 
Not every state of affairs can properly 
be described as just or unjust. It 
mustj first of all, involve sentient 
beings, and --paradigmatically it 
involves beingsiýho are both sentient 
and rational. ... It must also be 
a state of affairs in iqhiý-h. at 
least one of the sentient beings is 
enjoying a benefit or suffering a 
burden; if no one is affected in 
either of these ways, questions of 
justice cannot arise. It must, 
thirdly, be a state of affairs which 
J. has resulted 
from the actions of 
sentient beings, or is at least 
of being changed by such 
actions. [emphasis added] 4U 
The underscored passage is crucial. In rejecting 
states of affairs as an appropriate subject 
for justice, 
Hayek is rejecting the claim that any situation which 
can be affected by human beings may. properly*be judged 
just or unjust. For Hayek only situations which human 
beings have brought about can'be judged to be just or 
unjust. it is for that reason that, referring speci- 
fically to Miller, he can say: 
The younger generation of social 
philosophers apparently do not ý 
even know what the basic concepts 
once meant. Only thus can it be 
explained when we find a young 
scholar seriously asserting that 
the usage of speaking of a 'just 
state of. affairs ... must be 
regarded as the primary one 
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(Footnote omitted] ... As we have seen a state of affairs which has not 
been deliberately brought about 
by men can possess neither intelli- 
gence nor virtue, nor justice, nor 
any other attribute of human 
values ... . 
41 
This stance certainly puts Hayek in the 
minority of contemporary social theorists. Miller is 
not alone in wishing to treat any situation which 
human beings can affect as a proper subject matter 
for justice. In fact, his position is even mild in 
comparison to some. Bruce Ackerman seeks to include 
even genetic endowmentin the subject matter of 
justice. 42 (Ackerman's views are so extreme that one 
wonders at times why he chose to omit the weather 
from his consideration. ). Be that as it may, Hayek 
has staked out a position which puts him at odds with 
many of his' contemporaries in the field of social 
philosophy. 
There is, however one difficulty with his 
position: it may rest upon a distinction without a 
difference. To wit, if human beings can change a 
situation and elect not to, can they not then be said 
to be responsible for the continued existence of that 
situation? If so, then we would have the human conduct 
which Hayek requires for a judgement of justice. To 
answer that question we have to know what it is that 
Hayek understands by human conduct. And to that 
subject I now turn. 
Let us begin with a point so obvious that 
I do not believe Hayek ever mentions it. Only voli- 
tional human action can be considered just or unjust. 
Clearly conduct which results from some force over 
which the person has no control -- such as an epileptic 
fit or a post-hypnotic suggestion -- can be neither 
just nor unjust. Similarly, a person who is bodily 
used as an instrument by another -- e. g. deliberately 
pushed into a third party -- acts neither justly nor 
unjustly. 
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.- Likewise, a person who is coerced into acting 
does not act volitionally, and hence cannot fairly 
be judged to have acted justly or unjustly. Of course, 
there are some problems here. Namely, what con- 
stitutes coerdion in a given situation, and whether 
coercion can ever be said to justify certain extreme 
actions, such as taking innocent human life. But these 
questions are beyond the scope of this study, involving 
as they do a detailed analysis of the philosophy of 
action. For our purposes it is enough to say that the 
idea of human conduct presupposes volitional. action, 
recognizing that at times what is volitional may be 
a moot point. 
There is one further point to add here, 
though. A strict determinist, or a behay. iourist 
such as B. F. Skinner,, might deny that there is ever 
such a thing as genuinely volitional action. And that 
would nullify the distinction just drawn between 
actions which constitute human conduct and those which 
do not. As'it turrsout, however, there is absolutely 
-nothing. in Hayek's writings to even faintly suggest 
that he holdssuch a position. Quite-the contrary, the 
notions of free will and responsibility play major 
roles in his entire social philosophy. 
Another quite obvious point which can be 
dispensed with rather quickly is that the human conduct 
with which justice is concerned must be conduct- which 
affects other human beings. Technically, this is not 
a requirement of human conduct, for patently human 
conduct can affect no one but the actor himself. But 
inasmuch as our present concern is the relation between 
justice and human conduct, it seems appropriate to note 
this factor here. As we have already seen, justice is 
inextricably linked with rules of just- conduct Jat 
least in a spontaneous order), and "rules of just 
conduct refer to such actions of individuals as affect 
others. " 
43 Admittedly, the line between conduct 
which affects others and that which does not may 
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frequently be difficult to draw. But that the distinc- 
tion may be difficult to draw in practice does not 
affect its importance in theory. 
One of the most interesting issues concerning 
human conduct arises when we consider the matter of 
consequences. As we have just seen in the preceding 
paragraph, in order for human conduct to raise problems 
of justice, it must affect other persons. And, when 
we talk about theEffects of an action on other persons, 
we are talking about its consequences. Thus, the 
question which must beanswered is, what sort of con- 
sequences are relevant to judgements of justice? 
Of course, like the analysis of volitionality, 
the analysis of consequences is a study unto itself. 
Hence in a work of this nature one cannot hope to do 
more than scratch the surface of some of the major 
issues. For that reason, our consideration will be 
limited to those issues raised by Hayek either ex- 
pressly, or imilicitly, in that they are fair re- 
joinders to points he makes. 
There are a variety of approaches one can 
take to the study of consequences, and the alternatives 
are by no means mutually exclusive. One could, for 
instance, begin by distinguishing the results of an 
action from its consequences. Or, one could concentrate 
on the distinction between proxima-te and distal con- 
sequences. And, in some contexts, e. g. the realm of 
legal decisions, one might choose to distinguish 
factual consequences from logical ones. Hayek utilizes 
none of these approaches. Instead, he concentrates his 
attention on two categories: intended and foreseeable 
consequences. 
If there is one aspect of his position which 
is clear, it is that justice is concerned with the 
intended consequences of human action. "Justice, like 
liberty and coercion, is a concept which, for the sake 
of clarity, ought to be confined to the deliberate treat- 
ment of men by other men. , 
44 or again, "[t1he attribute 
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of justice may thus be predicated about the intended 
results of human action but not about circumstances 
which have not deliberately been brought about by 
men. , 
45 Thus, whatever a man intends to bring 
about, and in fact does bring about, falls within the 
realm of justice. That much seems to be clear. 
There are, however, several difficulties with 
the notion of intended consequences with which Hayek 
does not deal. For instance, there is the question of 
intended consequences which do not eventuate. How are 
we to treat such a situation for purposes of justice. 
There are really two situations which must be con- 
sidered here: that in which the intended consequences 
would be just, and that in which the intended con- 
sequences would be unjust. 
Let us take the latter first. Consider a 
simple example, an attempted murder which fails 
through no fault of the prospective murderer. (Quaere, 
whether this situation actually raises an issue of 
justice. But notwithstanding any doubt thereon, it 
does illustrate the point with which we are concerned. ) 
If we consider solely the consequences which have 
actually eventuated, we must conclude that the actor 
has not done wrong. (I speak of doing wrong here to 
allow for the possibility the case may not actually raise 
a problem of justice. ) But this seems a counter- 
intuitive and most undesirable result. Moreover, in 
terms of the actual criminal law, we know it to be a 
counter-factual result. That is to say, under the crim- 
inal law the actor is judged in terms of what he 
intended to accomplish. (For present purposes it is 
irrelevant that the penalty for an attempted offense 
may be less than that for a committed offense. ) 
Now, the question, is how would Hayek deal 
with such a situation, keeping in mind that he does 
not specifically address the point at all. It is my 
belief that he would treat the intended, albeit un- 
realized, consequendes as a fitting subject for a 
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judgement of justice. I take this position for three 
reasons. First, the contrary position would, as I have 
already noted, be counter-intuitive. While the fact in 
and of itself is not determinative of anything, when 
combined with the fact that Hayek does not argue the 
contrary position, it becomes significant. It seems to 
me unreasonable to impute a counter-intuitive posi- 
tion to a theorist, when he does not espouse that 
position either expressly or implicitly. 
The second reason I offer in support of the 
position I have suggested is that the contrary result 
would be incompatible with the heavy emphasis which 
Hayek places on personal responsibility. As I alluded 
to earlier in the discussion of determinism, personal 
responsibility is a cornerstone of Hayek's philosophy, 
both in a descriptive and in a normative sense. That 
is to say, his view of society assumes both that 
individuals are responsible for their own actions and 
that they shoul-d be so responsible. Now, if respon- 
sibility has any applicability at all, it must 
certainly apply to the consequendes an individual in- 
tends to bring about. Arguably, responsibility may 
extend further than that. But it would be a strange 
notion of responsibility indeed which did not extend 
at least so far. 
The final reason why I believe that Hayek 
would treat these intended but unaccomplished con- 
sequences as being within the realm of justice is that 
this position is compatible with what he actually says 
about justice and consequences, while the contrary 
position is not. Consider again the statement 
quoted above: "[t3he attribute of justice may thus be 
predicated about the intended results of human action 
but not about circumstances which have not deliberately 
been brought about by men. " What we are warned against 
is predicating justice of circumstances which were not 
deliberately brought about. To hold a man responsible 
for intended but unaccomplished consequences is not 
115 
incompatible with this exclusion. Moreover, it is 
compatible with predicating justice as to the intended 
results of human action. This reason, taken together 
with the other two, seems to me. ample justification 
for concluding that Hayek would include within the 
realm of justice intended consequences which do not, 
in fact, eventuate, provided that those intended con- 
sequences are unjust. 
But what of the counterpart to this situa- 
tion. By-this I mean a situation-. in which the actor 
intends to accomplish something which would be just, 
but actually. accomplishes something different which is 
unjust. The story of Isaac, Jacob, and Esau comes 46 
readily to mind here. Isaac, who is blin. d, intends 
to bestow his blessing upon Esau, but bestows it 
instead upon Jacob who has impersonated Esau. Has 
Isaac acted unjustly? 
It seems to me that the same arguments used 
above here dictate that the answer is no. To say 
that Isaac has acted unjustly is counterintuitive, and 
there is no explicit basis in Hayek for drawing this 
conclusion. - To say that. Isaac has acted 1ýinjustly- is 
to hold him resp_pns7iVle for something which (according 
to the Old Testament account) was beyond his control. 
And this flies in the very teeth of the notion of 
personal responsibility. Finally, to say that Isaac 
has acted unjustly is to predicate justice about 
circumstances which were not deliberately brought 
about by Isaac. In short, there seem no grounds 
whatsoever for saying that Isaac has acted unjustly. 
This, of course, is not to say that no 
injustice has been committed. There has been, but the 
injustice is the act, the intended and deliberate act 
of Jacob. Admittedly, the state of affairs -- the 
depriving of Esau of Isaac's blessing -- is the same 
whether we look from Isaac's position or Jacob's. 
But-this illustrates well Hayek's contention that it 
is never states of affairs as such which are just or 
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unjust, but only the conduct which produces them. 
This may sound like hair-splitting, particularly in 
the circumstances under consideration. But that would 
be too facile a judgement. Had Jacob's action in 
some way been a mistake, i. e. non-intentional, the state 
of affairs would still have been the same. That is, 
Esau would have been deprived of the blessing. But 
in these circumstances the predication of justice would 
clearly be inappropriate. We might describe the state 
of affairs as unfortunate, or unfair, or inappropriate. 
What we would not do is describe them as unjust. 
To sum up then, justice and injustice may 
properly be predicated only of the intended conse- 
quences of human action. This remains the case even in 
those situationsin which the intended consequences are 
different from those which actually result. For Hayek 
unintended consequences may never be judged just or 
unjust, intended consequences must always be so judged, 
even when they fail to eventuate. 
So far so good. However, to this point we 
have been speaking as if there could never be any 
doubt as to what the intended consequences of an action 
were. But is this necessarily the case? There is apt 
to be some confusion here, so let me make clear 
what it is about which I am concerned. I am not con- 
cerned with the simple empirical question of what the 
actor intended to accomplish by his action. Although 
there may be situations in which this question will 
be difficult to answer, it remains an empirical 
question, and as such of limited theoretical interest. 
My concern here is with the way in which 
the actor categorizes his action -- assuming all the 
time that he is being honest in explaining his intent 
to us. An actor may categorize his action so narrowly 
as to exclude from consideration what would normally 
be thought to be significant consequences. A standard 
example of this (albeit not realistically relevant 
for our purposes) is to describe an action as squeezing 
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the trigger of a gun. Under this description the 
actor might seek to limit the consequences of his 
action to causing the firing pin to strike a bullet. 
Alternatively, the actor might categorize his action 
so broadly as to exclude from consideration what would 
normally be thought to be significant consequences. 
For example, an action might be described as making 
the water level in the bathtub rise, glossing over the 
fact that this was done by holding a small child under 
the water. 
Such cases seem so obviously contrived that 
it is difficult to imagine a serious question of 
justice arising in the context of one. But given the 
popularity of this question, i. e. the categorization 
of an action, it seems fair to ask how Hayek would 
deal with it. - -One possibility depends on the idea of 
responsibility. As we have already seen, responsibility 
is closely related to Hayek's stress on the intentional 
consequences of human conduct. Justice is not pre- 
dicated of the unintended consequences of action because 
human beings are not to be held responsible for things 
beyond their control. This would suggest at least a 
rough equivalence between intended consequences and 
consequences within the actor's control. In the situa- 
tions under consideration, what we might call the 
untoward circumstances are within the actor's control. 
He might not categorize his action so as to depict 
these circumstances as intended consequences. But, 
in terms of what appears to be the r6levant factor -- 
responsibility -- they are identical to intended 
consequences. It would, therefore, appear not un- 
reasonable to attribute such circumstances to the 
actor, irrespective of whether he himself treats them 
as consequences of his action. 
That is one way in which Hayek might approach 
this sort of problem. There is also another way, 
and that involves the notion of foreseeability. 
Whether or not consequences are foreseeable is a 
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totally distinct question from whether they are 
intended. Hence, if Hayek would predicate justice of 
foreseeable consequences, another route is open to 
bring the above situations within the realm of justice. 
This because in these types 'Of situations the conse- 
quences with which we are concerned are foreseeable, 
regardless of how the actor chooses to categorize his 
specific acti6n. 
And so the question to which we now turn is, 
does Hayek treat foreseeable consequences as within 
the realm of justice. Let me fiote at the outset 
that the question of foreseeability has a wider signif- 
icance than the somewhat contrived problem which has just 
lead us to this topic. Its most obvious relevance is in 
situations in which a person intends to produce a given 
consequence, and acts so as to produce that consequence, 
knowing full well that in so doing he will also produce 
another consequence which is in itself undesirable. In 
terms of Hayek's"social philosophy the most important 
occurrence of such questions is in the context of the market 
economy, for it may be argued that while certain results of 
such-an economy are unintended, they are nonetheless fore- 
seeable. This particular issue is one with which we will 
deal in greater detail later. 
Unfortunately, Hayek's position on fore- 
seeability and justice is far from clear. Quite 
frequently he talks as if justice were solelyconcerned 
with intentional consequences. For instance, in the 
passage cited a few pages back he says, "[t1he attribute 
of justice may thus be predicated about the intended 47 
results of human action" . Note, there is no mention 
of foreseeability. And silence suggests omission. 
On the other hand, there are at least three 
passages in which he makes the negative statement that 
'we cannot treat as just or unjust consequences which 
are neither intended nor foreseen. Each of these 
passagesýarises in the context. of a discussion of 
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so-called 'distributions' in a market economy. For 
example, "if it is not the intended or foreseen result 
of somebody's action that A should have much and B 
little, this cannot be called just or unjust. , 
48 
From this second line of passages it would 
seem fair to conclude that justice can be predicated 
of consequences which, though unintended, are foreseen. 
But what then of the contrary line of passages? 
Ideally one would like to be able to reconcile in some 
way these two lines of thought. Yes, it could be 
argued that the first set of passages do not specifi- 
cally exclude foreseeable consequences, but rather are 
silent concerning them. And, contrary to what I said 
above, perhaps silence does not imply exclusion. Yet, 
in the context in question, the silence does seem 
significant. When the question is what sort of con- 
sequences are relevant to judgements of justice, to 
say intentional consequences and to say no more, strongly 
suggests that it is only intentional consequences which 
are relevant. 
My point here is perhaps an odd one, and may 
even seem inappropriate. Be that as it may, I do 
not think the two lines of thought are reconcilable. 
Instead, I think this is an excellent example of the 
sloppiness which sometimes creeps into Hayek's 
thoughts about justice. At timeshe tells us that 
justice is concerned only with intentional conse- 
quences, and at other times he tells us that it is 
concerned with both intentional and foreseeable 
consequences. Such inconsistency I consider wholly 
indefensible in a reputable scholar, and it is for 
that reason that I call attention to it. 
In any event, given the contrary lines of 
thought, it appears to me clear that the second must 
be treated as controlling. Foreseeable consequences 
must be treated as within the realm of justice. I 
conclude this because it would be an odd notion of 
responsibility indeed which ignored the foreseeable 
120 
consequences of action. It would be so counter- 
intuitive that one could fairly expect the position 
to be justified in some way. But this is not done. 
Thus, while there are passages which, by silence, 
exclude foreseeable consequences from the realm of 
justice, the lack of any argument to support this 
position, combined with passages which expressly include 
such consequences, leads me to maintain thatHayek's 
conception of justice can and must be predicated of 
both ihtendeaand foreseeable consequences. 
Granting this, it remains to determine what 
Hayek would understand by foreseeable consequences. 
I am aware of only two instances in which he speci- 
fically discusses the question of foreseeability, and 
neither of these occurs in Law, Legislation and Liberty. 
The first occurs in the context of a discussion of 
individualism. In this passage he sets forth what 
might be called a strict or tight standard of foresee- 
ability. It stresses that foreseeability should be 
judged only from the viewpoint of the actor whose 
conduct is in question. 
The real question, therefore, is not 
whether man is, or ought to be, 
guided by selfish motives but 
whether we can allow him to be guided 
in his actions by those immediate 
consequences which he can know 
and care for or whether he ought to 
be made to do what seems appropriate 
to somebody else who is supposed to 
possess a fuller comprehension of 
the significance of these actions 
to society as a whole. 49 
To paraphrase, foreseeability is restricted to only 
what the individual himself can foresee and does not 
take in what can allegedly be foreseen by some expert. 
The second passage, though more succinct, squares with 
the first one: 
This means that what he is allowed 
or required to do must depend only 
on circumstances he can be presumed 
to know or be able to ascertain. 
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No rule can be e*f f ective, or can 
leave him free to decide, that makes 
his range of free decisions dep- 
endent on remote consequences of 
his actions beyond his ability to 
foresee. 50 
The difficulty which I see with Hayek's 
position is that it rests upon a distinction which is 
not nearly so clear as he appears to think. It takes 
little thought to realize that there must be some 
objective standard of foreseeability. This because if 
we literally judge foreseeability from the viewpoint 
of the individual in and of himself, there. would seldom 
be legitimate gro . unds to criticize anyone. Yes, there 
would be situations in which it could be said that the 
actor saw the consequences of his action and deliberately 
chose to ignore them. But more commonly we will be 
faced with a situation in which the actor can fairly 
say that he never saw or anticipated that certain con- 
sequences would result. To accept this statement as 
the final word, would be to accept a standard of 
foreseeabilitY which -smacked of solipsism. 
Rather than this, it seems plausible that 
Hayek must intend some sort of reasonable man standard 
similar to that found in tort law: viz., foresee- 
ability is to be assessed in terms of what a reasonable 
man in like circumstances would foresee.. However, 
once we admit the reasonable man standard, we open'a 
door by which expert opinion can creep back in, for surely 
the reasonable man would take heed of expert opinion. 
How then are we to balance Hayek' 's patent 
desire for a strict standard of foreseeability with 
the need for a reasonable man standard? The answer, I 
believe, lies in Hayek's epistemology. As we saw in an 
early- chapter, Hayek is a proponent of what he calls 
critical rationalism and a persistent and determined 
opponent of what he calls constructive rationalism. 
He maintains that, given the limits of the human mind 
and the vagaries of the'world in which we live, we 
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have-at very best a narrowly circumscribed ability to 
foresee the consequences of our actions. The appro- 
priate standard of foreseeability follows from this 
premise: foreseeability must rest within the limita- 
tions of critical rationalism. An individual can be 
-held responsible for those consequences which a reason- 
able man standing in his situation would have foreýeen, 
againwithin- the'. 1imits of critical rationalism. As to 
expert opinion, there is no difficulty in taking such 
into account, provided it too remains within the bounds 
of critical rationalism. Difficulty arises -- and this 
I think is Hayek's source of concern -- when the expert 
attempts to engage in constructive rationalism. It is 
-such transcendental foresight which he declines to 
impute to the individual. And it is consequences which 
can be 'foreseen' only in this sense which he excludes 
from the province of justice. Admittedly, the dis- 
tinction will still be difficult to draw. But the 
difficulty now is at least practical rather than 
theoretical. Thus,. though difficult to draw, the 
distinction is at least significant. 
Let us noý7 turn to what is -p3ýobably the most 
important, gap in Hayek's consideration of human action. 
-That gap 
is the prohlem of omissions. To the present 
we have been concerned with situations in which the 
actor has affirmatively acted. But what of situations 
inwhich the actor declines to act? In one sense in 
such situations the actor does nothing. But in 
another sense doing-nothing is itself an action. 
The question then is, can justice be predicated of the 
consequences of such actions by omission? 
As already indicated, Hayek nowhere speci- 
fically confronts this issue. When speaking of the 
relation between justice and human conduct his'concern is 
almost exclusively-intended consequences. And from the 
context it is clear that he is thinking in terms of 
affirmative action. There are, however, a-few passages 
in which, seemingly unwittingly, Hayek makes some. 
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mention of failure to act., For instance hetells us 
that justice can be meaningfully 
attributed only to human action 
and not to any, state of affairs as 
such, without reference to the 
question whether it has been, 
. or could have, been deliberately brought about by-gymebody. 
[emphasis added] 
Or again he says: 
If we apply the terms [just or 
unjust] to a state of affairs, they 
have meaning only in so far as we 
'hold someone responsible for bring- 
ing it about or allowing it to. come 
about. [emphasis added] 
Taking his words literally, we can conclude 
that justice is concerned with states of affairs whýich* 
could have been brought about by someone, and states of 
affairs which someone has allowed to come about. The 
trouble is, this conclusion appears to go a long way 
towards completely emasculating the distinction he 
has attempted to draw between justice as a predicate of 
human conduct alone and justice as a predicate of states 
of affairs. But is that really the case? 
Let us begin -with the first passage'-. 
'- Wh I ile not 
every state of affairs could have been. deliberately brought 
about by someone, there are certainly a great many which 
could have been. To say that all such situations can have 
justice predicated of them is to expand the realm of justice 
far beyond the'limits which Hayek is otherwise trying to 
impose. Or is it? 
Let us consider a little further what could 
be meant by saying that justice can be predicated of 
any state of affairs which could have been brought 
about by somebody. Consider first a state of affairs 
which would be called just, if only someone had deliberately 
brought it about. Is Hayek to be understood as saying that 
anyone who could have brought this state of affairs about, 
even though they did not in fact do so, has acted justly? 
That-conclusion seems too ludicrous to be possible. Consider 
then a state of affairs which could be called unjust, if only 
someone had deliberately brought it about. Is Hayek here to 
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be understood as saying that anyone who could have brought 
this state, of affairs about, even though they did not in 
fact do so, has behave unjustly? This conclusion too seems 
beyond the pale. 
'But if we eliminate both of these possibilities, 
what is it that Hayek is saying? I suggest that the 
only possible meaning of this passage lies, in treating 
it as a most misleading elliptical statement. The 
state of affairs which could have been brought'about 
can only refer to the contrary of the state of affairs 
which actually exists. Moreover, we must assume that 
the state of affairs which actually exists is one-which 
would be called unjust, if only someone had deliberately 
brought it about. What Hayek ig then saying is that 
anyone, who had it within his power to'prevent the' 
occurrence of a state of affairs which would be called 
unjust if someone had deliberately brought it about, 
has in fact acted unjustly by failing to prevent the 
occurrence of that state of affairs. That interpreta- 
tion is at least plausible. This is particularly so when 
you consider that this passage has now become nothing 
more-than a rather tortuous restatemene of-the other 
passage I have cited; namely, that justice can, be pre- 
dicated of states of affairs which people have allwed to 
come about. 
Granting that that is what Hayek is saying, it 
still remains to ask whether he can really mean what he- 
is saying. Does he really mean that justice can be pre-', 
dicated of any state ofýaffairs which someone-has allowed 
to occur? The answer to this question is most certainly 
no. Although we have had little occasion to refer-to it 
in this section, we must'recall yet'again that for Hayek 
the sine qua non of justice is rules. And, in a spon- 
taneous order those rules will be rules of just conduct. 
justice can be predicated of a failure to act if and only 
if that failure to act is proscribed by a rule of just 
conduct. Hence, it is not the case that every failure 
to act raises a problem of justice. 
. 9-5 
It would be impossible to attempt here to 
give any even faintly detailed listing of the situa- 
tions in which Hayek would see an obligation to act. 
obviously such a listing would depend upon the system 
of rules which exist in the society *under considera- 
tion. And even on the broad level. of spontaneous 
orders in general no meaningful catalogue is possible. 
The best that can be done is to draw attention to two 
factorý which suggest that the number of situations 
in which action will be obligatory is quite limited. 
The points which follow have been made in greater detail 
in an earlier chapter. But it i's worthwhile touching 
on them again here. 
The first factor is Hayek's contention that 
the rules of 'just conduct are predominantly negative 
in form. They aim to'define the individual's prot ected 
sphere of responsibility, not by telling him what he 
may do, but by telling 6thers what they may not -do. 
This emphasis on proscription rather than prescrip- 
tion is the result of two factors. The primary one is 
that the function of a spontaneous order, to the 
extent A-t--can be- said -to have a func: tion, is to provide 
the maximum possible opportunity for individuals to 
pursue their own ends secure from the interference of 
others. This is best done by negative rules. 
The other factor which is here pertinent is the 
increasing size of what Hayek calls the Great Society. 
justice requires that the same rules be applied to all. 
As a society grows beyond the tribal level, this re- 
quirement becomes feasible only if the rules abstract 
more and more from particulars. Patentiy, the larger 
a society the fewer particulars an individual will 
know about any of his fellows. And it is negative rules 
rather than positive ones which can most readily be 
abstracted from particulars. 
In addition to the restrictions imposed by 
the rules of just conduct there is also another 
element which serves to limit the scope of obligations 
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to act. This is the fact that society is a spontaneous 
order rather than a deliberate construction, a, cosmos 
rather than a taxis. For Hayek this means that many 
states of affairs are altogether outwith the sphere of 
human control. They are the result of human action 
but not of human design. And the maintenance of the 
spontaneous order dictates that such states of affairs 
should continue to remain outwith the sphere of human 
control. The most notable example of this phenomenon 
are the distributions of the market economy. Thus even 
w. ere it possible to articulate rules of just conduct 
applicable to such states of affairs, the need to 
maintain the spontaneous order would dictate that they 
not be brought within human control. And that is 
simply another way to say that there should be no 
obligation to act in regard to such states of affairs. 
The long and short of all this is that for 
Hayek there will be very few situations in which an 
individual is required to act in a particular way, 
as distinct from not acting in a particular way. There 
are, therefore, very few situations in which by allowing 
a state of affairs to come about an individual has 
engaged in conduct of which justice can be predicated. 
In this, as in so many things, his position stands in 
marked contrast to the position of the majority of 
contemporary social theorists. To give but a single 
example, consider again Hayek's reference to congenital 
defects. 
Only if we mean to blame a personal 
creator does it make sense to 
describe it as unjust that somebody 
has been born with a physical 
defect ... . 
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Now compare what John Rawls has to say about a similar 
problem. 
The natural distribution (of 
talents] is neither just nor un- 
just; nor is it unjust that persons 
are born into society at some par- 
ticular position. These are simply 
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natural facts. What is just and 
unjust is the way that institutions 
deal with these facts. 54 
In a later chapter we will consider this problem of 
failures to act, in relation to the critique of social 
justice. 
To this point I have been concerned with 
analyzing the conduct element of human conduct. 
But 
to fully understand Hayek's position on the relationship 
of human conduct and justice we must also consider the 
human element. That is, we must consider who or what 
can act so as to come within the realm of 
justice. 
Fortunately, Hayek's position is, for a change, 
quite clear and consequently we can dispose of this 
issue relatively quickly. Individuals, groups of 
individuals, and organizations can all act justly or 
unjustly; society, however, cannot. 
Evidently, not. only the actions of 
individuals but also the concerted 
actions of many individuals, or the 
actions of organizations, may be 
just or unjust. Government is such 
an organization, but society is 
not. And, though the order of so- 
ciety will be affected by actions of 
government, so long as it remains 
a spontaneous order, the particular 
results of the social process cannot 
be just or unjust. 55 
Little comment is warranted on those entities which are 
included. If the actions of an individual do not 
constitute human conduct, what does? Similarly, if 
the actions of a single individual are included, 
why not the actions of several individuals acting 
together? Organizations may at first give pause 
for thought, but in effect they are no more than a 
very large group of individuals acting in concert. 
And, government is patently an organization. The factor 
which is common to each of these cases is that there 
is some entity capable of deliberate, purposeful action. 
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It is the absence of this factor which justi- 
fies the exclusion of society. For Hayek society is 
not an entity capable of deliberate, purposeful action. 
It is instead a spontaneous order which functions by 
human action but not human design. Obviously the most 
direct way to challenge this exclusion of society from 
the group of entities which can engage in human conduct 
is to attack its status as a spontaneous order. one 
might argue that society is not in fact a spontaneous 
order. Alternatively, one might argue that society 
should be changed from a spontaneous to a directed 
order. 
There is, however, another way which would 
leave unchallenged Hayek's basic premise. That is to 
argue that, notwithstanding the status of society as 
a spontaneous order, the actions attributed to it are 
ultimately the actions of individuals. And, the actions 
of individuals-can be adjudged to be just or unjust. 
As we have seen, however, it is only the intended or 
foreseeable consequences of an ihdividuall" s actions of 
which justice can be predicated. The problem then 
becomes to show that the actions of society which it is 
sought to judge can fairly be viewed as the intended 
or foreseeable consequences of individual conduct. This 
line of attack would be especially apropos when con- 
sidering whether market distributions can be adjudged 
just or unjust. For now I will content myself with 
merely noting the possibility of this line of attack. 
But it will receive greater consideration later in 
the thesis. In any event, notwithstanding the via- 
bility of the position, Hayek does maintain that 
justice cannot properly be predicated of the actions 
of society. 
And with that we complete our analysis of 
human conduct as it relates to justice. There remain 
however, two further points which pertain to what I 
have designated as Hayek's views of the subject matter 
of justice. These points are both negative, involving 
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things which Hayek maintains justic6i is not concerned 
with. Like the topic of human conduct, their con- 
nection with justice is their relation to the rules 
which are the sine qua non of justice. But unlike the 
topic of human conduct, their focus is, not what the rules 
of justice are concerned with, but rather what those 
rules are not concerned with. These two points are 
apparently singled out for consideration because they 
are, in fact, frequently treated as within the subject 
matter of justice. And for that reason Hayek takes the 
trouble to specifically exclude them 
The first of these exclusions is found in 
Hayek's frequent warning that justice is concerned 
only with transactions. and not with the results thereof. 
[J]ustice is not concerned with the 
results of the various transactions 
but only with whether the tran- 
sactions themselves are fair. 56 
This sounds a bit like the old adage: it doesn't 
matter whether you win or lose, it's how you play the 
game which counts. And in fact, Hayek cites John 
Locke for virtually the identical point.. 
It was from this tradition that John 
Locke and his contemporaries derived 
the classical liberal conception of 
justice for which, as has been rightly 
said, it was only 'the way in which 
competition was carried on' [Footnote 
omitted] that could be just or 
unjust. 57 
At first blush this might sound like an ad- 
monition to concern ourselves solely with what people 
do as distinct from the consequences of what they do. 
But, even were it possible to keep separate an action 
and its consequences, we have already seen that justice 
is concerned with the consequences of human action, 
provided they be intended or foreseeable., What then 
is Hayek about when he stresses the transaction over 
the result? I would suggest that his aim is to emphasize 
thatfactors beyond the control of the actor can ana 
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frequently do significantly influence the outcome of 
his actions. Such factors are of two sorts: the con- 
current or subsequent action of others, and what might 
be called the role of chance. To the extent that these 
factors are responsible for a particular outcome, that 
outcome cannot have justice predicated of it. 
Since the consequences of applying 
rules of just conduct will always 
depend on factual circumstances 
which are not determined by these 
rules, we cannot measure the justice 
of the application of a rule by 
the result it will produce in a 
particular case. ... That it is 
possible for one through a single 
just transaction to gain much and for 
another through an equally just trans- 
action to lose all, (Footnote omitted] 
in no way disproves the justice of 
these transactions. Justice is not 
concerned with those unintended con- 
sequences of a spontaneous order 
whicb-have not been deliberately 
brought abgut by anybody. [Footnote 
omitted] 5 
This is the issue with which Hayek is concerned when 
he says that justice must be concerned with trans- 
actions and not results. 
The stress on transactions over results 
also has significance in another way. It is relevant 
to assessing the justice of rules. As we saw in the 
first section of this chapter, to say that a rule is 
unjust is to say that it is not a part of and/or 
compatible with the existing system of rules. But 
in making this judgement we must concern ourselves 
with the transaction, i. e. the conduct which the 
rules prescribes or proscribes as the case may be, and 
not with the results of applying the rule in any single 
case. As the legal maxim puts it, hard cases make bad 
law. And in Hayek's own words: 
A more important point is that the 
rules which have been adopted because 
of their beneficial effects in the 
majority of cases will have these 
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beneficial effects only if they are 
applied to all cases to which they 
refer, irrespective of whether it 
is known, or even-true, that they 
will have a beneficial effect in the 
particular case . 
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Whether a rule will have a beneficial effect in a 
particular case is the result. And it is, therefore, 
because we must disregard the effects in particular 
cases that our concern is with transactions and not 
results. 
The other point to be discussed is Hayek's 
repeated assertion that justice is concerned only 
with external performance and not with moral merit. 
The concept of justice has applica- 
tion only in so far as all will be 
equally rewarded according to the 
value of the objective results of their 
efforts and not according to someone's 
judgement of the mgEit they have 
thereby acquired. 
The rationale for this position is twofold. First, in 
a spontaneous order reward according to moral merit 
is irrelevant, if not outright undesirable. Second, 
in any event, moral merit is not susceptible to 
objective assessment. 
The first argument depends upon Hayek's 
espousal of the market order or catallaxy. It rests on 
the contention that in such an order prices, wages, 
and the like, do not in fact function as rewards. 
Rather they function as indicators of appropriate 
courses of action. 
Their function is not so much to 
reward people for what they have 
done as to tell them what in their 
own as well as in general interest 
they ought to do. We shall then 
also see that, to hold out a suffi- 
cient incentive for those movements 
which are required to maintain a 
market order, it will often be 
necessary that the return of 
people's efforts do not correspond 
to recognizable merit., but should 
132 
show that, in spite of the best 
efforts of which they were capable, 
and for reasons they could not have 
known, their efforts were either 
more or less successful than they 
had reason to expect. In a spon- 
taneous order the question of whether 
or not someone has done the 'right' 
thing cannot always be a matter of 
merit, but must be determined in- 
dependently of whether the persons 
concerned ought or could have known 
what was required. 61 
It is for this reason, i. e. to facilitate the function- 
ing of the spontaneous order, that moral merit is 
considered outwith the concern of justice. 
There is an interesting aside worth noting 
here. In Social Justice David Miller maintains that 
a theory of justice can be understood only in the 
context of the overall view of society which it pre- 
supposes. He identifies three ideal-types of theory 
of justice: rights based, desertbased, and need 
based. He then further identifies the rights based 
theory of justice with a hierarchical society, the desert 
based with a market society, and the need based with a 
tribal or communitarian society. What is interesting is 
that while Hayek espouses a market society, he spe- 
cifically rejects the idea of a desert based theory of 
justice. In Miller's terms, Hayek's theory of justice 
would have to be called a rights based. And this 
should, per Miller, be found in the context of a 
hierarchical society. So much for Miller's analysis. 
The second justification which Hayek gives 
for being concerned with external performance and not 
moral merit is more factual and less ideological than 
the first. It is succinctly stated in the words, of 
David Hume which Hayek quotes: 
So great is the uncertainty of merit, 
both from its natural obscurity, and 
from the self-conceit of each indi- 
vidual, that no determinate rule of 
conduct could ever follow from it. 
[Footnote omitted] 62 
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To paraphrase, the problem with basing justice on moral 
merit is that we cannot readily identify rqoral merit. 
Why is this so? To assess and act upon moral 
merit two factors are necessary. One, there must be a 
commonly accepted hierarchy of values which constitute 
moral merit. Two, we must be able to comprehend a variety 
of factors which go far beyond the actual results achieved. 
Reward according to merit must in 
practice mean reward according to 
ascertainable merit, merit that 
other people can recognize and agree 
upon and not merit merely in the 
sight of some higher power. Assess- 
able merit in this sense presupposes 
that we can ascertain that a man 
has done what some accepted rule of 
conduct demanded of him and that 
this has cost him some pain and 
effort. Whether this has been the 
case cannot be judged by the result: 
merit is not a matter of the objec- 
tive outcome but of subjective 
effoi-t. The attempt to achieve a 
valuable result may be highly meri- 
torious but a complete failure, and 
full success may be entirely the 
result of accident and thus without 
merit. 63 
The problem, of course, is that given Hayek's espousal 
of critical rationalism and the spontaneous order 
there is no possibility of knowing all of these aspects 
for any particular action. 
Reward according to merit thus 
presupposes that we know all the 
circumstances which led to a 
particular performance. But in a 
free society we allow the individual 
to decide himself about his actions 
because we do not know those very 
circumstances which determine-how 
meritorious his achievement is. It 
is therefore necessary in a free 
society to reward the individuals 
according to the value of the 
services actually rendered to their 
fellows, a value which has often 
little relation to the subjective 
merit they have earned in rendering 
them. 64 
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Thus, to attempt to assess conduct by moral 
merit instead of by external performance is to engage 
in a quixotic activity. It is to pursue a goal which 
we can never have any hope of even approaching, much less 
of attaining. It is for this reason that justice is 
predicated of external performance and not of moral merit. 
That completes this examination of Hayek's 
position on the appropriate subject matter of justice. 
Probably the most significant aspect of Hayek's posi- 
tion is that, as compared with the positions of other 
theorists, it envisions a relatively narrow realm within 
which it is proper to predicate justice. Many situations 
which other theorists see as raising problems of justice 
are for Hayek outwith the sphere of justice. 
C. Exegetical Criticism 
In the first part of the thesis, including the 
instant chapter, my concern is primarily exegetical. In 
the instant chapter that aim translates into trying to 
explain precisely what it is that Hayek says about 
justice, a task that is far from easy. It has not 
been completely possible to avoid critical comments, but 
for the most part I think the first two sections of 
this chapter can be considered essentially exegetical. 
This section, on the other hand, will be more critical 
than exegetical. At first blush that would suggest 
deferring this section to a later part of the thesis. 
However, I believe that the criticisms to be made are 
still exegetical, in that we cannot get a complete 
grasp of Hayek's conception of justice without con- 
sidering the issues raised herein. It is this idea of 
exdgesis by critique which I have tried to suggest with 
the title of this section. 
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The first point I wish to consider is Hayek's 
contention that the -ultimate justification for having a 
conception of justice is our unavoidable ignorance. As 
we have already seen he maintains that rules are the 
device by which we compensate for our limited rationalism. 
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Were we in fact able to comprehend all of the facts 
pertinent to any decision, as well as the relative im- 
portance thereof, then there would be no need for a 
concept of justice. 
[Iln a society of omniscient persons 
there would be no room for a con- 
ception of justice: every action 
would have to be judged as a means 
of bringing about known effects, 
and omniscience would presumably 
include knowledge of the relative 
importance of the different 
effects. Like all abstractions, 
justice is an adaptation to our 
ignorance -- to our permanent 
ignorance of particular facts which 
no scientific advance can wholly 
remove. It is as much because we 
lack the knowledge of a common 
hierarchy of the importance of the 
particular ends of different indi- 
Viduals as because we lack the 
knowledge of particular facts, that 
the order of the Great Society 
must be brought about by the ob- 
servance of abstract and end- 
independent rules. 66 
In short, were we able to overcome our perpetual 
ignorance, then we could dispense with the concept of 
justice. 
This strikes me as a very dubious and con- 
tentious conclusion. Even in the way Hayek uses the word 
justice clearly appears to be a*normative concept. It 
deals with what ought to be the case in certain cir- 
cumstances. How then could any increase in knowledge, 
even to the extent of omniscience, eliminate the need 
for justice? If you will, knowledge is an is, justice 
is an ought. Even assuming that omniscience entails 
not only knowledge of facts, but knowledge of the 
relative weight of values as well -- and to speak of 
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omniscience in this context seems extremely odd --, 
this does nothing to ensure that any individual will 
act in accord with the scale of values. The total 
dependence of justice upon ignorance which Hayek. 
. espouses would make sense only 
if knowing what was 
appropriate to do ensured that one did what was appro- 
priate to do. 
Possibly Hayek would make just such a claim. 
But I find it difficult to imagine what kind of argu- 
ments he could give in support thereof. I suspect 
instead that the difficulty I see here has arisen 
because Hayek has failed to distinguish in his own 
mind two related but separate ideas associated with the 
use of rules. Rules both identify conduct which, for 
whatever reason, it is desired to bring about, and at 
the same time they tell us that that conduct should be 
engaged in. - In other words, rules tell us both what 
to do and to do it. They both describe and prescribe. 
It is only this first aspect, the identification of the 
desired conduct, which-is affected by Hayek's presump- 
tion of omniscience. Omniscience can eliminate the 
descriptive, -but not the prescriptive aspect. 
In the face of this, were Hayek to yet main- 
tain that omniscience wolild eliminate any need for the 
concept of justice, he would almost have to be denying 
that there is a normative element associated with 
justice. Were he to do this, I would have to say two 
things. First, I apparently do not yet understand the 
way in which he is using the word"justice! 
.. Second, to 
the extent I do understand him, his use of the word 
is so radically removed from the general usage, that 
it seems inappropriate to use the word"Justice'at all, 
in short, I am willing to grant that there is a connec- 
tion between justice and ignorance. But even within 
the confines of his own theory I think that Hayek has 
overestimated t; he import of this connection. Even in a 
society of omniscient people, there would still be 
a place for justice. 
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The next issue I wish to consider is one I 
have already alluded to several times in this chapter. 
Hayek's conception of justice appears to be extremely 
legalistic. But is this a fair categorization of it? 
To begin with, let us get a working idea of what is 
meant when we speak of a legalistic conception of 
justice. The following thoughts of Chaim Perelman 
serve that function quite nicely. Legal justice 
entails. ý 
[T]o be just means to accord to 
each person what the law entitles 
him to. This conception entitles 
us to say that a judge is just, 
that is, impartial and uncorrupt, 
when he applies the same laws to 
the same situations (in paribus 
causis paria iura 
')'. 
To be just is 
to apply the laws of the country. 
... In effect, to be just is to 
apply the rules of a given juridical 
system, and to be unjust is to 
misapply týiem. 67 
If we substitute the phrase "rules of just 
conduct"for'ýaw"in the above quotation, it becomes 
apparent that Hayek's conception of justice fits 
this definition quite nicely. That Hayek's justice 
is a legal justice becomes even more apparent when 
we consider the alternative types of justice which 
Perelman gives. 
1. To each the same thing. 
2. To each according to his merits. 
3. To each according to his work. 
4. To each according to his needs. 
5. To each according to his rank. 68 
Patently, Hayek's conception of justice would fit none 
of these classifications. 
Instead, as we have seen, justice for Hayek is 
totally dependent on an existing system of rules. 
Justice requires a precise articulation and development 
of the rules of that system. And, it requires that 
those rules be universally applied. Moreover, much 
of the discussion of justice occurs in the context 
of applying rules, as distinct from complying with 
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them. The concern is with the authorities who are 
articulating and developing the rules, and not with 
the individual who is attempting to guide his be- 
haviour by the rules. The only distinction, but 
an important distinction, between Hayek's justice 
and the common view of legal justice is that for 
Hayek justice is prior to law and not vice versa. 
Ordinarily the significance of classifying 
a conception of justice as legalistic is that the 
term legal justice suggests a rigid hide-bound sys, 
tem. Certainly there is not the same leeway of 
judgement in Hayek's system as there would be in one 
based, for example, on justice according to need. 
However, as we -have already seen Hayek's conception 
of. justice does allow room for prosthetic action. 
The probl*em I see here is of a different nature. Hayek's 
discussion of justice occurs so exclusively in a legal 
context that itý is difficult to envision how, if at 
all, it would function when we were dealing with a 
situation outwith the legal system.. To be more speci- 
fir-, the question is. would Hayek's conception of jus-. 
tice-be functional in the moral, --as distinct-from-the' 
legal, realm. Could Hayek make judgements of justice 
in that realm, or do his thoughts on justice make sense 
only in the context of a legal system? 
Let it be noted at the outset that I know 
of nowhere where Hayek expressly limits his conception 
of justice to the legal realm. Nor am I aware that he 
anywhere expressly excludes the moral realm from the 
sphere of his conception of justice. On the other hand, 
in Chapter Eight of Law, Legislation and Liberýy, which 
is the most detailed and extended discussion he gives 
of justice, he takes time to distinguish between law 
and morality. 
69 The pertinence of this particular dis- 
cussion c-ould be explained by pointing out that it 
follows a discussion of legal positivism and precedes a 
discussion of natural law. But even so, given that the 
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subject matter of the chapter is justice, at least a 
faint suspicion is raised that, in terms of Hayek's 
conception of justice, there may be a reason to 
distinguish law from morality. 
When we turn to the essence of Hayek's 
conception of justice the suspicion grows even stronger 
that what he is saying may not be applicable to the 
moral realm. The inapplicability is not one of ex- 
clusion as such. Rather it is that it is difficult 
to make what Hayek says about justice functional in 
the context of moral, as distinct from legal, problems. 
Where Hayek's conception of justice would be 
applicable to the individual moral decision is in the 
requirement to apply the same rules to all. This, as 
we have already noted, is very much like the idea of 
universalization or even the first formulation of 
the Categorical Imperative. It makes perfect sense 
to require that! - in making a moral decision the indi- 
vidual act in accord with a rule which he is applying 
to all. To this extent Hayek's thoughts on justice 
seem equally relevant to the legal and the moral 
realm. However, it must be kept in mind that when 
Hayek is discussing justice, it is this aspect which 
gets the least attention. 
The bulk of Hayek's attention and the real 
stumbling block is the notion of the articulation 
and development of the rules of just conduct. This 
seems to take for granted the existence of some 
central authority, like the courts, which is doing the 
articulating and developing. But, as we have seen in 
an earlier chapter, it is the very absence of such a 
central authority which distinguishes law from morality. 
Who then is to do this articulation and development 
in the moral realm? It might be suggested that the 
individual, in deciding what to do, engages in this 
process. But this seems wholly unrealistic as an 
attempt to describe how individuals make moral deci- 
sions. The process which Hayek is describing is a 
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very deliberate and formal process. It is not unlike 
70 the task of Dworkin's Hercules. Perhaps the 
moral philosopher, or a particularly thoughtful indi- 
vidual in the quietof his study, might engage in 
something approaching this prodess. But certainly 
the typical individual in the typical context of a 
moral decision does not engage in anything even faintly 
akin to the process Hayek describes. And yet, it 
certainly makes sense to speak of such individuals 
acting justly or unjustly. 
So what are we to conclude from this? 
First, let me make it clear that I am not arguing that 
Hayek denies the applicability of justice to the moral 
realm. What I do think is that Hayek is simply not 
concerned with the moral realm., His aim is not to 
set forth a theory of justice which encompasses every 
context in which the word"Justiceý'might be used. In- 
stead, he is concerned with the way that word is used in 
certain contexts. The moral realm is simply not a 
context with which he is concerned. It would be 
misleading, therefore, to say that Hayek's conception 
either is or is not applicable to the moral realm. 
Rather, what we should say is that the moral realm is 
irrelevant to what Hayek has to say about justice. 
The final point which I wish to make in this 
section is almost opposite in effect to that which I 
have just made. The previous discussion suggested 
that there was a very definite narrowing to the scope 
of Hayek's conception of justice. The instant point 
suggests that in fact the scope of that conception 
may be far broader than Hayek thinks. 
The argument begins by noting that Hayek 
does recognize the existence of a sense of justice. 
Though our sense of justice will 
generally provide the starting point, 
what it tells'us about the particular 
case is not an infallible or ultimate 71 test. It may and can be proved wrong. 
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What determines whether what the sense of justice tells 
us is right or wrong is whether what it suggests can be 
brought within the confines of the existing system of 
rules of just conduct. ' As an aside, it is interesting 
to note that the prodess Hayek is envisioning here has 
72 some similarity to John Rawls' reflective equilibrium. 
The significant difference is that unlike Rawls, Hayek 
does not allow for the system of rules to be corrected 
73 in light of the feelings of the sense of justice. 
In any event, the sense of justice becomes 
important. when we realize that for many people it 
suggests that justice should be based on factors such 
as desert or need, to name but two of the more common 
formulae of justice. That being so, the question then 
is whether this inclination to base justice on the 
criteria of desert or need (or other such criteria) 
can be brought within the system of rules of just 
conduct. Now, recall that for Hayek the notion of a rule 
can include what we would call both rules and'principles, 
be they articulated or unarticulated. That being so, it 
is at least prima facie arguable that general principles of 
desert and/or need-do comprise part of'the system of 
rules of. just conduct. And if they are in fact part 
of that system, theh Hayek's justice demands that they 
be taken into account. - 
The thrust of this argument is that Hayek's 
conception of justice. may not altogether supplant 
alternative conceptions. Hayek's justice, as we have 
seens is essentially formalistic. It draws its sub- 
stance from the particular system of rules of just 
conduct with which it is concerned. Should one or more 
of the more traditional conceptions of justice consti- 
tute a part of any particular system of rules of just 
conduct, then those traditional conceptions of justice 
and their demands would actually co-exist with Hayek's 
conception of justice. 
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With that we come at last to the end of this 
examination of Hayek's thoughts on justice. And having 
done so we are now free finally to turn our attention 
specifically to the critique of social justice. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
HAYEK'S CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
What we have to deal with in the 
case of-'social justice' is simply 
a quasi-religious superstition of 
the kind which we should respect- 
fully leave in peace so long as it 
merely makes those happy who hold 
it, but which we must fight when 
it becomes Yhe pretext of coercing 
other men. 
Introduction 
The critique of social justice is by far 
the most polemic aspect of Hayek's thought. As the 
headnote to this chapter indicates, he derides the 
very mention of the concept and vehemently opposes any 
attempt to instantiate it in society. The purpose of 
this chapter is to consider the nature and basis of 
Hayek's attack on social justice. 
This is not an easy task, for the arguments 
are long, confused, and repetitive. The crux of the 
problem is that Hayek dismisses social justice as 
a meaningless concept, while including at least three 
different senses under the aegis of meaningless. First, 
social justice is meaningless in that it has no single, 
definite, generally accepted meaning. Second, it is 
meaningless in that it is incompatible with Hayek's 
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theory of justice. That is, the demands of social 
justice, rather than being derivable from Hayek's 
conception of justice, are actually expressly pre- 
cluded thereby. Finally, social justice is meaningless 
in that it is not attainable in a society which con- 
stitutes a spontaneous order. Hayek wanders from one 
to the other of these senses of meaningless seemingly 
at random and with no awareness that the nature of his 
argument changes with the sense in which he uses 
meaningless. It is this which causes the confusion 
and makes it, difficult to deal with Hayek's thought 
in any orderly fashion. 
In an attempt to facilitate discussion I 
have divided my analysis into three parts. The 
three parts are concerned respectively with: the 
various efforts to give some meaning to the concept 
of social justice; the reasons why social justice is 
not attainable -in a spontaneous order; and, the rea- 
sons why it is dangerous to pursue social justice. 
It must be kept in mind, however, that these divisions 
are mine and not Hayek's. Consequently, it has not 
been possible to keep the different parts of my analy- 
sis strictly separate. In fact, most of what is said 
in parts two and three (Sections C and D) will have 
been presaged in part one (Section B). For that 
reason the first part of this analysis will be by far 
the longest, with the latter two parts being quite 
short in relation thereto. The remainder of this 
introduction will sketch the outlines of my analysis. 
In the first part of the analysis my concern 
is with Hayek's efforts to determine the meaning of the 
concept of social justice. To this end, we will exam- 
ine the word"social! ', as well as the concepts of the 
general welfare, equality, and distributive justice. 
We will see that Hayek's major objection to these 
concepts is not so much the vagueness of their meaning, 
as that they carry meanings and implications of which 
he disapproves. In this section we will also consider 
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Hayek's reaction to two situations which allegedly 
present a problem of social justice. Finally, we 
will look at Hayek's explanations for the popularity 
of social justice. 
In the second part of the analysis we will 
consider why it is that social justice is unattainable 
in a spontaneous order. Here Hayek grants arguendo 
that social justice is a sufficiently meaningful goal 
at which to aim, and he goes on to consider pre- 
cisely how that concept would have to be pursued. He 
argues that, inasmuch as social justice requires that 
the material position of every member of society be de- 
termined according to some 'rational' principle, it is 
incompatible with a society which constitutes a spon- 
taneous order. This is so because within such a society 
the material position of individuals is determined only 
in part by intentional human conduct, while the vagaries 
of chance play-an equal, if not greater, part in such 
determination. Hence, to control in any meaningful 
sense the material position of individuals the element 
of chance must be drastidally minimized. This, however, 
can be accomplished only by transforming society from 
a cosmos catallaxy to a taxis: that is, by transform- 
ing it from a spontaneous order to a deliberately con- 
structed and controlled order. For this reason social 
justice is a goal which is meaningless so long as 
society remains a spontaneous order. 
The third part of the analysis is an out- 
growth of the second. Given the apparent desirability 
of social justice, the question might be asked, why 
not transform society in the direction of taxis, at 
least to the extent needed to achieve social justice? 
Is not the game worth the price? Hayek's reply is a 
resounding and categorical "No". Under no cir- 
cumstances must im transform society in pursuit of the 
elusive goal of social justice. Desirable as social 
justice may seem -- and, as we shall see, Hayek ques- 
tions its desirability -- pursuit of it would gravely 
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threaten values which are essential to society as we 
know'it. Justice, personal freedom, personal res- 
ponsibility, and morality would all be detrimentally 
affected by pursuit of social justice. For Hayek these 
are values which are of far greater importance than any- 
thing connoted by the concept of social justice. 
Such then is the gist of my analysis of Hayek 
on social justice. And to that analysis I now proceed. 
B. The Meaning of Social Justice 
It seems safe to say that social justice is 
a concept which currently enjoys much popularity. In 
the political arena, for instance, social justice is 
the basic stan(jard against which all activity must be 
judged. 
The appeal to 'social justice' 
has nevertheless by now become the 
most widely used and most effec- 
tive argument in political dis- 
cussion. Almost every claim for 
government action on behalf of 
particular groups is advanced in 
its name, and if it can be made 
to appear that a certain measure 
is demanded by 'social justice' 
opposition to it will rapidly 
weaken. People may dispute whether 
or not the particular measure is 
required by 'social justice'. But 
that this is the standard which 
ought to guide political action, and 
that the expression has definite 
meaning, is hardly ever questioned. 2 
Similarly, social justice has become the watchword 
for much contemporary religious activity. 
It seems in particular to have 
been embraced by a large section 
of the clergy of all Christian 
denominations, who, while in- 
creasingly losing their faith 
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in a supernatural revelation, 
appear to have sought a refuge 
and consolation in a new 'social' 
religion which substitutes a tem- 
poral for a celestial promise of justice, and who hope that they 
can thus conýinue their striving 
to do good. 
In fact, social justice has, quite simply, been accepted 
as "a new moral value which we must add to those that 
,, 4 were recognized in the past ... It is, perhaps, 
the ultimate touchstone, for it is the standard by 
which we judge the good man. 
The commitment to 'social justice' 
has in fact become the chief out- 
let for moral emotion, the distin- 
guishing attribute of the good 
man, and the recognized sign of the 
possession of a moral conscience. 
Though people may occasionally be 
perplexed to say which of the con- flicting claims advanced in its 
name -are valid, scarcely anyone doubts that the expression has a definite meaning, describes a high ideal, and points to grave defects 
of the existing social order which 
urgently call for correction. 5 
With all this to be said in its behalf, it 
is clear that social justice is a concept with-para- 
mount importance for contemporary life. No one could 
deny this. To question the value, or worse yet the 
very existence, of social justice would be akin to 
attacking motherhood. 
The contention that in a society 
of free men (as distinct from any 
compulsory organization) the con- 
cept of social justice is strictly 
empty and meaningless will probably 
appear as quite unbelievable to 
most people. 6 
Yet Hayek does just this, for he has the audacity to 
suggest that social justice is like the emperor's 
new clothes. If we look closely, we see that there 
is really nothing there. 
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But how can this be? Is it not true that 
as we observe the world around us we are constantly 
struck by the myriad of injustices which occur? 
"Are we not all constantly disquieted by watching how 
unjustly life treats different people and by seeing 
the deserving suffer and the unworthy prosper? .7 
Certainly this is true. But in making such observa- 
tions we must be careful not to confuse mere unfair- 
ness with injustice. Do we not experience the same 
feelings of disquietude in regard to situations which 
are clearly beyond any human control? 
8 Is it unjust 
that one farmer's crops are devoured by locusts while 
another's are not? Of course notl It may be unfair, 
but it is not unjust. Well, Hayek contends, the situa- 
tion is no different as to those circumstances'which 
rouse thoughts of social justice. 
If there is doubt that this is the case, 
let us look behind those root feelings of disquietude 
at supposed social injustice and consider what it is 
they rest upon. To talk about social injustice, we 
must have some idea of what social justice is. That 
is the real question: what is social justice? But 
that question is also the problem,. for, says Hayek, 
social justice is a meaningless term. There is no 
generally agreed meaning for it. It seems to mean 
all things to all people. Whatever the claim, when 
in doubt appeal to social justice. Moreover, not 
only is there no agreement on the particular applica- 
tion of the concept, but there is not even a basic 
principle thereof t6 guide the efforts at application. 
Now, this is not to'deny that there are 
attempts to imbue the concept with real meaning. 
Rather, it is to state that if we look carefully at 
the proferred meanings for social justice, we find 
that they are so empty as to provide us with no real 
guidance. To see that, let us now consider carefully 
some of the different attempts to imbue the concept 
of social justice with meaning. It seems logical to 
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start with the word "social". We already know what 
justice is -- see the preceding chapter --, so if we 
can determine what social is, we will know the mean- 
ing of social justice. Unfortunately, the facts do 
not conform to our logical expectations. 
Certainly social has, or perhaps it is better 
to say had, a definite meaning: pertaining to the 
functioning of society. But in that case social justice 
and justice must be one and the same, for all justice 
is social in this sense. 
Originally 'social' had of course 
a clear meaning (analagous to 
formations like 'national', 
'tribal', or lorganizatio 
, 
nal'), 
namely that of pertaining to, or 
characteristic of the structure and 
operations of society. In this sense 
justice clearly is. a social phenom- 
enon and the addition of 'social' 
to the noun a pleonasm [Footnote 
omitt. ed] such as if we spoke of 
'social language' -- though in 
occasional early uses it might have 
been-inte-aded todistinguish the 
generally prevailing views of 
justice from that held by particular 
persons and groups. 9 
This, however, cannot be what the proponents of social 
justice have in mind, for clearly they intend something 
more than simply ordinary- justice. 
What then? Well, in the passage just cited 
Hayek does suggest another meaning. As applied to 
justice social is a reminder that we must look beyond 
narrow self-interest, that the proper scope of justice 
is all of society and not just particular groups 
therein. 
When it came into general use in 
the third quarter of the last 
century it was meant to convey an 
appeal to the still ruling classes 
to concern themselves more with the 
welfare of the much more numerous 
poor whose interests had not re- 
ceived adequate consideration. 
[Footnote omitted] The 'social 
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question' was posed as an appeal 
to the conscience of the upper 
classes to recognize their respon- 
sibility for the welfare of the 
neglected sections of society whose 
voices had till then carried little 
weight jý the councils of govern- 
ments. 
But this meaning too is inadequate to encompass the 
full scope of what is intended by the proponents of 
social justice. 
Their concern is not simply to be aware of 
and to give equal consideration to the interests of 
all members of society. Rather, they argue that 
society itself should in some way become responsible 
for the interests of all of it's members. 
(T1he conception gradually came 
to mean that 'society' ought 
to hold itself responsible for 
the particular material position 
of all its members, and for assur- 
ing that each received what was 
'due' to him. It implied that the 
process of society should be delib- 
erately directed to particular 
results and, by personifying society, 
represented it as a subject endowed 
with a conscious mind, capable of 
being guided in its operation by 
moral principles. [Footnote 
omitted] 11 
However, Hayek continues, though this new meaning of 
"social" gives the word a far broader scope than it 
originally had, it also makes its meaning so vague 
as to be of no help in pinning down the concept of 
social justice. 
Indeed, it has produced a situa- 
tion in which 'social' can be used 
to describe almost any action as 
publicly desirable and has at the 
same time the effect of depriving 
any terms with which it is combined 
of clear meaning. 12 
Hence, we must try some other approach if we hope to 
determine the meaning of social justice. 
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Social justice is sometimes described as 
synonymous with the general welfare, the common wel- 
fare, the common good, and similar such like terms. 
To the extent that most people would accept the general 
welfare as a worthwhile goal towards which to strive, 
the equation of social justice with these concepts 
presents no problem. However, it takes little thought 
to realize that the general welfare is as amorphous 
a concept as social justice itself. 
The common welfare or the public 
good has to the present time remained 
a concept most recalcitrant to any 
precise definition and therefore 
capable of being given almost any 
content suggested by the interests 
of the ruling group. [Footnote 
omitted] 13 
The core problem with the general welfare, 
Hayek suggests, is that there is a tendency to identify 
the concept with some sort of sum-total of individual 
ends or satisfactions. Such identification, however, 
presents an insoluble. problem, for there is no way 
to determine any such sum-total. 
14 For one thing, 
there is the purely pragmatic problem that it is im- 
possible to ever know all the different ends and satis- 
factions. 
The fact, however, is that in a 
Great Society in which the indi- 
viduals are free to use their own 
knowledge for their own purposes, 
the general welfare at which a 
government ought to aim cannot 
consist of the sum of particular 
satisfactions of the several 
individuals for the simple reason 
that neither those nor all the cir- 
cumstances determining them can 
be known to government or anybody 
else. 15 
But aside from the difficulty (impossibility) 
of identification, there are some even more serious 
problems with this notion of the general welfare. To 
attempt to satisfy all individual interests is a 
quixotic task, for it is neither possible, nor desir- 
able, to satisfy all such interests. It is not 
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possible because individual interest will inevitably 
conflict. It is not desirable because clearly it is 
not in the common interest (however amorphous that 
term may be) to satisfy all individual interests. The 
justification for this latter conclusion is twofold. 
First, some interests-will by their very nature be 
contrary to the common interest.. Second, 
The order of the Great Society does 
rest and must rest on constant un- 
designed frustrations of some 
efforts -- efforts which ought not 
to have been made but in free men 
can only be discouraged by failure. 
The interests of some individuals 
will always be that some changes 
in the structure of society made 
necessary by changes in circum- 
stances to which in the general 
interest that structure ought to 
adopt itself, should not be allowed 
to take place. 16 
Consequently, inasmuch as not all individual 
interests can be satisfied, we find that, in order to 
define the general welfare in terms of individual 
interests, we must pick and choose between competing 
interests. But how is such a decision to be made? Of 
cburse it is totally unrealistic to expect such selec- 
tion could be made by mutual agreement. 
17 How then 
is it to be made? 
It might be thought that the way to proceed 
is to balance the competing interests one against 
the other. But this approach is fraught with peril. 
Given the limits of human reason -- recall Hayek's 
distinction between critical and constructive ration- 
alism -- we cannot hope to foresee all of the con- 
sequences of choosing one set of interests over 
another. Thus, to engage in a weighing process is 
to sacrifice the foreseeable to the unforeseeable. 
Nor can the choice of the appropriate 
set of rules [i. e. for selecting 
between interests] be guided by 
balancing for each of the alternative 
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sets of rules considered the par- 
ticular predictable favorable effects 
against the particular predictable 
unfavorable effects, and then select- 
ing the set of rules for which the 
positive net result is greatest; for 
most the effects on particular per- 
sons of adopting one set of rules 
rather than another are not pre- 
dictable. 18 
Thus, a balancing of interests is not a viable solution 
to our problem. 
Another possible solution is closely 
related to that just considered. We could simply 
choose between competing interests on the basis of 
majority opinion. However, the mere fact that some- 
thing is desired by a majority in and of itself makes 
it neither just nor desirable, for the many are as 
likely as the few to. err under the delusion of self- 
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interest. Hence, 
[I)t would obviously be a per- 
version of that ideal [i. e. justice] 
if we were to define the general 
interest as whatever the majority 
desires. 20 
Now, there is one way in which we. could deal 
with-particular interests which at first glance seems 
to avoid the problem of conflict between them. There 
are certain interests which can be thought of as 
genuine collective interests. 
There are many kinds of services 
which men desire but which, because 
if they are provided they cannot 
be confined to those prepared to 
pay for them, can be supplied only 
if the means are raised by compul- 
sion. Once an apparatus for coer- 
cion exists, and particularly if 
this apparatus is given the monop- 
oly of coercion, it is obvious t* hat 
it will also be entrusted with sup- 
plying the means for the provision 
of such 'collective goods. ', as 
the economists call those services 
which can be rendered only to all 
the members of various groups. 21 
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Instances of such collective goods would be roads and 
sanitation facilities. 
However, the difficulty with relying on 
such collective goods.,, to define the general welfare 
is that they too are hard to identify. Such things 
as roads and sanitation facilities may seem obviously 
to be collective goods. And yet, to say this is to 
rest upon some form of consensus agreement. What if 
such agreement is lacking, then how are we to deter- 
mine collective goods. Hayek's own thought on this 
issue is not especially clear. He argues that collec- 
tive goods can be determined by some sort of principle 
of reciprocity, a give and take between collective 
goods. 
A collective interest will become 
a general interest only in so far 
as all find that the satisfaction 
of the collective interest of* 
particular groups on the basis of 
some principle of reciprocity will 
mean for them a gain in excess 
of the burden they will have to 
bear. 22 
But this principle is so vaguely sketched as to be of 
limited practical use. Moreover, in any event it seems 
fair to say that the number of interests which could 
legitimately be identified as collective goods will be 
exceedingly small. That being the case, it is most 
unlikely that those who equate social justice with the 
common welfare are limiting themselves to the notion 
of collective goods. 
And so we return again to the question. how 
are we to determine what selection of individual 
interests constitutes the general welfare. The answer, 
says Hayek, is that we are not. Quite simply, the 
general welfare does not consist of any particular 
substantive content. It is instead a procedural 
concept. Thus, while it is not feasible to expect 
individuals to agree on the relative impGrtance of 
their particular interests, it is feasible for 
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individuals to agree on a process or order which will 
provide optimum opportunity for each to satisfy his 
particular interests. 
Indeed, the possibility of extending 
an order of peace, beyond the small 
group which could agree on particular 
ends, to the members of the Great 
Society who Could not agree on 
them, is due to the discovery of a 
method of collaboration which re- 
quires agreemen only on means and 
not on ends. 
b 
This, and nothing else, is what the general welfare is. 
It is the formation of an order which gives each indi- 
vidual an equal opportunity to satisfy his particular 
interests. 
In this sense the general welfare 
which the rules of individual con- 
duct serve consists of what we 
have already seen to be the purpose 
of the rules of law, namely that 
abstract order of the whole which 
does not aim at the achievement 
of known particular results but 
is preserved as a means for assist- 
ing in the pursuit of a great 
variety of individual purposes. 24 
But, as must be obvious, this definition of the 
general welfare is essentially synonymous with Hayek's 
view of society as a cosmos or spontaneous order. 
If, therefore, the general welfare is syno- 
nymous with social justice, then society as Hayek 
understands it to function is already manifesting 
social justIce. But this cannot be what the propo- 
nents of social justice intend, for it is within such 
a society that the supposed social injustices by which 
they are disturbed occur. That being the case, it 
will not do to understand social justice as being the 
general welfare. And so, we must seek for some other 
meaning of the concept. 
It is thought by some that social justice is 
defined by the notion of equality. 
156 
The most common attempts to give 
meaning to the concept of 'social 
justice' resort to egalitarian 
considerations and argue that every 
departure from equality of material 
benefits enjoyed has to be justi- 
fied by some recognizable common 
interest which these differences 
serve. (Footnote omitted) 25 
However, while the idea of equality of materialýposi- 
tion, also referred to as equality of result, does 
seem to be primary in this context, there are two 
other notions of equality which must also be noted. 
one is equality of treatment, the other is equality 
of opportunity. 
Equality of treatment is'important here 
because it significantly affects Hayek's reaction to 
equality of result. Now, equality of treatment may 
sound as if it is quite similar to Hayek's first 
sense of justiQe, viz. "the principle of treating all 
under the same'rules. , 
26 In fact, Hayek considers 
the two notions not just similar, but identical. That 
is, he maintains that to apply the same rules to every- 
one is to treat everyone equally. Conversely, if 
we do not apply the same rule to everyone, then we are 
not treating everyone equally. It is, of course, de- 
batable whether this identification is valid. However, 
the fact remains that Hayek does make this identifi- 
cation. 
The importance of this identification is that 
it means for Hayek equality of result is not achiev- 
able without violating the principle of justice. Given 
the differences in people's aptitudes and zeals, given 
the altogether unforeseeable role of chance in this 
world, it is not possible to put different individuals 
in the same material position, while at the same time 
applying the same rules to all. 
The great problem is whether this 
new demand for equality does not 
conflict with the equality of 
the rules of conduct which 
15 
government must enforce on all in a 
free society. There is, of course, 
a great difference between government 
treating all citizens according 
to the same rules in all the activ- 
ities it undertakes for other pur- 
poses, and government doing what is 
required in orderto place the dif- 
ferent citizens in equal (or less 
unequal) material positions. In- 
deed, there may arise a sharp 
conflict between these two aims. 
Since people will differ in many 
attributes which government cannot 
alter, to secure for them the same 
material position would require that 
government treat them very differ- 
ently. ... Strict equality of those benefits which government could 
provide for all, on the*other hand, 
would clearly lead to inequality 
of the material positions. 27 
Thus, if social justice is equated with equality of 
material position, we are forced to choose between 
justice and social justice. For Hayek there is no 
doubt which is the correct choice to make. 
There is, in addition, one further diffi- 
culty with equating social justice and equality of 
material position. That is that so long as govern- 
ment is not responsible for the particular material 
position of each individual, those inequalities which 
do occur cannot reasonably be ascribed to anyone's 
intention, but can instead be shrugged off and attrib- 
uted to fate or chance or the like., However, if, in 
the cause of social justice, government becomes re- 
sponsible for determining the material position of 
each citizen, then such inequalities as do occur will 
now clearly be the result of deliberate action. 
In assigning people to their 
different tasks, the central plan- 
ning authority would have to be 
guided by considerations of effi- 
ciency and expediency and not by 
principles of justice or equality. 
No less than in the market order 
would the individuals in the common 
interest have to submit to great 
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inequalities -- only these inequal- ities would be determined not by 
the interaction of individual skills 
in an impersonal process, but by the 28 uncontradictable decision. of authority. 
Although not expressed in so many words, it 
seems. clear that Hayek thinks it best that no one, 
individual or group, have such extensive power to 
determine the status of others, for such would be a 
serious threat to individual freedom. To put it 
another way, equality of result can only be attained 
through equality of submission. 
Full equality for most cannot but 
mean the equal submission of the 
great masses under the command of 
some elite who manages their 
affairs. While an equality of 
rights under a limited government 
is possible and an essential condi- 
tion of individual freedom, a claim 
for equality of material position 
can be met only by a government 
with totalitarian powers. [Footnote 
omitted]29 
There remains for consideration the notion 
of equality of opportunity. 
The demand for equality of oppor- 
runity. or equal starting conditions 
(Startgerechtigkeit) appeals to, 
and has been supported by, many 
who in general favor the free 
market order. 30 
In principle there can be no objection to striving for 
ýquality of opportunity. The difficulty rather is-one 
of pragmatic application. Certainly as to those 
benefits which are within government control there 
should be equal opportunity of access for all. 
So far as this refers to facilities 
and opportunities. as are of neces- 
sity affected by governmental 
decisions (such as appointments to 
public office and the like), the 
demand [i. e. for equality of oppor- 
tunity] was indeed one of the central 
points of classical liberalism ... 
31 
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But this would not produce equality of opportunity. 
This is so because in a spontaneous order the 
number of "facilities and opportunities" which are, or 
could be, brought, within the control of the government 
are exceedingly few when compared with the pertinent 
aspects which are beyond governmental control. If, 
therefore, the demand for equality of opportunity is 
taken in its most literal sense, this demand, like 
that for equality of result, becomes a demand to dras- 
tically extend the powers of government. 
But all this would still be very 
far from creating real equality of 
opportunity, even for persons pos- 
sessing the same abilities. To 
achieve thisgovernment would have 
to cont * rol 
the whole physical and 
human environment of all persons, 
and have to endeavor to provide at 
least equivalent chances for each. 
... This would have to go on until 
government literally controlled 
everf circumstance which could af- 
fect any person's well-being. 32 
Yet even were we to go this path, we could never truly 
produce equality of opportunity, for we could never 
hope to control all the relevant variables. Thus, 
Hayek concludes that literal equality of opportunity 
is a "wholly illusory ideal, and any attempt con- 
cretely to realize it apt to produce a nightmare. , 
33 
Let us now turn to what is probably the most 
commonly recognized synonym for social justice: dis- 
tributive justice. 
But the sense in which it is now 
generally used and constantly 
appealed to in public discussion, 
and in which it will be examined in 
this chapter, is essentially the 
same as that in which the expres- 
sion 'distributive justice' had long 
been employed. 34 
The meaning of distributive justice can, of course, be 
expressed in the old maxim: "tribuere suum cuique. " 
But this tells us very little. Similarly we can accept 
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Hayek's view that the aim of distributive (social) 
justice is the same as that of classical socialism: 
namely to bring about a just distribution of wealth. 
35 
But we have not yet advanced very far, for the crucial 
question which still faces us is, -what is a just 
distribution of wealth, - That is the question which 
we must answer if we are to understand what it is that 
the proponents of social justice are seeking. 
Now, there are several different standards 
against which it might be argued that a just dis- 
tribution of wealth (or material benefits in general) 
could be determined. Interestingly, Hayek does not, 
to my knowledge, consider one of the most basic stand- 
ards: i. e. distribution according to need. That is, 
it can be argued that justice requires that the material 
benefits in any society should go to those who need 
them most. 
36 However, despite the extent of his dis- 
cussion of social justice, Hayek never confronts this 
possibility. 
Another standard by which a just distribution 
of material benefits could be determined is that of 
distribution according to merit. However, as we saw 
in considering Hayek's theory of justice, there are two 
insurmountable obstacles to any attempt to reward 
according to merit. The first is that in most cases 
it will be quite difficult, if not altogether impos- 
sible, to assess the merit of the individual or indivi- 
duals involved. Given the limits of human reason, we 
can never hope to know more than a small fraction 
of the factors which are relevant to assessing merit 
in any situation. 
The second obstacle which thwarts any attempt 
to distribute material benefits according to merit is 
that there is no single, universally (or even generally) 
accepted standard against which to assess merit. In 
order to reward according to merit, we must be in agree- 
ment'as to what constitutes merit. But, there are 
likely to be as many different opinions on what 
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constitutes merit as there are opinion holders. How 
then can we use merit as a standard against which to 
assess a just distribution? The answer, of course, 
is that we cannot. In the words of David, Hume which 
Hayek cites: 
So great is the uncertainty of merit, 
both from its natural obscurity, 
and from the self-conceit of each 
individual, that no determinate rule 
of conduct could ever follow from 
it. 37 
If then social justice is deemed synonymous with dis- 
tribution according to merit, we must agree with Hayek 
that it is a meaningless concept. Unless; that is, we 
allow the standard to be set by either a central 
authority or majority opinion. But there are grave 
drawbacks to accepting either of these procedures, as 
we shall see shortly. 
Distribution according to merit is not the 
oflyystandard against which a just distribution could 
be assessed. Another standard which is often put 
forward. is that-distribution should be in accord with 
the value of the service in question to society. Since 
our concern is with social justice, it would seem that 
value to society should be a determinative factor in 
assessing reward. There is, though, one difficulty 
with this reasoning. 
But though the conception of 
'value to society' is sometimes 
carelessly used even by economists 
there is strictly no such thing... 
Servi6es can have value only to 
particular people (or an organiza- 
tionY, and any particular service 
will have very different values for 
different members of the same 
society. 38 
Moreover, not only is there no notion of value 
to society as a whole, but the only notion of value 
which we do have -- i. e. to particular individuals 
does not lend itself to interpersonal comparisons. 
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The point is not that the true values 
are different, but that the values 
attached to the different services 
by different groups of people are 
incommensurable. 39 
There is, therefore, no way to assess the value of 
any service on anything other than an individual 
basis. But, if that is the case, what standard do we 
use to judge the value of any service? Whose assess- 
ment of value is determinative? 
Two possibilities come to mind. First, we 
could have a standard of value set by some central 
authority. Undoubtedly this would provide a definite 
standard against which to measure the justice of the 
distributions of material benefits. But consider the 
disadvantages of such a system. It would be 
to treat society not as a spontaneous 
order of free men but as an organization 
whose members are all made to serve a 
single hierarchy of ends. This would 
necessarily be a totalitarian system 
in whic personal fre'edom would be 
absent. 
ýO 
obviously, for Hayek this is not a desirable way to 
proceed. 
The other possible way to produce a standard 
of value to society would be to allow the values of the 
majority to be determinative. This however, would be 
little different from a standard set by a central 
authority. In fact, in one way it might be worse. A 
central authority could at least be expected to make a 
reasoned choice between different activities. Majority 
opinion, on the other hand, is much more likely to be 
guided by emotional prejudices. 
The consideration of the different 
attitudes which different groups 
will take to the remuneration of 
different services incidentally 
also show that the large numbers 
by no means grudge all the incomes 
higher than theirs, but generally 
only those earned by activities 
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the functions of which they do not 
understand or which they even regard 
as harmful. ... It is where most 
people do not comprehend the use- 
fulness of an activity, and fre- 
quently because they erroneously 
regard it as harmful ... that the 
outcry about the injustice of it 
arises. 41 
Thus, for Hayek there is no acceptable way to determine 
a standard of value to society. And so, this concept 
too fails to imbue social justice with any determinative 
meaning. 
To this point we have been concerned with 
attempts by Hayek to deduce the meaning of social 
justice from other concepts put forward as synonymous 
thereto. However, at one point he proceeds in his 
search in a manner-that is inductive. That is, he 
considers two situations which are supposed to present 
problems of social justice and endeavors to draw there- 
from the meaning of the concept. 
The first of these situations in- 
volves the fact that "the most unpleasant jobs are 
commonly also the worst paid. "42 This is frequently 
thought to be an illustration of social injustice. 
Now, what does this tell us about social justice? 
Nothing, says Hayek, for there is no problem of justice 
in this situation. Had someone assigned particular 
individuals to these unpleasant low-paying jobs, then 
we could ask why these individuals and not some others. 
But in a free society no one is assigned to any par- 
ticular job. As to the seeming disparity between the 
nature of the work and the remuneration therefor, this 
is simply another way of arguing that remuneration 
should be based on value to society. However, as we 
have seen, there is no concept of value to society. 
The person querying the, supposed disparity may value 
the service in question higher than the person paying 
for the service. But there are no grounds for conclud- 
ing that his valuation is right (just) and the other's 
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valuation wr6ng (unjust). Thus, to repeat, there is 
simply no problem of justice in this situation. 
The other situation that Hayek considers is 
"the idea that people are to be protected against 
an unmerited descent from the material position to which 
they have become accustomed. , 
43 Here too he sees no 
problem of justice. The key is that in a spontaneous 
order remuneration is neither a reward nor a punishment. 
Rather, it is simply a signal of what activities should 
be continued and what activities should be discontinued. 
Admittedly, it may be unfair that one person prosper and 
another fail as the result of factors of which neither 
of them could reasonabley have been aware. But this 
is neither just nor unjust. 
The sense of injury which people 
feel when an accustomed income is 
reduced or altogether lost is 
largely the result of a belief 
that they have morally deserved 
that-Income and that, therefore, 
so long as they work as industri- 
ously and honestly as they did 
before, they are in justice 
entitled to the continuance of that 
income. But the idea that we have 
morally deserved what we have 
honestly earned in the past is 
largely an illusion. What is true 
is only that it would have been 
unjust if anybody had taken from 
us what we have in fact acquired 
while observing the rules of the 
game. 44 
Thus, both gain and loss are part of the game, and 
neither gives rise to a claim of injustice. 
Moreover, not only is there no legitimate 
ground for protecting an individual against unmerited 
loss, but to do so would itself be unjust. To protect 
an individual against unmerited loss would be to 
freeze the status quo and thereby to deprive other 
individuals of the opportunity to better their own 
position. 
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The satisfaction of such claims by 
particular groups would thus not be 
just but eminently unjust, because 
it would involve the denial to 
some of the chances to which those 
who make ts claim owe their 
position. 
ýý 
And so it is that neither of these situations of 
supposed social injustice is in fact able to shed 
any light on the meaning of social justice. 
It should be noted in passing that, while 
Hayek has no sympathy for the cl: aim that people should 
be protected against unmerited descent in their 
material position, he does not object to the provision 
of a minimum level of subsistence for all members of 
a society. Whether he considers this a matter of jus- 
tice, charity, '. or even self-interest is not clear. 
But he does not-object thereto. 
46 
There is yet one additional way by which the 
doncept of social justice might be given some meaning. 
It will be recalled that in Hayek's theory of justice 
the key concept was injustice and that justice was 
an ideal towards which we moved by identifying and 
eliminating injustice. Now, cannot a similar arrange- 
ment hold with social justice? That is, can we not 
approach social justice by identifying and eliminating 
social injustice when we find it? 
There can be no test by which we 
discover what is 'socially unjust' 
because there is no subject by which 
such an injustice can be committed, 
and there are no rules of individual 
conduct the observance of which in 
the market order would secure to the 
individuals and groups the posi- 
tion which as such (as distinguished 
from the procedure by which it is 
determined) would appear just to us. 
[Footnote omitted] 47 
No, for Hayek there can be no negative test 
of social injustice. 
There is one final issue relating to the 
meaning of social justice which remains to be discussed. 
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The question comes to mind, if social justice is as 
meaningless as Hayek contends, how do you explain 
its popularity? Or, putting the shoe on the other 
foot, we might wonder whether examining the reasons 
for the popularity of social justice might be of use 
in determining its meaning. 
Three different reasons for the popularity 
of social justice are offered by Hayek. The first we 
have already mentioned at the beginning of this 
section. That is, as we observe the world around us 
we are constantly struck by instances of unfair treat- 
ment. But as we have already noted, there is a dif- 
ference between unfairness and injustice. However, 
our tendency to anthropomorphize the world around 
us tends to blur this distinction. And so, we tend 
to describe as unjust situations which are not the 
result of human action and, hence, not a suitable ob- 
ject for a judgement of justice. 
The second reason why thoughts of social 
justice are so popular is that they are an atavism, a 
throwback to the days of the small, tribal society. 
There can be little doubt that the 
moral feelings which express them- 
selves in the demand for 'social 
justice' derive from an attitude which 
in more primitive conditions the in- 
dividual developed towards the fellow 
members of thý, small group to which 
he belonged. 48 
In such a small group it was possible to know the 
abilities, merits, and needs of one's fellows. Further, 
given such knowledge, it was possible, and perhaps 
obligatory, to guide one's actions in accord with such 
knowledge. However, such awareness is not possible 
in the Great Society, and so our actions cannot take 
the same form as they would in a small society. 
In the Great Society many of the 
effects of a person's actions on 
various fellows must be unknown 
to him. ... In particular, he 
will often not know who the 
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individual people will be who will 
benefit by what he does, and there- 
fore not know whether he is satis- 
fying a great need or adding to 
abundance. He cannot aim at just 
results if he does not know who will 
be affected. 49 
In short, the demand for social justice is a futile 
attempt to apply the morality of a small society to 
the Great Society. 
The final reason Hayek gives for the popu- 
larity of social justice is not at all favorable to 
the concept. Often, he says, claims for social justice 
are no more than disguised envy and self-interest. It 
"camouflages under the name of justice what has nothing 
to do with justice. " 
50 Thus, calls to redistribute 
income are often no more than envy at the good fortune 
of others. Similarly, claims to be protected against 
unmerited loss of benefits are frequently the espousal 
of self-interes't against the legitimate interests of 
others. Hayek does not contend that all proponents of 
social justice are motivated by such base motives. 
But he does believe that this element is present. 
With that we come to the end of the first 
part of this analysis. 
C. Social Justice is Meaningless within 
a Spontaneous Order 
In the previous section we were concerned 
with Hayek's efforts to determine the meaning of the 
concept of social justice. We sýLw:, there that, despite 
the various terms put forward in explanation thereof, 
he maintained that the concept had no single, definite 
meaning. The thrust of this aspect of his argument is 
obviously "how can you pursue social justice if you 
don't know what it is? " 
168 
In this section we will examine Hayek's 
attack on social justice in a different manner. Here, 
we will assume that social justice can be understood 
as distributive justice and that this concept presents 
a sufficiently definite goal at which to aim. However, 
notwithstanding this, Hayek argues that social justice 
is still meaningless. This is so because, if we 
examine what must be done to pursue the goal of social 
justice, we will see that 
1 
it is not attainable within 
a society which constitutes a spontaneous order. Thus, 
to advocate social justice while society remains a 
spontaneous order is to engage in a meaningless 
activity. 
Let us begin by granting arguendo that social 
justice and distributive justice 'are the same and that, 
viewed in this manner, social justice does present a 
determinate goal at which to aim, the goal being dis- 
tribution of the material benefits of society accord- 
ing to some rational principle. Now, why is this a 
goal which is meaningless within a spontaneous order? 
The answer is actually quite simple. Distributive 
justice makes sense only if some human agency is dis- 
tributing the material benefits of society. But, in-a 
spontaneous order there is no distribution of such 
benefits. And, if there is no distribution, there is 
n6thing against which to measure distributive justice. 
That there is no distribution in a spontaneous 
order can be explained in several ways. First, not- 
withstanding efforts to personify society, society is 
not an entity capable of acting. 
Society, once more, is not an 
acting person but an orderly 
structure of actions resulting from 
the observation of certain abstract 
rules by its members. We owe all 
the benefits we rec&ive from the 
operation of this structure not 
to anyone's intention to confer 
them on us, but to the members of 
society generally obeying certain 
rules in the pursuit of their 
interests. ... 51 
169 
Thus, to say that society has been unjust in distribut- 
ing material benefits is nonsense, for society does 
not, and is not capable of, distributing anything.. 
Even more decisive is the fact that in a 
spontaneous order not only does society not dis- 
tribute material benefits, butho one does. Rather, 
in a spontaneous order the distributing agent -- if 
one must use that term -- is an impersonal process 
and not a human agent. There is no one who has been, 
or can be, just or unjust. 
The general failure to see that in 
this connection we cannot meaning- 
fully speak of the justice or in- 
justice of the results is partly 
due to the misleading use of the term 
'distribution' which inevitably sug- 
gests a-personal distributing agent 
whose will or choice determines the 
relative positions of the different 
persons or groups. (Footnote 
omitted] There is of course no such 
agent, and we use an impersonal pro- 
cess to determine the allocation of 
benefits. ... 
52 
The confusion is furthered when we speak of 
the earnings in a spontaneous order as rewards or 
benefits. As we have already seen, this is not the 
function of earnings. They are not means to reward 
good actions, and their lack to punish bad actions. 
No, in a spontaneous order earnings are a signal by 
which efforts are channeled into or away from 
particular activites as the case may be. 
But earnings in a market system, 
though people tend to regard them 
as rewards, do not serve such a 
function. Their rationale (if 
one may use this term for a role 
which was not designed but de- 
veloped because it assisted human 
endeavor without people understand- 
ing how), is rather to indicate to 
people what they ought to do if the 
order is to be maintained on which 
they all'rely. 53 
And so, given all of this, social justice is indeed 
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meaningless in a spontaneous order, for if there is 
neither distributing agent, nor distribution, nor bene- 
fits, what grounds are there to speak of distributive 
justice. 
However, it might be argued that the fore- 
going analysis is too simplistic, that it rests on 
-sleight-of -hand 
involving the word "distribute". Per- 
haps social justice is not attainable with society in 
its present form. But could we not modify society 
slightly so as to retain its overall spontaneous nature 
while at the same time making social justice an attain- 
able goal? No we could not, and to see this we need 
only to consider what would have to be done to attain 
social justice. 
The aim of social justice as we have stated 
it is to secure that the distribution of material 
benefits in a society is in accord with some rational 
principle. Among the principles put forward to control 
the distribution are merit and value to society. Now, 
what does this aim entail? 
First, there must be control of all remunera- 
tion. A central authority must be empowered to decide 
who gets what for doing what. Only in this way can 
there be any guarantee that distributions will be in 
accord withýthe controlling rational principle. 
of course, if the central authority is to 
distribute in accord with the rational principle, then 
it must also decide what is required by the principle. 
As we saw above, neither merit, nor value to society are 
susceptible to a single, uncontroversial meaning. 
Accordingly, the central authority must determine and 
enforce its own view of what is demanded by the applic- 
able principle. 
A further result of the central authority's 
controlling remuneration is that earnings will no 
longer be signal of what activities should and should 
not be pursued. That being the case, it will then become 
incumb6nt upon the central authority to determine what 
activities are done and by whom. And this in turn will 
entail the setting of one single set of ends for all 
members of society. This, all of this, is what is 
required if we are to move towards the goal of social 
justice. 
But if this is so, it takes little thought 
to see that the society which would take such form 
could hardly be called a spontaneous order. What is 
spontaneous about a society in which a single set 
of ends is set by government to everyone, in which a 
single set of values applies to everyone, in which each 
individual is told what he must do and when? What is 
spontaneous about a society in which indivduals can 
no longer guide their lives by their own knowledge 
and their own values and goals? The answer is nothing. 
Such a society is not spontaneous, but is instead a 
taxis, a deliberately directed society. 
In other words, if 'social justice' 
is to be brought about, the indi- 
viduals must be required to obey 
not merely general rules but speci- 
fic demands directed to them only. 
The type of s-otdfil order in which 
individuals are directed to serve a 
single system of ends is the organ- 
ization and not the spontaneous order 
of the market, that is, not a system 
in which the individual is free 
because bound only by general rules of 
just conduct, but a system in which 
all are subject to specific directions 
by authority. 54 
Quite simply, we have a choice: Justice and a spon- 
taneous order, or social justice and an organized, 
centrally controlled society. We can have one or 
the other, but not both. 
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D. The Dangers of Pursuing Social Justice 
Let us now take the choice with which we 
ended the last section and turn it into a question. 
Grant that social justice is a desired goal -- for 
the nonce we will forget that its popularity can be 
explained at least in part by envy and self-interest. 
Now, if that is the case, should we not pursue social 
justice, even if we must transform society from a 
spontaneous order to a taxis in the process? Is it not 
right to do so, and are we not, perhaps, obligated to 
do so? 
But the prior question is whether it 
is moral that men be subjected to the 
powers of direction that would have 
to be exercised in order that the 
benefits derived by the individuals 
could be meaningfully described as 
just or unjust. 55 
As should be quite apparent by now, Hayek's 
answer to this question would be a very definite "No". 
To a large extent the reasons for his answer have 
already been clearly set forth in the prior chapters 
of this thesis. In particular, in Chapter One we 
discussed at some'length his preference for and ad- 
vocacy of cosmos over taxis. Those arguments will not 
be repeated here. However, at this point it is worth 
noting that Hayek opposes social justice on the grounds 
that to pursue it is to radically alter society as we 
know it and to threaten the existence of certain values 
which are basic to our way of life. 
Unfortunately, this vague desire 
which has become one of the strong- 
est bonds spurring people of good 
will to action, not only is bound to 
be disappointed. This would be sad 
enough. But, like most attempts to 
pursue an unattainable goal, the 
striving for it will also produce 
highly undesirable consequences, 
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and in particular lead to the des- 
truction of the indispensable 
environment in which the tradi- 
tional moral values alone can 56 flourish, namely personal freedom. 
The first is justice. As we have already seen, 
justice for Hayek involves "the principle of treating all 
under the same rules. " To Hayek this is the same as 
treating everyone equally. Social Justice, however, is 
concerned not with the way people are treated, but rather 
with the results of that treatment. It aims to make the 
material position of each individual subject to some 
rational principle of distribution. There is, however, 
no possible set of general rules by means of which such 
just distributions could be achieved. 
It appears sometimes to be imagined 
that a mere alteration of the rules 
of individual conduct could bring 
about the realization of 'social 
justic-e'. But there can be no set 
of such rules, no principle by which 
the individuals could so govern their 
conduct that in a Great Society the 
joint effect of their activities 
would be a distribution of benefits 
which could be described as material- 
ly just, or any other specific and 
intended allocation of advantages 
and disadvantages among particular 
people or groups. 57 
Social justice can, therefore, be pursued only by 
treating people diffei7ently. For that reason, it is 
incompatible with Hayek's principle of justice. And 
for Hayek it is enough merely to point out this 
conflict to show that social justice must not be 
pursued. 
Social justice is also a clear and present 
danger to personal (individual) freedom. And, 
personal freedom is a value which is at the foundation 
of Hayek's entire philosophy. The threat arises 
because, as was seen in the last section, social justice 
is meaningful only in a society which is rigidly con- 
trolled by a central authority. It is incompatible 
with any society in which individual s. ar e free to use 
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their own knowledge for their own purposes. 
For in such a system in which each 
is allowed to use his knowledge 
for his own purposes [Footnote 
omitted] the concept of 'social 
justice' is necessarily empty and 
meaningless, because in it 
nobody's will can determine the rela- 
tive incomes of the different people, 
or prevent that they be partly de- 
pendent on accident. '-Social 
justice' can be given a meaning only 
in a directed or 'command' economy 
(such as an army) in which the indi- 
viduals are ordered what to do; and 
any particular conception of 'social 
justice' could be realized only in 
such a centrally directed system. 
It presupposes that people are guided 
by specific directions and not by 
rules of just individual conduct. 
Indeed, no system of rules of just 
individual conduct, and therefore 
no free action of the individuals, 
could produce results satisfying 
any princi le of distributive 
justice. 59 
Thus, Hayek would argue that social justice is as in- 
compatible with personal freedom as it is with justice. 
. Concommitant with this threat to personal 
freedom is a threat to personal responsibility, for 
responsibility goes hand-in-hand with freedom. The 
goal of social justice is to make each individual's 
material position coherent with some rational prin- 
ciple. This, in turn, means that the individual's 
position must be made subject to the control of a 
central authority. Now, the effect of this will be 
to remove an individual! s fate from his own control and 
place it largely in the hands of the central author- 
ity. And thus, it will be the central authority and 
not the individual which is responsible for the 
individual's fate. 
Finally, the combined effect of the loss of 
personal freedom and responsibility, as well as the 
stress on equality, will be felt most acutely in the 
field of morality, for our basic notion of morality 
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is dependent on these other values. 
[T]he demand that we should equally 
esteem all our fellow men is ir- 
reconcilable with the fact that our 
whole moral code rests on the ap- 
proval or disapproval of the conduct 
of others; ... similarly the tradi- tional postulate that each capable 
adult is primarily responsible for 
his own and his dependent's wel- 
fare, meaning that he must not 
through his own fault become a charge 
to his friends or fellows, is in- 
compatible with the idea that 
'society' or government owes each 
person an appropriate income. 
... Though all these moral prin- 
ciples have also been seriously 
weakened by some pseudo-scientific 
fashions of our time which tend to 
destroy all morals -- and with them 
the basis of individual freedom -- 
the ubiquitous dependence on other 
peoplels power, which the enforcement 
of any image of social justice cre- 
ates, - inevitably destroys that free- 
dom of personal decisions on which 
all morals must rest. [Footnote 
omitted]59 
In sum, for Hayek to pursue social justice 
is to sacrifice justice, personal freedom, and re- 
sponsibility, and ultimately our basic notion of 
morality. Surely, he says, social justice is not 
worth this price. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PROBLEMS WITH THE IDEA OF A SPONTANEOUS ORDER 
As we have just seen in the preceding chapter, 
Hayek's criticism of the mirage of social justice is 
very much related to his advocacy of society as a 
spontaneous order or-cosmos. The essence of the re- 
lationship between the two is that social justice, as 
Hayek understands the concept, is not attainable or 
even pursuable within the framework of a, spontaneous 
order. Rather, social justice has meaning only within 
a directed order or taxis. In that the preserva- 
tion of the spontaneous order is for Hayek a matter 
beyond dispute, the pursuit of social justice must 
for that reason be abandoned. 
In a later chapter we will consider whether 
the pursuit of social justice is as totally in- 
compatible with a spontaneous order as Hayek maintains. 
Here, however, our concern is a different one. It is 
to see whether the very idea of a spontaneous social 
order is meaningful and viable. Should the idea of 
a spontaneous order prove unstable for reasons in- 
dependent of those connected with the pursuit of 
social justice, then the impact of Hayek's critique 
of social justice, to the extent that it is based on 
alleged incompatibility with the spontaneous order, 
will be seriously lessened. If the spontaneous order 
cannot stand on its own terms, then it is not terribly 
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important that the pursuit of social justice further 
weakens that idea. 
Critical v. Constructive Rationalism 
The foundation of Hayek's advocacy of the 
spontaneous order is as we have seen his epistemology. 
And at the heart of that epistemology is the distinc- 
tion between critical and constructive rationalism. 
The latter maintains both that no belief is justified 
if it cannot be rationally justified, and that what 
men can achieve by considered and applied use of 
reason is extensive. '' This form, of rationalism Hayek re- 
jects as sadly mistaken. He espouses instead critical 
rationalism which maintains that there are very definite 
limits indeed to what can be achieved through the use 
of reason.. These limits are a result of our inevit- 
able ignorance as to most of the facts which are per- 
tinent to any course of action. 
The implication of this for the social order 
is that it is naive to believe that our social orders 
are the result of deliberate human action. Given the 
limitations of critical rationalism, and given the 
complexities of our social orders, it simply cannot 
be that the latter were deliberately designed. The 
knowledge required for such a task would be far beyond 
that which critical rationalism would admit to be 
possible. But if our social orders were not deli- 
berately designed, then the only feasible explana- 
tion for their origin is spontaneous or evolutionary 
development. Likewise, the limitations of critical 
rationalism preclude us from attempting to deli- 
berately develop our social orders in the future. 
Here too we will be able to know at best only a 
fraction of the facts which will be relevant to any 
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course of action that we may consider. Moreover, 
since the original development of the social order was 
spontaneous rather than deliberate, we cannot ade- 
quately gauge the value of any particular existing 
institution, for we cannot know for what reason it 
evolved. Thus, any attempt to tamper with existing 
institutions may have untoward consequences. All 
things considered, it is best then to let future de- 
velopment carry on in the same vein as in the past. 
That is, what originated as a spontaneous order should 
be allowed to continue to develop as a spontaneous 
order. 
Stated this way, Hayek's advocacy of the 
spontaneous order seems to make sense. But does it 
really? Consider, what would happen to this argument 
if the distinction he draws between critical and con- 
structive rationalism could not be maintained? And 
that is exactly. where I want to begin the substance 
of this chapter, with the contention that in practice 
the distinction between critical and constructive 
rationalism is not terribly precise, and thus not 
terribly meaningful. 
our analysis must begin by noting that there 
are really two separate ideasinvolved in the contrast 
between critical and constructive rationalism. One 
is the idea that nothing should be taken for granted, 
that everything must be rationally justified before 
it can be accepted. The other is the idea that there 
are very strict limits beyond which we cannot see when 
we attempt to plot our future course of action, and 
these limits must not be exceeded. Each of these ideas 
must be examined when we are considering the cogency 
of the distinction between critical and constructive 
rationalism. 
Let us consider first the demand for jus- 
tification. It must now be recognized as beyond any 
doubt that in any argument there comes a point at which 
no further justification is possible. Put succinctly, 
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ultimate values cannot be justified. And any argument 
must, if pushed far enough, come to rest upon an ul- 
timate value. This, of course, is not to say that 
justification will always be pushed to this extreme. 
But it could be. To this extent, then, it seems to me 
that Hayek is on solid ground in rejecting the idea 
that no position should be maintained unless it can be 
rationally justified. If this were the case, then 
no position at all could ever be maintained. 
However, that is an extreme view. There is 
a more moderate position which must also be considered. 
That is the idea that when 'f airly challenged' a position 
must be supported with some justification. To under- 
stand this, let us begin by considering the standing of 
the status quo. Perelman argues, and in this I am in 
agreement with him, that it is rational to treat the 
status quo as needing no justification. Thus, he 
speaks of 
a tendency, natural to the human 
mind, to regard as normal and 
rational, and so as requiring no 
supplementary justification, a 
course of behaviour in conformity 
with precedent. 1 
To hold the contrary position would be to envision a 
life entirely consumed with attempts at justification. 
If everything had to be justified, there would be no 
time to engage in anything except the process of justi- 
fication, which presumably would itself have to be 
justified. 
But that is not the case. It is rational 
to accept the status quo, to take it for granted. 
it is the one who seeks to challenge the status quo 
who bears the initial burden of proof. To quote 
Perelman again, "Change only must be justified. " 
2 
To this extent'too, it seems that Hayek is right to 
reject constructive rationalism, if by that concept 
is meant a'prima facie need to justify the status 
quo. 
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But it is with the next step that Hayek moves 
on to rather thin ice. Once the status quo is 'fairly 
challenged' by justifying a proposed change, it loses 
its prima facie immunity from the need to iustify 
itself. It is then eminently rational to require that 
the proponent of the status quo come forward with some 
justification therefor. 
Yes, there is considerable looseness in 
what I have just said. It will always be open to ques- 
tion whether a proposed change has been adequately 
justified, whatever adequately may mean. And it may 
even be that some changes will by their very nature be 
such that they can be disregarded, justified or not. 
But these are not matters with which we need here to 
be concerned. The fact is that Hayek does not 
appear to recognize any need to justify the status 
quo, no matter how it may have been challenged. 
His stock response to any challenge to the 
status quo, at least in terms of the social order, is 
to fall back on the idea of spontaneous development. 
Because the order evolved rather than being deliber- 
ately developed, we can have no accurate idea of what 
function any particular aspect of it may be serving. 
And because we can not know the function of a par- 
ticular institution, we cannot know what we will lose, 
what detrimental effects we will produce, if we change 
it. Therefore, the best policy is to keep hands off. 
The following is a good example of this form of argument. 
Since the value of freedom rests 
on the opportunities it provides 
for unforeseen and unpredictable 
actions, we will rarely know what 
we lose through a particular 
restriction of freedom. Any such 
resti7iction, any coercion'other 
than the enforcement of general 
rules, will aim at the achievement 
of some foreseeable particular 
result, but what is prevented by 
it will usually not be known. The 
direct effects of any interference 
with the market order will be near 
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and clearly visible in most cases, 
while the more indirect and remote 
effects will mostly be unknown and 
will therefore be disregarded. 
[Footnote omitted] We shall never 
. 
be aware of all the costs of achiev- 
. 3-ng particular results 
by such 
interference. 3 
I find this argument most unpersuasive. The 
fact is, if we do not know what we lose by changing 
a particular institution , 
neither do we know. what we 
possess by retaining it. By contrast, the proposed 
changei if justified, at least attempts to show what is 
gained by making*the change. Hayek's posit3'*on thus 
becomes a reversal of the old adage. For him it is 
better to go with the devil we don't know than with 
that we do. To-me such a conclusion is unacceptable. 
If the status quo is'to be maintained in the 
face of a proposed justified change, then it must be 
justified, it must be defended. It is not enough to 
simply refuse to recognize t; he legitimacy of the 
challenge. Rather that challenge must be rebutted, 
either by, - calling 
into question its. own justification, 
and/or by providing a more persuasive justification 
for the status quo. This process will, of course, be 
a very murky one, involving that fine old notion of 
metaphorical weighing. No hard and fast standards 
can be set. And that is the crucial point. 
Defense of the status quo cannot be explained 
in terms of any black-white distinction such as that 
Hayek seeks to draw between critical and constructive 
rationalism. It will-of necessity depend upon the 
particulars of each context in which it arises. And 
once that is recognized, it follows that it is not 
any definition of rationality per se which requires 
that the institutions of the spontaneous order be 
maintained. Rather it will be the strength of the 
arguments which can be offered in each particular 
situation in which dispute arises. In a given 
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situation the spontaneous order may prevail. But 
rationality Per se does not dictate that this will 
always be the case. 
Now what of the otýer idea which is involved 
in Hayek's distinction between critical and construc- 
tive rationalisiw. Does it provide support for the 
advocacy of the spontaneous order? This second concern 
is the idea that there are very strict limits beyond 
which reason cannot go. In planning future developments 
we can see only a very short way, and further than we 
can see we should not attempt to go. 
Here too there is a range within which the 
distinction Hayek draws makes some sense. But again, 
it is a narrow and not especially useful range. To 
support a course of action by means of an argument 
which purports to consider all possible consequences 
of that action does seem patently unreasonable. Like- 
wise, an argument based on consequences -foreseen to 
occur years in the future also seems unreasonable. If 
it is these sort of arguments'which Hayek rejects 
under the name of constructive rationalism, then his 
position does seem defen-sible. 
The difficulty is that the 'reasonings' just 
described again represent an extreme case. At least 
today, it is for the most part only in the context of 
utopian thought experiments that such far reaching 
consequences are considered. The value of such experi- 
ments is, of course, a matter for dispute. Hayek, for, 
one, thinks them most unhelpful. 
To talk about a socýety about which 
either the observer or any of its 
members'knows all the particular 
facts is to talk about something 
wholly different from anything 
which-has ever existed -- a society 
in which most of what we find in 
our society would not and could not 
exist and which, if it ever occurred, 
would possess roperties we cannot 
even imagine- 
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On the other hand, William Gals. ton devotes an entire 
chapter in Justice and the Human Good to "defending 
utopian theory as the most appropriate procedure for 
political philosophy.. 
5 Be that as it may, the crucial 
fact is that it is not utopian thought experiments 
which Hayek is concerned to exclude with the critical- 
constructive rationalism dichotomy. 
No, his concern is with arguments of a much 
more specific and practical application. It is with 
arguments which do not claim to foresee all conse- 
quences or even consequences at any future time long 
removed. Rather, they purport to do no more than take Z, 
into account seemingly readily foreseeable factors 
which relate to the course of action under considera- 
tion. 
So wherein lies the problem? It lies in 
determining what factors can be treated as readily 
foreseeable. It lies also in determining at what 
point one can ressonably disregard unforeseeable 
factors. That is, at what point can one say, I don't 
know precisely what effect this action will have in a 
-given area, but that is something we can worry about 
when the time comes. And finally, it lies in knowing 
-- perhaps intuitively -- which factors need not 
be 
considered at all. Or, turning that about, it lies 
in knowing which factors must be considered . 
Now, I have not yet given any examples of 
the sort of argument which raises this type of problem.. 
And, it is not my intent to do so. The fact of the 
matter is that virtually all reasoning about courses 
of action must ask the questions I have just posed. 
The real problem with such arguments is not whether 
they do or do not cross the line between legitimate 
(critical) and illegitimate (constructive) rational- 
ism. Rather, it is precisely where that line is to 
be drawn in any given case. In effect, all Hayek's 
critical-constructive rationalism distinction does is 
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to tell us that we must draw a line. It does nothing 
to tell us where that line is to be drawn. 
It is worth noting in this connection that 
when it comes to determining the range of reason's 
vision, we must keep in mind that the frontiers of 
human knowledge are continually being pushed back. 
Hayek disputes, or at least attempts to minimalize 
the import of this argument. 
6 He does so by em- 
phasizing the unknowability of the myriad of partic- 
ular facts which may be relevant to any decision. But 
the fact remains, as he himself admits, that "science 
consists not of the knowledge of particular facts... ', 
7 
Rather, it is concerned with abstract patterns of 
behavior. And it is in'recognizing and understanding 
these;: db'sýtratt patterns that human knowledge continues 
to grow. Thus, what was beyond the reaches of reason 
100 or even 50 years ago, may today be considered 
within reason's-ken. Examples abound. Consider, for 
instance the extent to which long range weather fore- 
casts are now possible. 
And the study of social orders is in no way 
excluded from the expanding sphere of knowledge. 
Yet Hayek would have us suppose just that. He would 
have it that our ability to understand our social 
orders is today no more expansive then it was 100, 
500, or even 1000 years ago. This seems palpably 
untrue, It is one thing to say that we are far from 
understanding everything there is to know about a 
social order. It is quite another to say we know 
virtually nothing at all about it. In connection with 
the narrowness of Hayek's vision, it is worth noting 
here what Wieslaw Lang has had to say about it. 
Hayek's theory of knowledge, for 
example, completely ignores the 
dynamic acceleration of the social 
sciences in this century. Hayek 
gives a clear preference to tradi- 
tional and irrational knowledge of 
social phenomena because this kind 
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of knowledge is much more suitable 
for the empirical underpinning of 
his concept of justice than modern 
theories of social structure, 
social change and social develop- 
ment. 8 
The essential point of all this is that in determining 
where to 
* 
draw the line between legitimate and illegi- 
timate reasoning we must keep in mind that that line 
is dynamic and not static. 
Does, then, Hayek make any attempt to tell 
us where this line is to be drawn? He does in a 
sense. But he does so only on an ad hoc basis. one 
might attempt to extrapolate some general principle 
from these particulaiý examples. But in my opinion the 
closest one can get to such a principle is something 
along the lines of: keep your hands off, don't 
touch the spontaneous order at all. But even this is 
dubj6us. as a general principle in light of Hayek's 
willingness to tinker with the spontaneous order 
whenever it suits his purposes. Witness the latter part 
of The Constitution of Liberty9 and the third volume 
of Law, Legislation and Liberty. Thus, it appears that 
Hayek thinks the social order should be left to its 
own wiles and designs (except where he holds otherwise). 
But surely this is the conclusion to which his theory 
of critical rationalism is supposed to lead. To 
treat it also as the touchstone of critical rational- 
ism is to render his argument tautological. 
It would appear, therefore, that Hayek's 
epistemology does not, in fact, support his pre- 
scriptive claims for the spontaneous order. But on 
the other hand, neither does it preclude those claims. 
In short, as far as his epistemology is concerned it 
may or may not be necessary that the spontaneous 
order remain essentially in its present form. But if 
that is a necessity, support for that claim must be 
found elsewhere than in Hayek's epistemology. 
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B. Spontaneous Development 
Another way in which Hayek attempts to support 
his prescriptive claim for the spontaneous order is 
by the notion of spontaneous development. The essence 
of this notion is the idea of development by human 
action but not human design. That is, the institutions 
of a spontaneous order do not come-about because some-. 
one-has deliberately set out to produce them. This 
would be incompatible with Hayek's critical rational- 
ism. Rather, what happens is that the institutions 
are the un-2: hteftded and unforeseen result of a course 
of action undertaken for purposes o* ften totally un- 
connected with the consequences which, actually occur. 
It is when the consequences of a course of action prove 
conducive to the survival of the group which follows 
that course of action t1idt the course of action becomes 
informally. crystallized into an institution. As I 
have-described it, the process of spontaneous develop 
ment is rather vague and general. But that is in fact 
the tenor-of Hayek's discussion. Interestingly, he 
does not once attempt a concrete illustration of the 
workings of this process. 
In any event, let me repeat that the essence 
of this notion*is that development is not the result 
of human design. ýocial institutions are not de- 
signed, they simply happen. From this Hayek draws 
the conclusion that what has been true in the past 
should remain true in the future, which is to say 
that we should avoid any attempt to design our social 
institutions and should instead allow them to con- 
tinue to develop spontaneously. In short, we are 
presented with yet another aspect of Hayek's hands 
off attitude towards the social order. 
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Now, even if we accept Hayek's notion of 
spontaneous development at face value, there is one 
very major problem with the conclusion he draws as 
to the social order. The problem is this. Even 
with spontaneous development as Hayek pictures it the 
individual actor is almost inevitably trying to 
accomplish something. Only in the rare case, such as 
Charles Lamb's roast pig, will the consequences which 
result be totally divorced from any purpose whatsoever. 
More commonly the actor will be bent on accomplishing 
something. Of course, what he accomplishes may be 
quite different from what he intended. But he has, 
nonetheless, set out to accomplish something, 
This is especially the case when we come to 
consider social and/or political institutions. It is 
difficult to accept that design played no part in the 
development of such institutions. This is not to say 
that they were-designed, in that what resulted was what 
was intended from the first. It is, however, to suggest 
that often the institution resulted because someone 
set out to accomplish something in the social or political 
realm. What was accomplished may have in fact been quite 
different,. -. from what was intended. But this does not 
gainsay the fact that it was an intent or design which 
resulted in the institution. Had nothing been attempted, 
nothing would have resulted. 
Herein lies the basis of my disagreement with 
Hayek. He would have it that social and political 
institutions should be left to look after themselves. 
Any attempt to alter them in accord with a pre- 
conceived design should be foregone in favor of simply 
letting them develop spontaneously. But absent any 
attempt to alter there can be no spontaneous develop- 
ment, for it is attempts to alter which constitute the 
grist for the mills of spontaneous development. As 
Hayek himself notes several times, a spontaneous order 
is the result of human action but not human design. 
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An 'action' totally devoid of purpose is not in fact an 
action. Thus, while a spontaneous order is not designed 
in the sense that the final product was what was en- 
-visioned and intended from the start, it does, neverthe- 
less, result because something was envisioned and 
intended. 
But with this the import of spontaneous de- 
velopment becomes rather different from what Hayek 
would have us believe. It is not required that we do 
nothing towards develoýing or changing the social 
order. Rather, what is required is that we do not 
unalterably and irrevocably lock ourselves into a pre- 
conceived plan of action. The best laid plans of mice 
and men may gang. af, t: a: -ýjjey. but *in so doing the result 
may be more advantageous than what was intended. In 
short, advocacy of spontaneous development requires 
that we leave open our plans to the unforeseen, not 
that we have no plans at all. 
There is also another problem with using 
the notion of spontaneous development to defend the 
continued maintenance of the spontaneous. order. Even 
if we acceptýthat the spontaneous order-has. resulted- 
from a process of spontaneous development, that is 
that it has evolved rather than being deliberately 
constructed, what basis is there to assume that the 
spontaneous order is the final re 
' 
sult of spontaneous 
development? If social orders have evolved to a 
spontaneous order, why cannot they continue to evolve? 
Wny cannot they leave the spontaneous order behind 
and move on to some other form of social order? 
'O 
It is not an implausible suggestion that 
this is precisely what has happened. The spontaneous 
order came about because it proved conducive to the 
survival of groups which utilized that form of social 
order. But cannot the same thing now be said about 
t. axis-like orders? Have not these too come about 
through a process of evolution (as distinct from 
revolution), at least in the case of Western societies? 
189 
Is it not the case that societies which attempted to 
exercise greater control over their social order found 
this to be beneficial and consequently continued to 
move in this direction? Certainly it seems at least 
arguable that the appearance of taxis-like orders in 
Western society has been a matter of gradual develop- 
ment rather than sudden imposition. And if that is 
the case then it is spontaneous development which 
has produced such orders. 
Moreover, even if historically it is not 
true that the taxis-like orders with which Hayek is 
concerned are an evolutionary development, this does 
not preclude the fact that such orders could come 
about through spontaneous development. There is 
absolutely nothing in the process of spontaneous de- 
velopment as Hayek, explicates it which would set 
any limitation on the movement or direction of move- 
ment of that p3: ocess. Spontaneous development could 
result in taxis. It could, unless, that is, it is 
nedessarily the case that a taxis-like order could never 
prove beneficial to the group which utilized it. But 
Hayek has made no such showing. The closest he comes 
to doing so is the argument that only a spontaneous 
order is compatible with critical rationalism. How- 
ever, as was demonstrated above, the epistemological 
defense of the spontaneous order does not hold up. 
Thus, the notion of spontaneous development, 
like Hayek's epistemology, proves indifferent between 
a spontaneous order and a taxis. The existence of 
either is compatible with a belief in the process of 
spontaneous development. That the arguments based 
on both epistemology and spontaneous development fail 
to support the prescriptive claim about the spontaneous 
order is significant. These two arguments have at 
least a semblance of being objective, that is valiie free. 
As we-shall soon see, the other arguments upon which 
Hayek bases his defense of the spontaneous order can 
make no such claim. 
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C. Normative Justifications for the Spontaneous 
Order 
The remaining arguments in support of the spon- 
taneous order have one factor in common. They are each 
concerned with demonstrating that the spontaneous order 
is advantageous or beneficial. One such argument relies 
on the idea of success. The spontaneous order, or 
rather the rules which constitute it, has prevailed 
because it proved conducive to the success of the groups 
which adopted it. 
These rules of conduct have thus 
not developed as the reco. -nized 
conditions for the achievement-of 
a known purpose, but have evolved 
because the groups who practised 
them were more successful and dis- 
placed others. 11 
Granting this, the question which comes to mind is 
what is the test of success. And the answer to that 
question is quite clear. For Hayek success is equated 
with mere physical survival. 
The reason why such rules will 
tend to develop is that the groups 
which happen to have adopted rules 
conducive to a more effective order 
of actions will tend to prevail 
over other groups with a less 
effective order. (Footnote omitted] 
The rules that will spread will be 
those governing the practice or 
customs existing in different groups 
which make some groups stronger than 
others. 12 
Thus, one advantage of the spontaneous 
it is conducive to the survival of the 
have adopted it. 
There are two points which c, 
response to this argument. The first 
vival is an after the fact explanation 
order is that 
groups which 
an be made in 
is that sur- 
rather than 
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before the fact justification. That is, the rules 
which constitute the spontaneous order were not put 
into effect because it was known they would be 
conducive to survival. Rather, it is their continued 
observation which is explained in terms of their being 
conducive to survival. That being so, the idea of 
survival can give little guidance to our future course 
of action. 
Only if a wholesale replacement of the spon- 
taneous order were being contemplated would the idea 
of survival be of any value. In such a case it could 
be argued that, since the spontaneous order has been 
conducive to survival, it would be foolhardy to dis- 
card it altogether. However, this situation is 
not one which is commonly faced. As we have already 
seen, the primary problem with which Hayek is con- 
cerned is the gradual transformation of the spontaneous 
order into a taxis-like order. In such a situation 
the idea of survival actually works against Hayek. If 
the rules are changed gradually -- i. e. if the change 
is evolved -- then if they prevail it would seem 
that they have passed the test of survival. 
Actually, I would not choose to push the 
argument that far myself. It seems to me that the 
real difficulty with using survival as a touchstone 
is that it is a very amorphous idea. This in two 
senses. First, there is the problem of knowing 
whether the time span with which you are concerned 
constitutes an adequate test period. Second, in 
most cases it will be virtually impossible to iso- 
late the effects of any particular rule. When 
analyzing social institutions there are rarely 
control groups. This latter aspect is particularly 
applicable when it comes to assessing the spon- 
taneous order. So long as change is gradual and 
piecemeal it seems difficult to preclude it by 
reference to the idea of survival. 
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The second point to be made in response to 
Hayek's argument would grant the test of survival as 
he sets it out, and then reply so what. Is mere 
survival of the group a sufficient test of the de- 
sirability of a particular type of social order? 
Are there not other standards by which a social 
order might be appraised, such as the style of life 
its members lead, or the values they espouse? Of 
course it is true that survival is a pre-requisite 
for the display of other values. But Hayek is not 
really talking about a choice between life and mass 
suicide. Rather, he is saying, that something has 
survived is a sufficient justification to warrant 
its continued existence. Moreover, even if one 
considers the extreme case, life or death, it is not 
always the case that life is chosen. Some may hold 
with Cervantes that "my honour is dearer to me than 
my life", or w: ýth the motto on the Italian coin "it 
is better to live one day as a lion than a hundred 
years as a sheep. " 
Let me make clear that it is not my intent 
to dispute the value Hayek attibutes to mere survival. 
All I want to do is point out that it is quite pos- 
sible to value other things more. In establishing 
survival as a justification for the spontaneous 
order, Hayek is making a normative judgement. For 
the person who disagrees with that normative judgement, 
that the spontaneous order has proved conducive to 
survival is no reason for holding that that order 
must be continued to be maintained. 
Another benefit which Hayek ascribes to 
the spontaneous order is that it is conducive to 
progress. But, by progress he does not mean what 
is more commonly understood by that word. He does 
not mean movement towards some determinate goal. To 
couple this idea of progress with the spontaneous 
order would be quite inconsistent, given that a 
distinguishing trait of the spontaneous order is 
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that it is purpose-independent. No, his idea of 
progress is quite compatible with the idea of a 
purpose-independent social order. 
It would be more correct to think 
of progress as a process of forma- 
tion and modification of the human 
intellect, a process of adaptation 
and learning in which not only the 
possibilities known to us but also 
our values and desires continually 
change. 13 
Progress is movement for movement's 
sake, for it is in the process of 
learning, and in the effects of hav- 
ing learned something new, that man 
enjoys the gift of his intelligence. 14 
The spontaneous order is to be preserved because it is 
conducive to this idea of progress. 
The difficulty with this argument is that it 
seems to be rather circular if not outright tautological. 
Hayek's idea of progress seems quite patently to be 
drawn from his belief that a social order ought to be 
purpose-independent. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the form of social order he espouses is compatible 
with his idea of progress. Of course, for those who 
espouse a more teleological view of society Hayek's 
idea of progress would be most unsatisfactory. For 
them 'the more common sense of progress, as movement 
towards a determinate goal, would be appropriate. And 
from that it would follow that the spontaneous order 
was not in fact conducive to progress. Thus, like the 
argument based on survival, the argument based on 
progress is, in fact, a normative argument. As such 
it does not persuade those who do not accept the norma- 
tive premise upon which it rests. 
The final argument on which Hayek bases 
his defense of the spontaneous order is its com- 
patibility with individual liberty. Obviously this 
is a normative argument. But notwithstanding that, 
it seems to me to be the most important and most 
likely to persuade of his arguments. I say that 
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because, despite the fact that respect for individual 
liberty is a normative premise, it is a premise which 
finds considerable support in contemporary society, 
or at least contemporary Anglo-American society. Now 
at this point I do not intend to devote any time to 
the question of whether, and if so why, individual 
liberty should be respected. However, I will return 
to the question of the value of liberty in a sub- 
sequent chapter which will deal more directly with 
Hayek's critique of social justice. 
For now, let us assume that respect for 
liberty is our goal and let us assume that we are in 
agreement as to what is meant by that concept. The 
question that leaves us with is whether or not the 
spontaneous order is compatible with respect for 
liberty, while a taxis-like order is not. To answer 
that question we must begin by noting that both 
respect for liberty and the spontaneous order (as 
distinct from a taxis) are relative concepts. An 
individual can have more or less liberty, but only in 
the most extreme situation -- and it is doubtful if 
even there -- will he have no liberty at all. Like- 
wise, a social order can be more or less spontaneous; 
but even in the most totalitatian society there will 
be some room for spontaneous action, i. e. some area 
in which the individual can direct his actions in 
accord with his own goals. 
Now, if we concentrate our attention on the 
extreme positions, then Hayek's argument does seem 
valid. That is, if we compare the ideal-type of a 
spontaneous order with a rigid and all-encompassing 
taxis, then it does seem fair to say that the former 
is compatible with respect for individual liberty 
while the latter is not. But to concentrate on the 
extremes is misleading. Hayek's target is not the 
imposed totalitarian society, rather it is the evolv- 
ing welfare state. 
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And if we compare, say, contemporary Britain 
with the ideal-type of the spontaneous order then I do 
not think we can fairly say that the former does not 
respect liberty. It may very well be that there is 
less of liberty in Britain. (And even this may be 
moot, depending on what one understands by liberty. ) 
But to say that there is less liberty is not to say 
that there is no respect for liberty at all. To see 
this, one need only compare Britain with the ideal- 
type taxis. 
Once we recognize this, we no longer have 
an either-or situation. We no longer have: spon- 
taneous order entails respect for liberty, while a 
taxis'like order does not. Both respect liberty. 
The difference between the two is that the taxis-like 
order also respects other values. And because these 
other values may not always be totally compatible 
with respect far liberty, a balance must be struck 
between them. In short, what we have is a priority 
problem. 
Thus, Hayek's contention that only the 
spontaneous order is compatible with respect for liberty 
is, in effect, a claim that respect for liberty is en- 
titled to priority over other values. And this is a 
point which cannot be glossed over. At the beginning 
of this section of discussion I noted that one merit of 
the argument based on liberty was that respect for 
liberty was a concept with considerable support. But 
to espouse respect for liberty is not necessarily to 
espouse it at the expense of all other values. And 
yet this is what Hayek does. It is, therefore, grossly 
misleading for him to argue that only the spontaneous 
order respects liberty. Taxis-like orders can and 
do respect liberty. They simply do not do so to the 
extent that Hayek thinks appropriate. 
With that we complete our examination and 
critique of the arguments Hayek uses to support the 
continued maintenance of the spontaneous order. In 
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my opinion none of those arguments have proved to be 
conclusive. They do give varying degrees of support to 
the claim that the spontaneous order ought to be main- 
tained. But at the end of the day the continued main- 
tenance of the spontaneous order is a matter of judge- 
ment and not a matter of necessity. 
D. Miscellaneous Thoughts Concerning the 
Spontaneous Order 
Before concfýding this chapter, there are two 
additional points relating to the spontaneous order 
which I would like to discuss just briefly. The first 
of these is the relation between the spontaneous order 
and the catallaxy. According to Hayek the catallaxy 
is one type of spontaneous order. 
A catallaxy is thus the special 
kind of spontaneous order produced 
by the market through people acting 
within the rules of the law of 
property, tort and contract. 15 
However, in discussing the spontaneous order Hayek's 
concern appears to be entirely with the catallaxy. To 
the extent we are ever able to picture what he under- 
stands by the spontaneous order, what we see is a 
catallaxy. Because of this, I find it virtually im- 
possible to imagine what a spontaneous order would look 
like which was not a catallaxy. And yet Hayek's own 
words make clear that there must be non-catallaxy 
spontaneous orders. 
This point becomes important in relation to 
the critique of social justice. As we have already 
seen, a significant part of Hayek's criticism of social 
justice is that it is incompatible with the spontaneous 
order. But in point of fact what his argument shows, 
if valid, is that the pursuit of social justice is 
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incompatible with a catallaxy. Now if in fact there 
are forms of spontaneous order other than the cat * allaxy 
and Hayek tells us that there are -- the critique of 
social justice, at least on its face, does not pertain 
to these other forms of order. Thus, even if social 
justice is incompatible with the catallaxy, Hayek has 
done nothing to show that it is incompatible with 
other types of spontaneous order. In other words, 
Hayek's critique of social justice may not carry him 
nearly so far as he seems to think. 
The final question I wish to raise is whether 
or not the spontaneous order is now an outdated concept. 
Granting Hayek everything which he wishes to claim 
anent the spontaneous order, is it not the case that 
contemporary western societies have now become so large 
and so complex that they can no longer function as 
spontaneous orders. Hayek's response would, I imagine, 
be to point out- that with the increased size it has 
become even less likely that anyone could ever have at 
his fingertips all of the pieces of information which 
are relevant to any decision. The beauty of the spon- 
taneous order, he would say, lies in allowing those 
who have information to utilize it. With this I would 
not disagree. 
However, it does seem to me that there are 
other considerations. As we have seen, the spontaneous 
order is able to function because there is agreement on 
basic values. Rules of just conduct find acceptance 
only because when articulated they strike a responsive 
chord with the unarticulated patterns of behaviour 
which guide us. The spontaneous order can be purpose- 
independent only because there is, in fact, agreement 
at a very deep level. The problem as I see it is that 
in the great societies of the west there is no longer 
agreement about basic values. (Or, if there is, that 
agreement is oriented towards collectivism rather 
than Hayek's individualism. ) And absent such agreement, 
the spontaneous order is not viable. 
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As for the complexity of contemporary society, 
it produces an order rather different from the model 
with which Hayek was working. As was noted just above, 
Hayek defends the spontaneous order in terms of the 
catallaxy. And the catallaxy he appears to have in mind 
is one of individual entrepeneurs. It is at least 
arguable that a purpose-independent society is meaningful 
when the focus of concern is individuals pursuing their 
own interests. But the significance and value of in- 
dividual goals loses considerable meaning when our 
focus shifts to a corporate-bureaucratic model. There 
we can no longer seriously talk about the goals of 
individuals. Rather, what we are dealing with is goals 
which one group determines for another much larger 
group. And with that we have rendered meaningless one 
of the primary aims of the spontaneous order: viz. to 
let individuals pursue their own goals in the way they 
think best. - 
I do not intend to carry this argument any 
further, if for no other reason than that it draws me 
into an area far outwith the scope of this dissertation. 
What I have said is, I believe, sufficient to raise a 
question which others might pursue. The hypothesis 
I pose is that while the spontaneous order may once 
have been a desirable form of social order, it is no 
longer viable, and should, therefore, be abandoned. 
To sum up this chapter, I think that to the 
extent Hayek's critique of social justice rests on its 
incompatibility with the spontaneous order, it is far 
from persuasive. The spontaneous order, viewed in the 
most favorable light, is far from stable. Hence, any 
threat posed to it by the pursuit of social justice is 
not terribly significant. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON JUSTICE 
Another very important aspect of Hayek's 
critique of the mirage of social justice is the alleged 
incompatibility betweenthe pursuit of social justice 
and Hayek's conception of justice. The essence of that 
conception of justice can be epitomized as: applying 
universally a coherent system of rules of just conduct. 
By contrast Hayek maintains that the pursuit of social 
justice is not possible through the universal applica- 
tion of such a system of rules. Rather, it requires the 
use of the sort of specific directives which Hayek terms 
rules of organization. 
The intent of this chapter is not to explore 
the alleged incompatibility between justice and social 
justice. That task will be taken up in the next 
chapter. The intent of this chapter is instead to 
critically analyze one aspect of Hayek's conception of 
justice which is very significant vis-a-vis the cri- 
tique of social justice. It should be noted that the 
scope of this criticism will be quite limited. It is 
not the purpose of this chapter nor of this disserta- 
tion to give a comprehensive critique of Hayek's 
conception of justice. As the length of the 
chapter thereon indicates, Hayek's thoughts on justice, 
as well as the issues raised thereby, are involved 
and extensive. Any comprehensive analysis thereof would 
warrant a work in itself. However, the primary focus 
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of this dissertation remains the critique of social 
justice. Accordingly, this chapter will discuss only 
one aspect of justice which relates specifically to 
the critique of social justice. 
A The Significance of Hayek's Objective 
Conception of Justice 
Hayek takes great pride in the claim that 
he has succeeded in demonstrating the existence of 
an objective conception of justice in his social 
order. The key elements in this objective con- 
ception are three. First, rather than being a 
positive test of justice, what we have is a negative 
test of injustice. Second, the standard of justice is 
inter-personally valid, that is, it is not limited to 
those sharing any particular beliefs, moral or other- 
wise. Finally the standard of justice is non- 
volitional, it exists independent of the will of any 
particular person or group of persons. Although all 
three elements are important, the last is perhaps 
the most crucial. 
This becomes apparent when we consider the 
reason why Hayek attached such importance to the claim 
of objectivity. Hayek sees his conception of justice 
as a rebuttal to the position of the Legal Positivists. 
That position can be succinctly stated in three stepp. -. 
One, it is the law that determines what is and is not 
just. Two, what the law is is in turn determined by 
an act of will. Three, it follows that the law (and 
with it justice) is whatever those in authority want 
it to be. Thus, whereas traditional natural law theory 
holds that certain actions are just in and of them- 
selves, legal positivism holds that both law and justice 
are the result of deliberate human action. Or, to 
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amend the phrase Hayýk often uses, they are the result 
of human action and of human design. 
It is to counter this claim that Hayek stresses 
the objectivity of his conception of justice. Rather 
than oppose positivism with the claims of natural law 
theory, Hayek posits a third view of justice. Under 
this objective conception justice is a matter of 
human action but not of human design; it is, in short, 
non-volitional. The significance of this position is 
that Hayek is able to maintain, contrary to the posi- 
tivists, that it is justice which determines law, and 
that justice itself is not simply a matter of what we 
want it to be. Justice and therewith law is outwith 
the realm of the will. Such a conception of justice 
gives genuine substance to the ideal of a government 
of laws and not men. In-turn, the realization of this 
ideal is crucial for a society which seeks to protect 
and nourish individual liberty. And Hayek, as we have 
seen, is a staunch advocate of individual liberty. 
Viewed in this light, the thrust of Hayek's 
objection to social justice becomes even clearer. In 
that the pursuit of social justice is incompatible 
with justice, ' by pursuing it we abandon the only objec- 
tive (non-volitional) standard we have by which to 
evaluate the rules of our society. By abandoning that 
objective conception of justice, we forego the ability 
to judge our laws in terms of justice. Having done 
that, we have little alternative but to agree with the 
Legal Positivists that justice is determined by law and 
ultimately by will. And to take that road is to strike 
a serious blow against the cause of individual liberty. 
or so Hayek would argue. 
In this chapter I will look more carefully 
at Hayek's claim that he has demonstrated a conception 
of justice which is objective, especially in that it 
is non-volitional. Now the key to this claim of non- 
volitionality lies in the nature of the rules of just 
conduct, the rules of just conduct being at the heart 
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of Hayek's conception of justice. To summarize very 
briefly, those rules are non-volitional in that 1) they 
arise spontaneously, 2)-they rest upon the general 
agreement of the populace, and 3) their development and 
articulation is a matter of reason and not will. In 
my analysis I will concentrate on the last two of these 
elements: I will attempt to show that volition may 
play a greater role in both the idea of agreement and 
in the nomos process than Hayek appears to suggest. 
B. The Idea of Agreement in the Rules of 
Just Conduct 
As we have seen in an earlier chapter, the 
rules of just eonduct are patterns of behaviour which 
arise spontaneously rather than by being specifi- 
cally laid down by some individual or group of indi- 
viduals. They are initially observed in practice without 
at the same time being consciously followed. However, 
once they are articulated by a judge or other'legal 
expert (the nomos process) that articulation is 
accepted because, and if, it reflects the pattern or 
practice of behaviour which had hitherto been observed. 
Thus, it is the judge's task to tell those involved 
what ought to have guided their 
expectations, not because anyone 
had told them before that this 
was the applicable rule, but be- 
cause this was the established 
custom which they ought to have 
known. 11 
This acceptance of a spontaneously generated pattern 
of behaviour, initially unconsciously and only later 
consciously,, is what I am designating by the term 
"agreement". 
203 
The idea of agreement is indispensably crucial 
to Hayek's claim to have provided an objective con- 
ception of justice. It is the basis for the claim that 
the rules of justice are non-volitional. Agreement 
is what allows Hayek to maintain that the rules of just 
conduct are neither posited by authority nor inherent 
in the nature of things, but rather are the result of 
human action though not of human design. If agreement 
does not exist, then neither does the objective con- 
ception of justice. 
In this section I wish to suggest that there 
are a number of problems with the idea of agreement. 
The problems do not take the form of internal-incon- 
sistencies. Rather, they represent significant gaps 
in what Hayek says about agreement. Hence, it is not 
that th ,e structure 
Hayek depicts is patently unstable, 
it is only that it is incomplete. My discussion of 
agreement revolves around three broad topics: what is 
meant by agreement, how do you determine agreement, and 
difficulties inherent in the idea of agreement. And 
it is to the first of those topics to which I now turn. 
It is all very well to say that the rules 
of just conduct rest upon an underlying agreement. But 
precisely what does it mean to say that there is 
agreement? Yes, it means that the pattern of behaviour 
in question has been observed in practice. But observed 
by whom, or rather by how many? 
One possibility would be unanimity. That is 
to say, the pattern of behaviour in question is 
accepted by all the members of the society. However, 
it takes little thought to decide that this cannot be 
what Hayek intends. The chances of unanimity among 
a group of anything other than the smallest size are 
virtually nil. If unanimity were what was required to 
establish rules of just conduct, there would be very 
few such rules, if any at all. 
What then of the idea of a simple majority? 
A pattern of behaviour is accepted as a rule of just 
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conduct whenever the majority of the people in a 
society so treat it. While this possibility is not 
subject to the same charge of impracticality as the 
requirement of unanimity, it is impractical in ways 
of its own. For one thing there is the dif f iculty of 
determining when there is majority acceptance of a 
particular pattern of behaviour. More importantly, 
a system of rules based upon majority opinion is apt 
to be highly unstable. Yet when Hayek discusses 
rules of just conduct it seems quite clear that he 
is thinking in terms of something of a rather enduring 
nature. 
The final difficulty with basing agreement 
upon majority opinion is philosophical rather than 
practical. Determining the rules of just conduct by 
majority opinion presents the very real threat of 
majority tyranny. For if a simple majority is suffi- 
cient to establish a pattern of behaviour as a rule 
of just conduct, it is distincly possible that rules 
so established might be inimicable to the interests of 
a significant minority. This most certainly is in- 
compatible with Hayek's advocacy of the cause of 
individual liberty. 
Now, if unanimity is not practical, and 
majority opinion is neither practical nor desirable, 
what remains? The only possibility appears to be 
that very vague idea known as consensus. Consensus 
is less than unanimity, but more than majority; and 
it seems to defy any more precise definition than 
that. But if it is consensus agreement which is 
necessary to turn patterns of behaviour into rules of 
just conduct, and if consensus defies precise defi- 
nition, how are we to determine when there is in fact 
agreement? 
Several approaches come to mind. First, it 
may simply be the case that it will be apparent when 
there is agreement sufficient to establish a rule of 
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just conduct. That is, it may be quite clear that 
p eople accept a particular pattern of behaviour as 
a rule of just conduct. There is difficulty with 
this approach, however, It must be kept in mind 
that, at least until such time as they are articulated 
in the nomos process, the rules of just conduct are 
unconsciously followed. People simply behave in the 
appropriate manner without being aware that it is 
their intent to do so. Their acceptance is, if you 
will, at the subconscious level. But if it is sub- 
conscious, how can it be apparent? 
But perhaps we are in error in seeking some 
sort of express agreement. Perhaps the agreement 
required to establish rules of just conduct is merely 
tacit. Thus, the mere-fact that people observe a 
particular pattern of behaviour is sufficient to 
demonstrate that they have accepted this pattern as 
a rule of just-conduct. At first glance this may 
appear to be precisely what Hayek has said. But further 
thought indicates that there are some serious diffi- 
culties with this position. 
We must keep in mind the role that agree- 
ment plays in Hayek's objective conception of justice. 
It provides the basis for non-volitionality. It ex- 
plains how it is possible for rules of just conduct to 
exist without those rules being posited by someone, 
without those rules being the result of someone's will. 
Mere tacit acceptance is not adequate to demonstrate 
this. 
That people observe a pattern of behaviour -- 
or comply with a rule once it, has been articulated 
through the nomos process -- may indicate an accept- 
ance, subconscious or conscious, that this is the 
appropriate way to act. However, it may also indicate 
other things. For instance, it may simply indicate 
apathy. People may observe the pattern not because 
they think it the appropriate pattern, but rather 
because they do not care enough to attempt to follow a 
contrary pattern. 
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Of even more significance is the fact that 
people may observe a pattern of behaviour because there 
is no effective way to resist. This is especially 
likely to be the case once the nomos process is operat- 
ing in conjunction with an effective enforcement 
agency; and it becomes even more likely the greater 
the size of the society in question. Being realistic, 
one must admit that in, say)contemporary Britain or 
the United States there is very little opportunity for 
the populace to defy or resist the decisions of the 
courts. Those decisions are accepted by the populace, 
but that they are in no way indicates that this is 
because they are believed to represent the under- 
lying pattern of behaviour. Yet this is what Hayek 
would have us belidve: that the rules articulated by' 
the judges are accepted by the populace because they 
reflect the underlying pattern of behaviour. That 
may be the case, but the mere fact that the rules are 
tacitly accepted by the populace most certainly does 
not demonstrate this to be so. Agreement cannot be 
presumed, it must be shown to exist. 
And that is a task which I have so far been 
unable satisfactorily to accomplish. The only solu- 
tion I see to this difficulty smacks very much of 
bootstrapping. But it is, I repeat, the only solu- 
tion which I see. I would suggest that by its very 
nature consensus exists only so long as one does not 
have to prove it exists. It is in a sense self- 
evident. Once a serious challenge has been raised 
as to whether there is in fact a consensus on a par- 
ticular point, it is probably safe to conclude that 
thereno longer is a consensus. But if this is the 
case, the implications for Hayek are serious. If 
rules of just conduct rest upon consensus agreement, 
and if such consensus exists only so long as there is 
no serious challenge to it, the fact that Hayek con- 
siders his entire social theory under attack suggests 
that the rules of just conduct which are essential to 
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the maintenance of that system may no longer be 
supported by consensus. 
Let us now change our tack slightly. Hereto- 
fore the condern has been-with what. is encompassed. by. 
the idea of agreement. Let us assume now. that the 
previous questions'have been satisfactorily answered. 
The question which then must be confronted is how 
likely is it that there will be agreement of the sort 
which Hayek requires in order for there to be rules of 
just conduct. 
At the outset of this particular inquiry 
we must begin by noting the connection between rules 
and values. In the chapter on justice we have already 
discussed the meaning of the concept of value. But it 
is worth quoting again Hayek's own definition: 
Which term we shall understand to 
refer to generic classes of events, 
defined by certain attributes and 
generally regarded as desirable. 
By 'desirable''in this connection 
we thus mean more than that a par- 
ticular action is in fact desired 
by somebody on a particular opca- 
sion; -it is used -to- describe a lasting attitude of one or m2 re 
persons to a kind of event. 
Now at the very least it must'be the case that the 
rules of just conduct which people accept are not 
incompatible with the7alue's which they espouse. Any 
such incompatibility would be quite ilýogical. But 
more than that, is it not also likely to be the case 
that. the rules of just conduct will reflect the values 
which people espouse? Thus, if people consider some 
class of events desirable would we not also expect 
them-to accept rules of just conduct which are condu- 
cive to the pursuit of those values? I think that 
clearly to be the case. 
Of course, Hayek goes to great lengths to 
try to divorce the rules of just conduct from any 
underlying values. It is to this end that he stresses 
that the rules must be general and purpose-independent. 
208 
The idea of purpose-independence in particular is aimed 
at dispelling the suggestion of any undue connection 
between the rules of just conduct and particular 
values. Notwithstanding these efforts, however, I think 
that Hayek fails to achieve the separation he seeks 
between rules and values. This for two reasons. 
First, while he stresses the general purpose- 
independent nature of the rules, the fact is they cannot 
be too much so this way. The function of the rules 
is to guide conduct so as to make a viable social order 
possible. Overly vague rules quite simply cannot 
achieve this function. A rule which is totally devoid 
of purpose will not effectively guide conduct. Thus, 
while very specific purposes can be avoided, to avoid 
any purpose is to produce a non-rule. The second reason 
why I think that Hayek fails to divorce rules from 
values is that he apparently forgets that his own social 
order is an ideology and as such is made up of com- 
ponent values. That this is so was discussed in the 
beginning of the chapter on Law, and I will not here 
repeat that discussion. Given this 'ideological base' 
it would be most incongruous for Hayek to maintain 
that there is no connection between rules and values. 
Now, it is this connection between rules and 
values which is the source of my questioning how likely 
it is that there will be any great amount of agreement 
on rules of just conduct in a contemporary society. 
Several types of problems arise. But all stem from 
the fact that there is not likely to be any sort of 
consensus agreement concerning values. 
One source of difficulty is the fact that 
values are apt on occasion to conflict. The only way 
to avo*id such a result would be to assume some sort of 
monolithic hierarchy of values, such that all conflicts 
could be resolved within the system. As it is though, 
Classical Liberalism with which Hayek allies himself 
espouses the notion of a plurality of values. And 
if there is a plu-jýality of values, not only are values 
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apt to conflict, but people are apt to attach different 
weight to different values. Since then the rules reflect 
values, and since there is unlikely to be any consensus 
on values, how can we expect there to be any consensus 
on the rules? 
A similar source of difficulty is the argument 
that values are espoused not so much on a society-wide 
level as on the level of various sub-groups. Thus, it 
can be argued that values are relative to such factors 
as class, ethnic background, and religion. Inasmuch as 
any Great Society, such as Hayek envisions, will almost 
certainly evince considerable diversity in each of 
these factors it seems difficult to believe that such 
a society will manifest sufficient consensus of opinion 
on values to produce the necessary agreement on rules 
of just conduct. 
The twoýsources of difficulty I have con- 
sidered to this point both involved conflict between 
the values espoused by different individuals at the same 
time. However, we must also recognize that there will 
almost certainly be conflict between values over periods 
of time. Conflict is, perhaps, too strong a word for 
what I have in mind. What I am concerned with is the 
fact that Hayek gives one the impression that the rules 
of just conduct found in any society, together with the 
underlying values which those rules reflect, will bb 
relatively static. This seems to me a quite counter- 
factual assumption. 
There are several factors which lead one to 
conclude that values must be treated as dynamic rather 
than static. One is that there are apt to be gradual 
changes in values reflecting changes of other sorts in 
the life of the society. A second is that values can 
be deliberately changed, either by legislation or judi- 
cial opinion, or by the example of influential figures. 
The decisions of the Warren court and the civil rights 
legislation of the 1960's are good examples of these 
first two avenues of change. Now, the crucial point 
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here. is not that values change, but rather that change 
will almost certainly be gradual. The problem this raises 
is what happens when values are in flux? Assuming there 
had been a consensus, at some point that consensus will 
disappear, and it may be a considerable time before a 
new consensus forms. What happens to the rules of just 
conduct which depend upon consensus for their existence 
during this time of flux? 
The upshot of the preceding few pages is to 
raise the factual question of how much agreement on basic 
values there actually is in contemporary societies. 
Certaihly there must be considerable agreement, else 
the society could not maintain its cohesion. But it is 
not the areas of agreement which warrant attention. 
Rather it is the areas of disagreement with which we should 
be concerned. And these appear to be significant. In a 
society such as-the United States one could illustrate 
this point by raising such issues as abortion and capital 
punishment. 
But one need not be that specific either in 
issue or in society to deal a telling blow to Hayek. Con- 
sider instead just two points: the movement from cosmos 
to taxis, and the pursuit of social justice. Hayek 
maintains that both of these trends are inimicable to 
the values his social order represents. Yet the very 
fact that they are current trends demonstrates that 
there is considerable agreement upon the values which 
these trends represent. Recall then my earlier con- 
clusion that once it become necessary to defend a 
consensus that consensus no longer exists. Are we not 
forced to concludethen that the social order which 
Hayek seeks to defend is not, in fact, based upon a con- 
sensus agreement. And if it is not based upon agreement, 
then the objectivity upon which he places so great a value 3 
is no longer present. 
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Problems with Nomos 
It may be argued that in the foregoing section 
I placed too much emphasis on the need for agreement 
to underpin each of the rules of just conduct. Yes, 
a, greement is necessary. But surely not for all of the 
rules. It is true that Hayek speaks as if every rule 
articulated through the nomos process must rest on the 
underlying agreement of the populace as to the appro- 
priate behaviour. But perhaps this is mere rhetoric. 
When one considers the sheer number of rules 
of just conduct which will comprise any system, and when 
one adds in tfiýýt the hard cases with which the judges 
must grapple are generally novel situations for which 
there is no previous pattern of behaviour, it seems 
patently obvious that Hayek cannot really be suggesting 
that all the rules of a system will rest upon the agree- 
ment of the populace. Is it not much more likely that 
what he intends is that there will be agreement on the 
basic principles about which the rules of the system 
are structured? And it is these principles which the 
judges will -identify and utilize in making their 
decisions in the nomos process. 
Now, this approach may appear to sidestep 
many of the problem areas concerning agreement which I 
raised in the previous section, although whether there 
is agreement on basic principles is still open to 
challenge. But in any event all this approach does is 
raise a new series of problems for the objective con- 
ception of justice. As we have already seen, the purpose 
of nomos is twofold. First, it is to articulate 
the appropriate rule in difficult cases in which it is 
not apparent what the proper pattern of behaviour is. 
Second, in genuinely novel situations in which there is 
no apropos pattern of behaviour, nomos must develop 
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a rule which not only resolves the problem but also is 
compatible and derived from the existing system of 
rules of just conduct. 
Hayek maintains that in each of these situa- 
tions nomos is a matter of reason and not will. That is 
although the judge has decisions to make in these situa- 
tions, those decisions depend on his rationality and 
and not upon his volition. 
The judge may err, he may not 
succeed in discovering what is 
required by the rationale of 
the existing order, or he may 
be misled by his preference for 
a particular outcome of the case 
in hand; but. all this does not 
alter the fact that he has a 
problem to solve for which in 
most instances there will be 
only one right solution and 
this is a task in which his 
'will' or his emotional response 
has no place. 4 
It is essential for Hayek that this be the case if he 
is to uphold the integrity of his objective concep- 
tion of justice. Should it turn out that the decisions 
made by a judge in the nomos process are primarily 
dependent upon his will, then Hayek could no longer 
claim that he has put forward a conception of justice 
which is volition free. He would then in effect be 
putting forward nothing more than a variation on the 
positivist conception of justice. 
In this section I wish to suggest that the 
nomos process is far from as clearcut and straight- 
forward a matter of reason as Hayek would have us 
believe. At the very least, as Hayek himself admits, 
it is not a matter of simple Ueductive logic. There 
are a variety of decisions which a judge has to make 
which cannot be made by simple deductive reasoning. 
Even the fact that the test of justice is negative and 
not positive does not eliminate the need to make these 
decisions. 
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As with the preceding section of this chapter, 
I will not be suggesting that the nomos process as 
Hayek has depicted it is inherently unstable. Rather, 
I will be suggesting that there are gaps in what he 
says. It may be possible to fill these gaps. But until 
such time as he does that, nomos does not do for him 
what he thinks it does. This section will be relatively 
short as, for the most part, it will consist of little 
more than pointing out problems with which Hayek has 
failed to deal. ' 
I see four basic areas in which questions can 
arise which, at least at first glance, will have to be 
answered by will and not reason. At the threshhold 
there is the question of how the problem is to be 
characterized. While the facts of a case may be pretty 
much pre-ordained (and even here there can be a certain 
looseness) there can be considerable leeway as to how 
the issues are to be characterized. Thus, a problem 
does not come ready labelled. Rather, it is up to 
the judge to determine what are the issues with which 
he will deal. 
once the issues are determi: ned, 'the next ques-, 
tion to be confronted is what principle or principles 
are applicable to these issues. If we grant Hayek his 
basic premises, the judge is expected to be familiar 
with the basic principles which underpin the system of 
rules of just conduct with which he is dealing. But 
merely knowing the principles of the system does not 
guarantee any sort of self-evidence about which prin- 
ciples are applicable to which issues. That 
I 
is a 
decision which the judge must make. 
There is one interesting aside worth noting 
in regard to this problem. That is the question of 
what sort of principles a judge may utilize. We have 
seen in an earlier chapter that for Hayek the essence 
of the law-morality distinction is that the former 
relies upon an organized enforcement agency. The ques- 
tion is whether this distinction precludes a judge 
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from utilizing moral principles in the nomos process. 
If it does not, and given that the judge is a part of 
the enforcement agency, does the mere utilization of 
a moral principle in the nomos process convert it into 
a legal principle. Interesting though this question 
may be, Hayek gives us no indication how he would 
answer it. 
The third source of difficulty for Hayek's 
nomos process involves situations in which principles 
conflict. To wit, even though the issues have been 
characterized and the applicable principles identified, 
it may turn out to be the case that the latter are not 
compatible. Thus, the principles deemed applicable 
may dictate contrary results. When this occurs, it 
is the judge who must determine which of the applicable 
principles to follow. 
The fourth and final source of difficulty 
involves the wdighing of consequences. Particularly 
when dealing with contrary principles, but in other 
situations as well, it may be necessary for a judge 
to pay heed to the consequences of making a decision 
one way or the other. It is all very well to speak of 
weighing consequences in such a situation, provided one 
realizes that any talk of weighing is purely meta- 
phorical. At the end of the day what really must be 
done is that a decision must be made as to which con- 
sequences are most desirable, or perhaps least un- 
desirable. And it is the judge who must make such a' 
decision. 
In addition to these problems which are spe- 
cifically found in the nomos process, there are two 
other problem areas related thereto which warrant 
notice. Again, all that can be said is that Hayek 
does not address these area. 
The first is the question of what happens 
when there is a difference of opinion between the 
judges or other legal experts. The question is not so 
much what you do about it, as it is how you explain it. 
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If nomos is a matter of reason and not will, then it 
seems most disturbing to find the putative legal ex- 
perts disagreeing amongst themselves. One can try 
to explain away the difficulty by maintaining that one 
side or the other must be involved in erroneous reason- 
ing. The problem will be to demonstrate this, given 
that the supposedly errant side will undoubtedly be 
quite prepared to issue a rational defense of its posi- 
tion. And if one tries to come to grips with the 
differing positions, one is apt to find that the source 
of the disagreement lies in different decisions on such 
matters as relevance and importance. And differences 
of this nature unfortunately give the appearance of 
being a matter of will and not reason. 
The other area worth noting is the question 
of whether there can ever be gaps in the law. That is 
to say, can cases ever arise in which there is simply 
no relevant la,,, z? Certainly Hayek speaks as if this will 
never be the case. Thus, he talks about a rule being 
5 "'implicit' in the body of the existing rules" . 
And yet, he tosses this point off as something so ob- 
vious as to warrant neither explanation nor proof. 
with all due respect, I think that further discussion 
is warranted. To 'create' a rule which after the 
fact can be made to appear compatible with the exist- 
ing system of rules is quite different from saying 
that the existing system provided an answer to the 
question at hand. And this difference is crucial if 
one is concerned with defending a non-volitional con- 
ception of justice. 
To sum up this entire section, Hayek is 
confronted with and has failed to deal with a basic 
problem of legal theory. And that is the problem 
of judicial discretion. Are judges totally unfettered 
in making decisions in so-called hard cases, or are 
there limits, great or small, as to what they can 
decide? This is an issue with which Hayek totally 
fails to come to grips. He simply tells us that nomos 
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is a matter of reason and not will, and he lets it go 
at that. Certainly one cannot extrapolate a theory of 
legal reasoning from what he says, for he says vir- 
tually nothing. There is not even enough said on this 
subject to construct a Hayekian, as distinct from 
Hayek's, theory of legal reasoning. 
Oh, one could attempt to construct a theory 
of legal reasoning which would be compatible with 
Hayek's overall social philosophy. Or, one could 
attempt to demonstrate that an existing theory of legal 
re 
. 
asoning, 'such as MacCormick's 
6 
or Dworkin's7, is 
compatible with that philosophy. But both of those 
would be major tasks, and both are outwith the scope of 
this dissertation. Moreover, to be quite blunt, the 
problem is not mine, it is Hayek's. He is the one who 
has put forward a conception of justice which he claims 
to be objective, objective especially in the sense that 
it is non-volitional. To defend that claim he must 
show that judges are carefully circumscribed in making 
the sorts of decisions which are required by the nomos 
process. This he has failed, or rather omitted to 
do. 
Let me now sum up the argument of this 
chapter. What I have attempted to do is demonstrate 
that volition may play much more of a role in Hayek's 
conception of justice than he admits. I do not main- 
tain that I have succeeded in rebutting the claim of 
objectivity. Rather, I think that I have demonstrated 
that there are quite a number of fuzzy edges which are 
caused by unanswered -questions. Until such time as the 
questions I have raised are satisfactorily answered, 
it seems to me that Hayek has failed to clearly estab- 
lish that the pursuit of social justice presents a 
razor sharp choice between a positivist and an objective 
conception of justice. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
PROBLEMS WITH THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
As we saw in Chýpter Six, Hayek's critique of 
social justice can conveniently be viewed as having three 
distinct, albeit related, prongs. ' The first is that 
social justice is a meaningless concept. The second is 
that social justice is inevitably incompatible with 
certain key elements of Hayek's social philosophy. And 
the third is that the very pursuit of social justice is 
inimicable to respect for individual liberty and certain 
other values associated therewith. In this chapter I 
will examine from a critical standpoint the first two 
prongs of Hayek's attack on social justice. I will 
reserve comment upon the third prong of that attack 
until the next chapter. 
At the outset I wish to make clear the stand- 
point from which I will approach Hayek's critique. I 
will do so from within the basic parameters of Hayek's 
social philosophy. That is to say, I will grant him 
his fundamental premises and will then consider whether 
the critique of social justice is actually justified 
by those premises. The nature of this approach must 
be kept in mind. Neither this chapter, nor this dis- 
sertation purports to be a definitive analysis of the 
concept of social justice. What it does purport to 
be is a definitive analysis of Hayek on social 
justice. 
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If one began with fundamental premises dif- 
ferent from those with which Hayek begins, one's approach 
to social justice would likely be quite different, and 
obviously conclusions of a very different nature might 
be drawn. A comparison of the conclusions reached 
by a different methodology with the conclusions reached 
by Hayek would certainly be interesting and probably- be 
informative as well. That I repeat, however, is not my 
present task. It must be recalled that I came to this 
dissertation initially as one who sympathized with Hayek's 
conclusions. My concern, therefore, was, not to convince 
others who might find Hayek's position anathema from the 
start, but rather to convince myself that his critique 
of social justice was genuinely viable. That being the 
case, it is only reasonable that my analysis should 
take place within the parameters of Hayek's system. 
Now, as, I have already noted, this chapter 
will consider the first two prongs of '1ýayek's attack 
on social justice. In the first part I will argue that 
the concept of social justice is not as altogether devoid 
of meaning as Hayek would have us believe. One can, in 
fact, talk intelligently of a concern for social justice'., 
In the second part I will argue that there is no neces- 
sary incompatibility between the pursuit of social 
justice and the various elements of Hayek's social system. 
it may be that the pursuit of social justice is often 
incompatible with Hayek's social system; but it need not 
always be so. Finally, in the third part of this chapter 
I will return to the concept of social justice and con- 
sider in some detail what is entailed by that concept. 
Social Justice is not a Meaningless Concept 
Hayek's initial objection to "the mirage of 
social justice" is that the term social justice is 
actually devoid of any real meaning. Thus, although 
people constantly talk of social justice and constantly 
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appeal thereto in criticizing a widevariety-of situa- 
tions and institutions, when one tries to identify pre- 
cisely what it is to which they are appealing it soon 
becomes apparent that there is no real substance to 
the term. 
, of course, it is not that people mean-abso- 
lutely nothing when they appeal to social justice. 
They, do have some meaning in mind to be sure. The 
problem, according to Hayek, is that the meaning of the 
term tends to be quite idiosyncratic. When people speak 
of social'-justice there is a wide variety of concepts 
to'-which they can be referring. Among those Hayek dis- 
cusses as proferred meanings for social justice are the 
common good, the general welfare, equality of material 
position, equality of treatment, equality of opportunity, 
and distributive justice. There is nothing even faintly 
approaching a consensus as to which of these concepts, 
accurately embodies the essence of'social- justice. - 
Moreover, each of these concepts when considered, indi-, 
vidually is-itself quite vague and subject, to a variety 
of interpretations as to its real meaning. Hencei'the 
real problem is not that social justice-has no. meaning, 
but rather that it means all things-to all men. It is 
in this sense that Hayek says it is-meaningless to 
speak of pursuing social justice. 
However, in my opinion Hayek's reasoning 
is faulty. The same reasoning, if applied to the 
concept of justice, would produce the conclusion that 
justice is a meaningless term. Consider, there are 
probably as many, or moreproferred meanings of 
justice as there are of social justice. It is, thus that 
Chaim Perelman can say: 
It is vain to try to enumerate 
all the possible meanings of the 
idea of justice. Let us, however, 
give a few examples which con- 
stitute the most current concep- 
tions of justice ... 1. To each the same thing. 
2. To each according to his merits. 
3. - To each according to his works. 4. To each according to his needs. 
5. To each according to his rank. 6. To each according to his legal,, 
entitlement. 1, 
And, just as there is with social justice, not only is 
there no consensus as to which of these ideas_. captures 
the 'real' meaning of justice, but the, meaning of these 
ideas themselves is open to dispute, some more so than 
others. 
- Of course, Hayek would likely reply that he 
has, in fact, demonstrated to us the, real meaning of 
justice. The other proferred meanings are simply 
erroneous interpretations., Unfortunately for Hayek, 
however, other theorists of justice would be equally 
prepared -to argue that they have demonstrated the 
real meaning of justice'and.: that it is Hayek and others 
who are in error. (And for'that matter, theorists of 
social justice would argue that they have demonstrated 
the real meaning of the term, and that it is Hayek with 
his claim of meaninglessness who is iný_error'. ) Thus, 'I 
with justice, just as it is with'social justice, there 
-is-. a variety of meanings, ' -each. -subject to varying 
interpretations, attached to the term. -If this result 
dictates that we deem social justice meaningless, it 
must also dictate that we so deem justice. Yet surely 
not many people, least of all Hayek, would argue that 
justice is a meaningless term, and that to pursue 
justice is to pursue a mirage. 
I suggest that the heart of Hayek's difficulty, 
the source of his problem, is that he has*confused the 
term "concepe'with the term "conceptioný. 4 The difference 
between the two is explained well by John Rawls in 
reference to justice: 
Thus it seems natural-to think 
of the concept of justice as dis- 
tinct from the various conceptions- 
of justice and as being specified. 
by the role which these different! 
sets of principles, these different 
conceptions, have in common. [Footnote 
omitted] 2 
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To paraphrase, a concept is the common denominator which 
ties the various conceptions together, it is the essence 
which must be shared in order to ensure that the various 
conceptions are actually addressing the same problem. 
It should be noted that to speak thus of concept and 
conception is not necessarily to assume the existence 
of any metaphysical entities. It is enough to view the 
two terms as relating to the way in which language is 
used. The concept is, if you will, the legitimate para- 
meters of a word in the appropriate language; outwith 
these parameters the word is simply being misused. 
I am suggesting that Hayek's difficulty with 
finding any meaning to the term social justice results 
because he mistakes the various conceptions of social 
justice for expressions of the concept. Such ideas 
as the common good, substantive equality, and distributive 
justice are, to use Rawls' words, "different sets of prin- 
ciples" proferred to give substance to the concept of 
social justice. That such sets of principles may be 
unduly vague and may to some extent be inconsistent with 
one another does not gainsay the fact that they share 
some common core which constitutes the concept of social 
justice. Moreover, for people to pursue such concep- 
tions is certainly not for them to embark on a meaning- 
less activity. Hayek's argument demonstrates not that 
the concept of social justice is meaningless and that 
the pursuit thereof is for that reason futile, but 
rather that, not surprisingly, there are a variety of 
conceptions of social justice currently in vogue. 
Now, Hayek may want to come back and argue 
that, conceptions to-the side, the concept of social 
justice is itself meaningless. But this, I stress 
again, he has of yet not done. However, even should 
he attempt to do so, I think that attempt is doomed 
to failure. Standing insurmountably at the thresh- 
hold is the widely held intuitive belief that social 
justice is a meaningful concept. And Hayek himself has 
recognized that our "sense of justice" is something 
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which must be taken account of. 
3 The fact of the matter 
is that large, very large, numbers of people believe 
in social justice. Hayek himself admits that social 
justice is constantly being held up as a standard of 
criticism. 
The appeal to 'social justice' 
has nevertheless by now become the 
most widely used and most effective 
argument in political discussion. 
Almost every claim for government 
action on behalf of particular 
groups is advanced in its name, 
and if it can be made to appear 
that a certain measure is demanded 
by Isocial justice' opposition to 
it will rapidly weaken. People 
may dispute whether or not the parti- 
cular measure is required by 'social 
justice'. But that this is the 
standard which ought to guide poli- 
tical action, and that the expres- 
sion has definite meaning, is hardly 
ever. questioned. 4 
However, while granting the existence of this wide- 
spread belief in social justice, Hayek does take steps 
to discount it. Specifically, he offers two argu- 
ments. First, he suggests that often appeals to 
social justice are no more than disguised expres- 
sions of envy and self-interest. 
5 This is an interest- 
ing suggestion to be sure. '. -However, a suggestion is 
all it is, for Hayek offers nothing by way of substan- 
tiation. To those who, like Hayek, oppose most appeals 
to social justice this suggestion may appear self- 
evident. But in the realm of serious argument it bears 
about as much weight as statements such as "most people 
on welfare are lazy and do not want to work. " More- 
over, even were one to grant arguendo that some appeals 
to social justice do rest upon envy and self-interest, 
this would not explain the significant number of such 
appeals in which there can be no hint, of these factors. 
I refer to the work of social philosophers and to 
appeals to social justice by people who would have to 
be described as financially well off. In such cases 
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envy and self-interest can serve no function. To attempt 
to explain, say, John Rawls' monumental defense of social 
justice 
6 by reference to envy could only be described 
as bizarre. 
Hayek's other attempt to discount the intuitive 
belief in social justice is a sort of analogy. He sug- 
gests that belief in social justice is a "quasi- 
religious superstition" akin to the belief in witch- 
craft. 
7 Just as the fact that people at one time be- 
lieved in witches in no way demonstrated that witches 
actually existed, so too the belief in social justice 
in no way demonstrates that it exists. With all due 
respect, this argument fails completely, and it fails 
because Hayek has become rather confused concerning 
what it is he is arguing about. 
It is true to say tfizLt the mere fact that 
people believe in witches does not demonstrate that 
witches exist. - It does not 
follow from this, however, 
that the concept of witch is meaningless. Quite the 
contrary. People could neither believe nor disbelieve 
in witches unless the concept had some meaning. Pace 
Hayek, that people believe in witches does in fact 
demonstrate that the concept of witch has meaning. So 
too with social justice. That people believe in social 
justice demonstrates prima facie that the concept of 
social justice has some meaning. To be honest, I must 
admit that there is an analogy which can be drawn 
with the witchcraft example. But it is quite dif- 
ferent from the one which Hayek has drawn. What we 
could say is that the mere fact that people believe in 
social justice -- i. e. believe that a certain type of 
behaviour is in some way obligatory -- does not demon- 
strate that such behaviour is actually obligatory. This 
analogy, however, goes to the question of whether social 
justice should be pursued and not whether it has any 
meaning. 
To sum up, the widespread intuitive belief 
in social justice warrants a rebuttable presumption 
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that the concept of social justice has some meaning. 
Neither Hayek's argument based on envy and self-interest, 
nor that based on the analogy to witchcraft succeeds 
in rebutting that presumption. 
Of course, it could still be the case that, 
while people express a belief in social justice, and 
while this belief is not contaminated by any base 
motives, this belief could yet be meaningless in that 
there is no genuine agreement among people as to what 
it is in which they profess to believe. That is to say, 
people may believe in 'social justice', but that term 
may mean quite different things to different people. 
The term would then have a variety of meanings, but 
no single common meaning. It would in that sense be 
meaningless. This is probably the argument Hayek 
attempted to make when he became muddled in the dif- 
ference between a concept and a conception. 
Now, -if that is the argument one wants to 
make, it seems to me there is a very simple but telling 
approach to take. Rather than attempting as Hayek has 
done to set forth a compendium of meanings of the con- 
cept in question and then to demonstrate that these 
meanings are mutually incompatible, why not simply 
shift the burden of proof? Demand that the proponents 
of the concept, in this case social justice, explain 
precisely what that concept means. After all, the surest 
way to prove that something exists is to produce that 
something. It is to that challenge to which I now turn. 
At the outset let me note that it is not my 
intention to set forth a comprehensive definition of 
social justice. Whether it ever makes sense to talk of 
the idea of an all encompassing definition is, in 
my opinion, doubtful. Fortunately, however, that is not 
an issue with which I need here concern myself. For my 
present purposes it will be more than adequate to 
'define' the concept of social justice in only a very 
loose sense. To rebut Hayek's claim that social justice 
is meaningless I need only to imbue that concept with a 
225 
content sufficiently broad to embrace the various concep- 
tions of social justice with which Hayek was concerned, 
yet notso vague as to be devoid of any real meaning. 
Interestingly, it seems to me that the most 
effective way to do this is to utilize Hayek's conception 
of justice as a background against which to sketch the 
concept of social justice. Inasmuch as one of Hayek's 
major objections to social justice is its alleged in- 
compatibility with his conception of justice, the approach 
appears eminently reasonable. What better way to grasp 
the meaning of social justice than to focus on the dif- 
ference between that concept and Hayek's justice. Let 
me stress again, however, that this approach is not 
intended to produce any definitive statement about 
social justice. It is intended to demonstrate only 
that the claim that the concept of social justice is 
without meaning is unwarranted. 
As we-have seen numerous times already, 
the essence of Hayek's conception of justice can be 
epitomized as follows: justice is the universal appli- 
cation of a coherent system of rules of just conduct. 
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, let me point out 
that, phrased this way, this conception has two ele- 
ments: universal application and a coherent system of 
rules. These elements are concerned with form and 
procedure. What they evince no concern with is content. 
In the chapter on justice we did discuss at 
some length the charge that Hayek's conception of 
justice is indifferent to the content of the rules 
on which it relies. We saw that that charge is not 
altogether accurate in that the form Hayek prescribes 
for the rules of just conduct will affect the content 
of those rgles. Nonetheless, it remains the case that 
the primary emphasis of Hayek's conception of justice 
is on form and procedure. Any concern with content is 
incidental and is dependent on the requirements of form 
and procedure. It is this emphasis which explains 
statements such as the following: 
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often the contentof the rule. is 
indeed of minor importance, pro- 
vided the same rule. is universally 
enforced. 8 
[JIustice is not concerned with the 
results of the various transactions 
but only with whether the transac- 
tions themselves are fair. 9 
In short, for Hayek justice is concerned not so much 
with what you do as with how you do it. 
By contrast, the primary emphasis of social 
justice is virtiýally the opposite of that of Hayek's 
conception of justice. To speak of social justice is 
to evince a concern with content rather than form and 
with effect rather than procedure. Social justice 
is not content merely to have a coherent system of 
rules. It is concerned, instead, with what those 
rules are. Likewise, social justice is not satisfied 
provided only fhat the rules are universally applied. 
It also is concerned with the effects of applying the 
rules universally. One might say that, whereas justice 
(Hayek's justice) concentrates on rules, social justice 
concentrates on people. Hayek obviously believes that 
if you look after the rules, the people will look after 
themselves. The proponents of social justice are not 
so sanguine, they believe we must never lose sight of 
what is actually happening to people. 
So far so good. But as is, the scope of 
social justice appears virtually unlimited. That scope 
can, I think, be considerably narrowed. And that 
narrowing results when we consider the nature of the 
concern expressed by the various conceptions of social 
justice with which Hayek dealt, and attempt to extra- 
polate therefrom a common denominator. Though there 
may be disagreement about how to express it in words, 
the essence of that common denominator seems to me 
quite apparent. 
The essential focus of social justice is 
what I will call the welfare of individuals. By 
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welfare I denote the wellbeing of individuals, well- 
being of both a physical and a psychological nature. 
Welfare encompasses such elements as food and shelter, 
housing and medical care, self-respect and dignity. 
Falling back again on our comparison with Hayek's 
justice, we can say that social justice is concerned 
with the effect the rules of justice have on the wel- 
fare of individuals. 
Of course, it goes without saying that the 
concern of social justice with the welfare of indivi- 
duals is a moral concern. Thus, someone who favors 
welfare oriented action on the grounds that it is apt 
to keep the have-nots from causing civil disruption 
(as Hayek himself does on at least one occasion)"o 
demonstrates prudential considerations and not a con- 
cern for social justice. The moral concern might be 
expressed in terms of the rights of the recipients or 
the duties of the well off, or it may take some other 
form altogether. But unless the concern is morally 
based, it is not a concern for social justice. 
Now, this moral concern with the welfare of 
one's fellows has not gone totally unnoticed by Hayek. 
He has noticed it, but only so far as to dismiss it 
out of hand. To him such concerns represent a throw 
back to the morality of the tribal or closed society. 
They may have had a place then, in a society which was 
relatively small and in which people knew each other 
well. However, in the Open or Great Society which 
Hayek advocates there is no place for such concerns. 
Again, as in the analogy to witchcraft, this response 
goes to whether social justice ought to be pursued, 
not to whether it has any meaning. Whether Hayek 
approves or not, the fact is that when people speak 
of social justice they are speaking of a moral concern 
for the welfare of their fellows. 
The final point to note about this concept 
of social justice as I am depicting it is that, 
like Hayek's justice, it is a value. It is not some- 
thing which can be achieved once and for all. Rather 
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it is an indefinite ideal. It is a perpetual concern 
with the welfare of one's fellows. The nature of that 
concern will, of course, depend both on the particular 
conception of social justice being espoused and on the 
nature of the society which is involved. But what- 
ever the nature of that concern, it will be an ideal 
towards which its proponents will constantly aspire, 
but never expect to attain. 
It should by now be apparent, if it was not so 
from the start, that social justice is a concept quite 
distinct from Hayek's justice. No small part of Hayek's 
difficulty with social justice stems from the fact that 
he considers it simply some kind of variant of justice. 
Given the nature of his conception of justice, it is 
difficult to imagine what a variant thereon would 
constitute. And I suppose that explains in part Hayek's 
problem: he both thinks it is a variant, and yet 
cannot understand how it can be. From that he concludes 
that social justice must be meaningless. 
However, as we have just seen, the two con- 
cepts are distinct, although they may in a sense be 
complementary. Justice (Hayek's justice) takes the 
nature of a concern for form and procedure, social 
justice takes the form of a concern for substance and 
effect. There is, of course, some room for overlap. 
Two aspects of social justice can be isolated. The 
first is the moral concern with the welfare of indivi- 
duals. The second is the action which results from 
that concern. Now, it may very well be that result- 
ant action will take the form of rules of just 
conduct. When, and if, that happens social justice has 
entered into the realm of justice and Hayek's concep- 
tion of justice will be applicable thereto. In such 
situations. one might indeed think of social justice as 
a variant of justice. But, --. notwithstanding such 
possible situations, the fact remains that social jus- 
tice is a concept separate and distinct from Hayek's 
justice. 
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Let me now recap this section. Herein I have 
attempted to demonstrate that, notwithstanding Hayek's 
arguments to the contrary, the concept of social justice 
is a meaningful concept and hence the pursuit thereof 
is not a pointless activity. Without claiming any 
finality or completeness therefor, I have put forward 
a 'definition' of social justice: to wit, social 
justice is a moral concern with the welfare of one's 
fellows. I will be the first to admit that this defi- 
nition is rather general to say the least. But I doubt 
that it is any more general than attempts to define 
the concept of justice. (Consider: justice means 
rendering to each his duet) 
The fact is that the real heart of a concept 
such as social justice lies in the various conceptions 
thereof which are put forward. As soon as we introduce 
ideas such as the common good or substantive equality, 
we are dealing in much more concrete terms. Of course, 
we are also dealing in much more controversial terms. 
And for that reason the mere appeal to social justice 
will tell us very little. Before being able, to come 
to grips with'that appeal we will first have to learn 
precisely which conception of social justice is being 
appealed to. But to say this is to give reason for going 
behind an appeal to social justice. It is not to justify 
disregarding that appeal altogether. 
Hence, to deny as Hayek does that social 
justice has any meaning is simply to avoid coming to 
grips with the real problem. And for that, reason I 
think that it is not the pursuit of social justice which 
is futile. What is futile is to attempt to deter the 
pursuit of that concept by arguing that it is 
meaningless. 
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B. Social Justice is not Necessarily 
Incompatible with Hayek's Social System 
Although Hayek goes to great effort to demon- 
strate that the concept of social justice is meaning- 
less, this line of argument does not constitute his 
entire attack on "the mirage of social justice". Hayek 
is willing to grant arguendo that social justice may 
have some extremely vague meaning; he accepts some 
loose notion of distributive justice. But, he says, 
even if we grant that the pursuit of social justice 
is the pursuit of distributive justice, it is not pos- 
sible to undertake such a quest within the social 
system which he has described. This is because the 
pursuit of social justice will prove at several points 
to be incompatible with Hayek's social philosophy. 
To demonstrate this incompatibility Hayek 
considers a variety of conceptions of social justice. 
He' shows how what is required to attain or even pursue 
each of these conceptions will run afoul of various 
aspects of his spontaneous order. The arguments 
which he makes have already been discussed at length 
in Chapter Six of this disse'rtation, and for our 
present purposes there is no need to repeat them here. 
The fact of the matter is that I have no serious 
problems with this aspect of Hayek's argument. Thus, 
it does seem to me that Hayek has persuasively argued, 
for example, that substantial equality of material 
position is not something which can be achieved within 
the parameters of a spontaneous order. 
My disagreement with Hayek is not with these 
particular arguments. It is, instead, with the con- 
clusion which he draws therefrom. From the fact that 
the various conceptions of social'justice which he 
considers are incompatible with his social system 
____ _ 
2_3_1__ 
____ _  
Hayek concludes that there is necessarily and in- 
evitably an incompatibility between the pursuit of 
social justice and his social system. In my opinion 
this conclusion is an unwarranted generalization. 
That some conceptions of social justice are in- 
compatible with Hayek's social system certainly does 
not demonstrate that all conceivable conceptions are 
likewise incompatible. 
In order for Hayek's conclusions to prove 
valid, the concept of social justice would have to 
be far more monolithic than it in fact is. Interestingly, 
in arguing that the pursuit of social justice per ýe 
must inevitably conflict with his social system, Hayek 
appears to be forgetting his own argument about the 
meaninglessness of social justice. He was led to this 
latter conclusion by the multiplicity of meanings 
attadhed to the term social justice. Now, as I argued 
in the previous section, this multiplicity of meanings 
in fact represents differing conceptions of social 
justice. It is these multiple meanings, these different 
conceptions, which provide the substance of any appeal 
to social justice. And given these multiple meanings, 
to assume that whatever applies to one conception of 
social justice must apply to all other conceptions is 
a baseless assumption. Yet Hayek has made just such 
an assumption. 
In this section I intend to'meet head-on 
Hayek's claim that the pursuit of social justice must 
always be incompatible with the integrity of his social 
system. I will do so by showing that it is possible 
to evince a concern for social justice which does not 
run athwart the essential elements of Hayek's social 
philosophy. For purposes of this discussion those 
essential elements can be treated as three: the 
spontaneous order, rules of just conduct, and justice. 
obviously my division is highly artificial inasmuch 
as the three elements are inextricably intertwined. 
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However, some division is necessary in order to allow 
the argument to proceed in some rational manner. 
Now, the first topic to be considered is the 
relation between social justice and the cosmos or 
spontaneous order. Although Hayek prefers to think 
of social justice as a meaningless concept, he is 
willing to grant that it carries some vague notion 
of distributive justice. But if that is the case, 
then social justice most certainly cannot be pursued 
within the spontaneous order. The one thing you must 
have to speak of distributive justice is a distribu- 
tion. And the one thing a spontaneous order does not 
have is a distribution. In a spontaneous order no one 
distributes income or wealth, the normal foci of con- 
cern when one speaks of distributive justice. 
It should be noted here that in this con- 
text when Hayek is speaking of the spontaneous order 
he intends a catallaxy or market economy. As was dis- 
cussed in an earlier chapter, it is far from clear 
whether spontaneous order and catallaxy are co- 
extensive, or whether the latter is merely a variety 
of the former. Be that as it may, when Hayek denies 
that the spontaneous order involves a distribution he 
is clearly speaking of a catallaxy. 
That there is no distribution in a catallaxy, 
or rather that Hayek so thinks, needs little dis- 
cussion. Certainly there is no need to discourse at 
any length upon his general theory of the market 
economy. Wages and other remuneration, according to 
Hayek, are neither assigned by any particular indi- 
vidual, nor are they a reward for merit. They are 
instead an impersonal signal from the market by which 
it indicates which courses of behaviour should be 
pursued and which abandoned. Now, it may of course 
be possible to challenge Hayek's economic analysis 
of the market economy. But to do that is to undertake 
a task clearly outwith the scope of this dissertation. 
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However, that line of approach is not the only avenue 
by which one can challenge the assertion that the market 
economy does not involve a distribution. 
One can, and I do, challenge Hayek's under- 
standing of what is involved in a distribution. Hayek 
assumes that one can speak of a distribution only if 
there is a personal and intentional distribution. Were 
that the case, then it would appear that there is no 
distribution in the catallaxy. However, why concentrate 
on the distributor to the exclusion of- the distribution? 
Can we not speak of a distribution any time we are con- 
cerned with the way in which something is dispersed, 
provided only that human agency plays some. part in the 
dispersal. In fact, to turn Hayek's words about, is it 
not sufficient to constitute something a distribution 
if it is the result of human action, even though not 
the result of human design. 
A ve-fy similar opinion is expressed by David 
Miller, and his words are worth quoting at length. 
(Iln order to implement a distri- 
butive principle, it is not neces- 
sary that there should be a phy- 
sical act of distribution. A pos- 
sible distributive principle, for 
example, is that everyone should 
retain what he currently possesses. 
Nor does it follow, in cases where 
redistribution is neccessary to 
satisfy a princ-iple, that some one 
person or agency must act as a 
distributor; a distributive ideal 
may be implemented by the concurrence 
of a large number of people or insti- 
tutions. One must avoid taking 
'distribute' and its derivatives too 
literally here. 11 
In denying that the catallaxy constitutes a distribu- 
tion, it seems to me that Hayek takes the word 
'distribute' too literally. 
In that income and wealth are to a large 
extent determined by the catallaxy, it is in fact the 
case that the catallaxy is a distribution. It is, if 
you prefer, a procedural rather than a substantive 
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distribution. That is, while it does not assign par- 
ticular things to particular people, it constitutes a 
procedure whereby particular things are assigned to 
particular people.. And such, a procedure is-no less of 
a distribution than the specific assignment. To give 
a very trite example, a mother who determines that. a 
toy will go to one of her two children on the basis of 
the flip of a coin distributes that toy just as much 
as if she simply decided to which child to'give the 
toy. 
Now, Hayek's response to this argument would 
undoubtedly be the following, Alright, I'll grant you 
that a procedure can constitute a distribution. It 
does so, however, ohly if we choose to use that pro- 
cedure as a method of distributing. What you forget 
about the catallaxy is that it is a cosmos and not a 
taxis. The batallaxy was not deliberately created, 
rather it simply evolved. That being the case, there 
was no conscious decision to utilize the catallaxy for 
distributing, and hence there is no distribution. 
That argument, even if correct, does not save 
the day for Hayek. Let us grant him that the catallaxy 
came about by evolutionary development. The key point 
is that at this time we are aware how the catallaxy 
functions, at least in general terms. We are aware 
that it constitutes a prodedure by which income and 
wealth are dispersed. Given this knowledge, it can 
fairly be argued that allowing the catallaxy to con- 
tinue to function constitutes a deliberate decision, 
to disperse in accord with that procedure. And such a 
decision constitutes a distribution. That we may not 
choose to alter the catallaxY is, of course, another 
matter altogether. But that cannot gainsay the fact 
that the catallaxy is a distribution. Thus, Hayek's 
claim that distributive justice is incompatible with a* 
spontaneous order because there is no distribution in 
such an order is unfounded. 
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In addition to arguing that the very notion 
of distributive justice is out of place in the context 
of a spontaneous order, Hayek has a further objection 
to social justice as it relates to cosmos. That 
objection is that it is not possible to implement any 
principle of distributive justice whilst maintaining 
a spontaneous order. Only a taxis-like society will 
have the wherewithal to implement such principles. 
Certainly if our concern is-with what Robert Nozick has 
called a patterned-principle of distribution12 then 
Hayek's assessment is correct. For instance, if one 
seeks to distribute income in accord with moral merit, 
or if one seeks to achieve substantial equality of 
material position, the spontaneous order will have to 
fall by the wayside. There is no way that a market 
economy can implement such principles. One will instead 
have to go to a controlled economy, that is to a taxis. 
However, if one sets one's sights in a 
different direction that result need not follow. 
consider, if one aims not to achieve substantial equality 
but rather only to lessen existing inequalities, or if 
one aims to maintain a minimal level of subsistence 
below which no one need fall (in effect one of the 
aims of the contemporary welfare state), one need not 
go outside of the market economy. A simple re-distribu- 
tion of income through the tax system will be sufficient 
to accomplish these goals. And to pursue such goals 
surely could be described as pursuing social justice. 
Thus, to this extent at least social justice could be 
pursued within the context of a spontaneous order. 
Closely related to the alleged incompatibil- 
ity between the pursuit of social justice and the spon- 
taneous order is an alleged incompatibility involving 
rules of just conduct. The argument here is similar 
to that we have just considered: to wit, that it is 
not possible to implement principles of distributive 
justice by means of rules of just conduct. Only 
through the use of the specific directives which Hayek 
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terms rules of organization is it possible to imple- 
ment such principles. The problem here, according 
to Hayek, is that general purpose-independent rules 
will always prove inadequate when it comes to 'im- 
plementing a principle of distributive justice. 
Admittedly, this will frequently prove to be so. But 
again I think that Hayek overstated his case in 
stating that this problem will be ever present. To 
see that we need only consider what is actually re- 
quired of the riAles of just conduct. 
Let us take the requirement of generality 
first. I can think of no other way to put this than 
to say I fail to see any reason why generality must 
be an unavoidable problem for the pursuit of social 
justice. If nothing else, almost any prescription could 
be phrased in the form of a general rule. As we have 
earlier seen, one difficulty Hayek has with the notion 
of generality irs that it is as vague a concept as one 
could ask for. Generality is not a black/white dis- 
tinction. Instead it tends to operate in the realm of 
more general/less general. And this makes it very dif- 
ficult to know what Hayek really intends when he requires 
that the rules of just conduct be general. 
But even without resorting to any verbal 
chicanery I do not see that generality must present 
a problem for social justice. More often than not social 
justice will be concerned with classes of individuals 
rather than particular individuals. The focus of con- 
cern tends to be those at the lower end of the economic 
spectrum. And such a group can easily and quite honestly 
be described in general terms. Likewise, to the extent 
that there is a redistribution involved, the redistribut- 
ing tends to affect those above a certain level of well- 
being. And this group too can be identified in general 
terms. Thus, it is at least conceivable that one 
could pursue social justice by means of general rules. 
The same factors which make generality no 
problem also serve to avoid any difficulty with the 
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requirement that the rules be purpose-independent. 
In its own way the notion of purpose-independence is as 
difficult to come to grips with as is the notion of 
generality. What it does not mean is devoid of any 
purpose, for a rule which was literally devoid of all 
purpose would not be a rule. Instead, what Hayek seeks 
to avoid are rules with narrowly defined ends, ends of 
the sort which it is possible to achieve once and for 
all. What he wants are rules which apply "to an unknown 
and undeterminable number of persons and instances.,, 
13 
What he wants are rules which deal with kinds of situa- 
tions rather than with a particular situation. 
Here again the fact that the concern of social 
justice will be predominantly with classes of people is 
dispositive. Often the aim will be not to assist this 
particular person in this particular situation. Rather, 
the aim will be to provide a certain kind of assistance 
to certain kinds of people who find themselves in cer- 
tain kinds of situations. Similarly, the burden of 
assisting will fall upon certain kinds of people who 
find themselves in certain kinds of situations. Given 
this, the claim that purpose-independent rules will 
never be suitable for the pursuit of social justice 
seems clearly unwarranted. 
Finally, we turn to Hayek's contention that 
social justice is incompatible with justice. We have 
already disposed of a major part of this objection in 
considering the alleged problems regarding rules of 
just conduct. Thus to the extent that it is possible 
to pursue social justice by means of rules of just 
conduct, then to that extent it is certainly possible 
to pursue it while applying the same rules to all. 
And applying the same rules to all, it will be recalled, 
is what Hayek sometimes calls the basic principle of 
justice. There are, however, two additional areas 
which need to be considered. The first is the limita- 
tion on the types of things of which justice may be 
predicated. The second is Hayek's claim that while 
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there is an objective standard of justice, there is no 
such standard by which we can determine what social jus- 
tice requires. 
In considering these two areas we should 
begin by recalling the two aspects of social justice 
which I have previously isolated. These aspects are 
a moral concern with the welfare of one's fellows and 
the resultant action precipitated thereby. To the 
extent the resultant action takes the form of rules of 
just conduct -- and I have just argued that it is 
possible for it to do so -- it falls squarely within 
the scope of Hayek's conception of justice. 
For our present purposes this appears to mean 
running afoul of the requirement that justice is con- 
cerned only with deliberate human action. It is not 
concerned with states of affairs. Social justice, 
however, is primarily concerned with states of affairs. 
In a sense it is also concerned with social institu- 
tions, but it is so only as far as these affect states 
of affairs. Hence, concern with social institutions 
is at heart a concern with states of affairs. 
The state of affairs with which social justice 
is concerned is the welfare of individuals. As we have 
seen, whereas justice is primarily concerned with hav- 
ing a coherent system of rules which is uniformly 
enforced, social justice is concerned with what those 
rules are and the way in which they affect individuals. 
Now, in order to avoid the putative conflict with the 
requirement that justice can only be predicated of 
deliberate human action, we must in some way view the 
concern of social justice as involving deliberate human 
action. 
There are two ways in which this can be done. 
The first is the notion of omissions. The tendancy is 
when speaking of action to think in terms of positive 
activity, that is of actually doing something. And, as 
we have seen in the chapter on justice, Hayek does con- 
cern himself almost exclusively with positive action. 
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However, failing to act can also constitute an action. 
It is, if you will negative activity. But omissions 
can properly be thought of as actions only if there 
was some duty to act. As far as the present problem 
is concerned, the issue turns on whether or not there 
is an obligation of social justice. In the next chapter 
I will suggest that it is at least arguable that there 
is such an obligation. If there is, then the concern 
of social justice with states of affairs could be 
viewed as a concern with the failure to alter and/or 
alleviate that state of affairs. It would, therefore, 
be a concern with deliberate human action, and justice 
could appropriately be predicated thereof. 
The other way to come at this problem is to 
recall that when we are dealing with deliberate human 
action we are also dealing with the intended and fore- 
seeable consequences of action. It is the aspect of 
foreseeable consequences that is of especial relevance 
here. Foreseeable consequences can be property treated 
as brought about by deliberate action. The argument to 
be made is that there are certain foreseeable conse- 
quences which result from the maintenance of a catallaxy, 
and that these consequences are relevant to a concern 
with social justice. Hence in very simple and very gen- 
eral terms one might attempt to argue catallaxy allows 
levels of poverty and unemployment to occur which can 
be considered unacceptable from a humanitarian stand- 
point. If such consequences can, in fact, be shown to 
be a foreseeable result of the catallaxy, then by 
maintaining the catallaxy we make these consequences the 
result of our deliberate action. And thus the predi- 
cation of justice is appropriate. 
The final point to be considered in this 
section is the argument that, unlike the case with 
j-ýIstice, there is no objective standard by which to 
determine what is required by social justice. Let me 
note merely in passing that in the preceding chapter 
I did cast some doubt on the alleged objectivity of 
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Hayek's conception of justice. But holding that aside 
here, the question is whether Hayek is correct in assert- 
ing that there is no objective standard of social justice. 
Certainly to the extent that the concern for 
social justice has resulted in rules of just conduct 
Hayek's contention is unwarranted. Once the resultant 
action is embodied in the form of rules of just conduct 
the same objective standard would apply thereto as 
applies to the other rules of just conduct. Such rules 
would have become a part of the overall coherent system 
of rules and would be subject to the nomoS process. 
Any subsequent development of those rules would be 
handled in the same way as it would with any other rule 
of just conduct. 
Where Hayek's challenge is more troubling is 
when we come to consider how any such social justice rules 
of just conduct would originate. This is, I suppose, 
another way of-asking where we get the basic principles 
of social justice. To a certain extent such principles 
will be dictated by the conception of social justice 
which we adopt. And, while there may be no objective 
standard for adopting a conception of social justice, 
neither is there any such standard for adopting a con- 
ception of justice. It must be kept in mind that, 
while Hayek's justice provides an objective standard, it 
is not itself reached by any such standard. 
But even aside from that, it seems to me that 
there is adequate raw material from which to draw an 
objective standard of social justice, at least as 
objective as that standard which Hayek claims for his 
conception of justice. For Hayek the basic rules of 
just conduct originate from spontaneous development. 
No one sets out to posit these rules, they simply 
evolve from people's behaviour. Well, what are the 
present concerns for and efforts to pursue social justice 
if not evolving rules of conduct? The widespread con- 
cern for social justice is a relatively recent phe- 
nomenon. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the 
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rules relating thereto are still nascent. And being 
nascent, they tend to be vague and at times mutually 
incompatible. But that this is the case does not 
denigrate the fact that there is a background of rules 
(principles) present against which Hayek's process of 
immanent criticism can work. To turn Hayek's words 
against him, we may not know'what is socially just, but 
we do have some basis for determining what is socially 
unj us t. 
And with that. we complete our examination of 
Hayek's contention that the pursuit of social justice 
must be rejected because it will inevitably run afoul of 
his social system. Now, it is important to make clear 
precisely what it is that I have been arguing in this 
section. What I have not argued is that the pursuit 
of social justice will never be incompatible with the 
maintenance of Hayek's system. That I most certainly do 
not believe to-be the case. I find the specific argu- 
ments Hayek makes on this subject quite persuasive. 
What I do object to, and what I have argued against, is 
the very broad conclusion Hayek has drawn from his 
specific arguments. What I object to is Hayek's attempt 
to reject out of hand any and all concern for social 
justice without taking the trouble of coming to grips 
with the specific claim which is being made. 
242 
C. ýurther Thoughts on the Conceptof Social 
Justice 
In the first section*of this chapter I argued 
that, contrary to what Hayek maintains, the concept of 
social justice is not devoid of all meaning. In fur- 
therance of that argument I-put forward a very general 
definition of social justice. And, although very general, 
that definition was ade-quate to demonstrate that when 
people speak of or appeal to social justice they are not 
speaking nonsense. Quite the contrary, they are having 
recourse to an intelligible realm of discourse. 
In this section I will return*to the task of 
defining the concept of social justice. My intent here 
is to delineate the boundaries of that concept far more 
precisely than I have done in the first section of this 
chapter. I undertake this task solely in the interest 
of obtaining a more accurate understanding of what is 
entailed by*an appeal to social justice. This objective 
must be kept in mind, for in my opinion the general defi- 
nition of social justice which I have-already-put forward 
is in and of itself adequate to refute Hayek's claim that 
social justice is meaningless. I can, therefore, afford 
to be more controversial at this stage than I could when 
I was specifically refuting Hayek's argument. I will, 
of course, put forward an argument which I consider per- 
suasive. But should the reader fail to be persuaded by 
this section, that fact would not affect the merits of 
my critique of Hayek's argument. 
Now, I have earlier defined social justice as 
a moral concern with the welfare of one's fellows: 
denoting by "welfare" physical and psychological well- 
being. There is, however, another element which, while 
not specifically an aspect 'of social justice, is none- 
theless frequently seen as a concomitant thereof. That 
element is the use of the coercive machinery of the 
state to enforce the moral concern with the welfare of 
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one's fellows. It is probably safe to say that the. vast 
majority of disputes about social justice involve to 
some degree the extent to which it is appropriate to use 
state coercion in support of a call for social justice. 
In fact, -one might say that the most fundamental problem 
concerning social justice is the extent to which state 
coercion can be used on behalf of concerns which had 
previously been deemed outwith the realm of state 
activity. 
But notwithstanding the frequency with which 
the. role of state coercion is involved in discussions 
of social justice, it is best to keep this element 
separate and distinct from the basic definition of a 
moral concern with the welfare of one's"*fellows. The 
reason for so doing is that it leaves open the possi- 
bility that one might accept social justice as a demand 
for a moral concern with-welfare, -and yet refuse to 
grant to the state any role in the pursuit of social 
justice. -This possibility is one to-which-we'will re- 
cut at the end of this section. 
Let us assume then that in order to grasp 
fully-the concept of social-justice we mustunderstand 
two things: what is entailed by a demand for social 
justice and the proper role of the state in the pursuit 
of social justice. If we approach the task in this way, 
it becomes apparent that there are really three questions 
with which we must be concerned. The first is what sort 
of moral reasons constitute reasons of social justice. 
The second is what sort of state activities constitute 
activities on behalf of social justice. Obviously the 
answer to this second question will be determined to a 
large extent by the answer to the first. But it. is yet 
worthasking it as a distinct question. The final ques- 
tion is who, if anyone, has an obligation in regard to 
social justice. The possibilities here are that there 
is no obligation of any sort, that the obligation rests 
strictly on the individual, or that the obligation is 
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one with which the state may become involved'. The re- 
mainder of this section will be devoted to an examina- 
tion of these three questions. 
As we have already noted several times, the 
concept of social justice entails a moral concern with 
the welfare of one's fellows. -In the first section of 
this chapter we saw that it is necessary to describe 
this concern as a moral concern in order to preclude 
other sorts of concerns which patently would not involve 
a demand for social justice. Thus we saw then that : one 
who argues for the welfare state on prudential grounds 
(e. g. as necessary to avoid civil disorder) is not 
arguing for social-justice. An argument for social 
justice must be premised upon moral arguments. 
But will any. sort of moral argument anent the 
welfare of one's fellows constitute an argument for social 
justice? Or will it rather be the case that only par- 
ticular types of moral argument can be deemed to invoke 
social justice? At first blush it may seem that the 
problem here posed is'little more than a semantic quibble. 
And to a certain extent that may be true. If one has made 
a valid moral--argument, of whit import is it how one 
characterizes that argument? There are, however, two 
reasons which warrant consideration of this problem. 
The first is, that, as we shall see shortly, coercion 
has traditionally been thought appropriate only to cer- 
tain sorts of moral arguments. The second is that the 
more precise we can be in identifying an argument for 
social justice the stronger will be our rebuttal of 
Hayek's claim that all appeals to social justice are 
meaningless. As we have seen in Chapter Six Hayek 
contends inter alia that an appeal to social justice 
is no more than a carte blanche justification for govern- 
ment action. Thus, if we can show that only some moral 
arguments qualify as reasons of social justice, we will 
at the same time demonstrate that appeals to social 
justice are far more specific than Hayek is willing to grant. 
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In attempting to specify the types of moral 
arguments or reasons which constitute reasons of social 
justice it is helpful to begin by noting that the concept 
. withwhichwe are concerned 
is s. ocial justice. Lin- 
guistically at the very least the concept with which we 
. are concerned would appear to 
be related to justice. 
But surely the relationship is more than merely linguistic. 
With all due respect to Professor Hayek, it seems diffi- 
cult to ignore the overwhelming opinion amongst both 
scholars and laymen that-when we speak of social justice 
we are 9peaking of a sub-set of justice. I would suggest 
that the similarity between justice and social justice 
lies in the type of reasoning employed, while the dif- 
ference lies in the aim towards which that reasoning is 
employed. Since we have already identified the aim of. 
social justice as the welfare of one's fellows, the 
question to which we must now turn is what is the dis- 
tinctive type of reasoning employed in arguments of both 
justice and social justice. 
Of course one might grant that social justice 
is a sub-set of justice and yet deny that justice itself 
presents- -any -specif ic -type -of:, moral. -reasoning. --Thus, --. -one 
might take the position that to say an action is just is 
to say no more than that it is the morally right action 
to perform. In this sense justice really might be seen 
as synonymous with all of morality. And yet, to argue 
in this manner does not (if one will excuse the pun) 
seem to do justice to the concept of justice. Recalling 
G. E. Moore's open-question argument, it seems eminently 
reasonable to admit that a particular action is just and 
then to inquire over and above that whether it is the 
right action to perform. It is because of this dichotomy 
between justice and morality all things considered 
that we can use such phrases as "justice'tempered with 
mercy". 
. To emphasize this dichotomy between reasons 
of justice and more general moral reasons William Frankena 
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suggests that we distinguish between "justicizing" 
and "justifying" reasons. 
14 To juiticize an action is to 
give reasons of justice in support therof.. To justify 
an action is to give more general 'right-making reasons 
in support thereof. It is by-means of this dichotomy 
that it is intelligible for us to speak of an action as 
being just, while at the same time admitting that it is 
not the morally-right action to perform. When we do so, 
we are saying that, although there are just-making reasons 
present, - there are also additional moral reasons present 
which are entitled to priority over the just-making 
reasons. However, that these just-making or justiCizing 
reasons are overridden does not denigrate from the fact 
that they constitute legitimate and distinct moral reasons 
for acting. 
Granting then that there are quite distinct 
justicizing reaons involved when one is making a case 
for social justice, the question remains specifically 
what are those reasons. What sorts of arguments must 
be made if one is legitimately to be arguing for social 
justice? In answering this question let us begin with 
-that-_justice-_ýLs what--; I- shall--call -the coercible-- the, fact 
virtue. To see this it is essential to separate moral 
conduct from the state of affairs which results from 
that conduct. Moral conduct as such cannot be produced 
by coercion. -That is to say, a man cannot be made to 
behave justly or honestly or charitably. However, he can 
be made to behave so as to produce a just or an honest or 
a charitable state of affairs. 
But while almost any moral state of affairs 
can be produced by coercion, it is only in the case of 
justice that coercion is commonly thought to be appro- 
priate. This is not to say that there is never resort 
to coercion in the case of other virtues. It is only 
to say that when coercion is resorted to in such cases 
the need is seen to defend its use. With other virtues 
coercion is the exception, not the rule. By contrast, 
4 
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when justice is involvedcoercion is commonly accepted 
without any express defense therefor. In fact, if any- 
thing it is in the cases purporting to involve justice 
but in which coercion seems inappropriate that explana- 
tion is required. Of course as we have already noted 
and as we will consider again later in this section, 
it is open to dispute whether state coercion can prop erly 
be used in support of social justice. However, for our 
present purpose, which is to isolate justicizing reasons, 
this point can be ignored. 
Now, the reason why coercion is thought appro- 
priate in the case of justice is that justice, in addi- 
tion to carrying the commendatory sense common to all 
virtues, also carries a prescriptive sense. Itentails 
what I shall call a strong ought. The just action is 
one which not only is commendable, but also ought to be 
done; and that in a strong sense of ought. The notion 
of a strong ought can best be understood by comparing it 
with a. weak ought. A charitable action is one which is 
commendable and one which ought to be performed.. But 
this. ought, a weak ought, does not have the same force 
as the- ýought r which -is- attached. -to- -justice. -- --A- man- who- 
does not perform a charitable action when such is appro- 
priate will not be subject to criticism of the same sort 
as a man who fails to perform a just action. The former 
has failed to do something which is desirable, whereas 
the latter has failed to do something-which is 
required. 
15 
Another way to look at this distinction 
between a strong ought. and a weak ought is in terms 
of Lon Fuller's distinction between the morality of 
duty and the morality of aspiration. The morality 
of aspiration is "the Morality of the Good life, of 
excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers. , 
16 
A man who does not comply with it is "condemned for 
failure, not for being recreant to duty; for shortcoming, 
not for wrongdoing. " 
17 By contrast the morality of 
duty 
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lays down the basic rules without which 
an ordered society is impossible, or 
without which an ordered society directed 
towards certain specific goals must fail 
of its mark. ... It does not condemn 
men Eor failingto embrace opportunities 
for the fullest realization of their 
powers. Instead it condemns them for 
failing to respect the basic require- 
ments of social living. 
The weak ought is the morality of aspiration, 
the strong ought the morality of duty. Thus, particular 
acts of charity are always a matter of aspiration and 
not duty. - (Ileave aside the possibility thdt there may 
be a duty to perform an indeterminate number of chari- 
table acts during one's life: i. e. a duty to be chari- 
table sometimes. ) Butý justice and just acts are always 
a matter of duty. Justice is not something to which 
one should aspire, but something-- which is positively 
required. 
it is because justice is positively required, 
because it is a matter of duty, that a demand for justice 
seems legitimate. By contrast, a demand for, say, charity 
or mercy.: strikes -us -as odd and unwarranted. -. - And -it -is 
because a person can 
ýemand justice that we are prepared 
to coerce compliance with the dictates of justice. Con- 
versely, it is because it is more appropriate to speak 
of asking for charity or mercy rather than demanding 
them that coercion is not normally thought to be appli- 
cable here. 
Given then that justice is something which a 
person can demand, what does this tell us about the sorts 
of reasons which can be' advanced in support of a claim 
for justice? To begin with, it tells us that we are 
dealing with a claim. The reasons advanced therefore 
must be such as will support a claim. And when we are 
talking about a claim, we are talking about something 
to which a person is entitled. Thus, reasons of justice 
must ultimately be reasons of entitlement. And so too 
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reasons of social justice must be reasons of entitle- 
ment, for as we have seen the relationship between justice 
and social justice lies in the types of reasons by which 
they are supported. And if there be any question that 
social justice involves reasons of entitlement, one 
need only consider that the proponents of social justice 
leave no doubt that social justice is something to which 
its beneficiaries are entitled and not something for 
which they should be grateful: social justice is a 
claim and not a gift. 
A caveat is, however, in order at this point. 
When I speak'of an entitlement I am using the word in a 
very loose sense. In a more technical sense to speak of 
an entitlement is to speak of what Miller would classify 
as a right (as distinct from desert .. and need) and 
Hohfeld as a claim-right. Certainly the way in which I 
am using entitlement would encompass these two uses. 
Thus, it is clearly the case that what Miller describes 
as a rights-based theory of justice would meet my re- 
quirement that justice be concerned with entitlements. 
However, what I understand by entitlement 
would lal, so, come into 'play in-'s ituations ý -in which- -Milld-k" 
would see no entitlement or right. For instance, while 
he distinguishes rights-based theories of justice from 
those based on desert or need, it seems to me that the 
idea of an entitlement can be found in each of those 
theories. In the case of desert it is certainly fair 
to say that what a person deserves he is also entitled 
to. (In fact, quite frankly I find Miller's distinc- 
tion between rights and desert to be untenable; I think 
the two do stand in a close relationship with one another 
while being-radically opposed to need. ) And in the case 
of need, to the extent that-it is being used as a basis 
for justice then to that extent it represents an en- 
titlement. That is, if the mere fact that John Doe needs 
X is considered a basis in justice for his having X, 
then it is appropriate to say that because John Doe 
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needs X he is therefore entitled to X. 
An entitlement can also be seen if one views 
justice in the light of some duty-based theory of moral- 
ity. This may initially seem counter-intuitive since 
with duty the emphasis is on the action, while with 
entitlement the'emphasis is on the beneficiary of the 
action. However, Hayek himself admits that to the 
extent that there is a duty to do X, whoever would 
benefit from the doing of X can be said to have a right 
to have X done. 
19 And in my terminology to have a right 
to have X done is the - same as to be entitled to have X 
done. In terms of social justice this would mean that 
if there is a duty to be concerned with the welfare of 
oness fellows, then one's fellows are entitled to that 
concern. 
Now, having-established that an argument for 
social justice involves reasons of entitlement, the 
question which remains is entitlement to what. To a 
large extent our initial definition has already estab- 
lished that. If social justice is a moral concern with 
the welfare of one's fellows, then the reasons of en- 
fitlemeritmust relate to welfare. And welfare, as we 
have =seen j- - encompasses -:, both. physical- znd psychal-ogical---- 
-wellbeing. 
Of course the idea of welfare is quite open- 
ended. And, while the aim of this section is to narrow 
the realm of social justice as much as possible, there 
is little which can be done to bring more precision into 
the idea of welfare. What is intended thereby, or rather 
what is argued for under the rubric of social justice, 
will be dependent upon the specifics of the argument 
being made. There are, however, two very general points 
which are worth noting in this connection. 
The first is that there appears to be a 
definite relationship between welfare and needs. When 
I speak of needs there are two distinct categories 
with which I am concerned. The first relates to things 
such as food, shelter and clothing, that is, things 
251 
which are essential if human life is to continue. The 
second category includes things such as minimal educa- 
tion, nutrition above the level needed to maintain bare 
physical existence, and possibly a supportive network 
of social relations. Such needs must be met if anything 
more than mere animal existence is intended. Borrowing 
the terminology of William Galston I shall refer to 
these two kinds of needs as existential and develop- 
mental. 
20 1 would suggest that anything which qualifies 
as a need of the sort just described would have to be 
included under the aegis of wýlfare. It may very well 
be that welfare would include things other than needs. 
But it must at the very least include existential and 
developmental needs. And thus, such needs must fall 
within the realm of social justice. 
The other general point to be made is that 
the welfare to which an individual is entitled at any 
given time and place will be affected by two factors. 
One is the general conditions of the society in ques- 
tion. Obviously the working idea of welfare will be 
quite different in a primitive tribal society from what 
it would be -in a Twentieth -Century-ý. industr. ial. --society... ----- 
The second factor is perhaps parasitic upon the first. 
That is that there is a comparative element involved 
in the idea of welfare. What constitutes the entitled 
welfare of one individual or group will to some extent 
be determined by the status of the other individuals 
in that. society. Even for a strict egalitarian this 
comparative element will be present, for he will wish 
all to have the same level of welfare. Thus, the en- 
titlement of each individual will not be determined in a 
vacuum, but rather within the matrix formed by the wel- 
fare of his-fellows. 
Let us now summarize the argument to this point. 
Social justice is a moral concern with the welfare of 
one's fellows. However, not any moral reason will qualify 
as an argument on behalf of social justice. Instead only 
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justicizing or just-making reasons will qualify. Jus- 
ticizing reasons are reasons which argue for an entitle- 
ment, using entitlement in a loose rather than a tech- 
nical sense. And the entitlement with which reasons of 
social justice are concerned is an entitlement to a 
concern with one's welfare. 
Given these limitations it should be. apparent 
that there are several commonly utilized moral arguments 
which cannot be deemed to be arguments on behalf of 
social justice. The first of these are arguments of 
charity or benevolence. An argument for welfare made 
on the grounds of charity or benevolence is clearly not 
an argument for entitlement, and it is for that reason 
not an argument for social justice. ' The ýsecond common 
form of moral reasoning to be excluded is an argument 
based on reasons of general utility. To argue that the 
overall balance of happiness over unhappiness, or pleasure 
over pain, will be increased by a concern with welfare is 
not to argue entitlement, and for that reason is not an 
argument for social justice. Finally, there are perfec- 
tionist arguments. One might argue that the ideal of 
either the -individual -or society in- general -which-* one 
advocates requires the provision of certain services or 
facilities. But, inasmuch as this is not an argument 
for entitlement, it is also not an argument for social 
justice. 21 Of course, the argument I am making is not 
to suggest that moral reasons of the sort just considered 
cannot provide a justification for a concern with the 
welfare-of one's fellows, for that they most certainly 
can do. What I am suggesting is that any such justifi- 
cations cannot be considered to be arguments on behalf 
of social justice. Only when one argues for welfare 
as a matter of entitlement can one be said to be ap- 
pealing to-social justice. 
The second question with which this section 
is concerned is what sort of state activities constitute 
activities on behalf of social justice. As was discussed 
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at the beginning of this section, in practice arguments 
about social justice are rarely divorced from arguments 
about state coercion. That is, most disagreements about 
social justice involve not only whether there is a moral 
obligation to be concerned with the welfare of one's 
fellows, but also whether any such obligation should be 
supported by the state coercive machinery. 
In keeping with the instant aim of attempting 
to be as precise as possible in delineating the realm of 
social justice, it is worth giving some consideration 
to the types of state activities which can be viewed 
under the rubric of social justice. Thus, if we hold 
to one side state coercion in support of rules of just 
conduct (which Hayek on more than one occasion suggests 
to be the only proper use of state coercion), we find 
there is still a large variety of state activities which 
are buttressed by the coercive machinery, If only in 
that they are supported by mandatory taxation. Yet 
surely not all such activites should be deemed to be in 
pursuit of social justice. -If the contrary were true, 
then Hayek's contention that the invocation of social 
justice is no more-than-a rubber-6tamp, used to justify 
(justicize) the use of state coercion for any end 
whatsoever would in fact be warranted. Moreover, aside 
from Hayek's contention, even the most ardent advocates 
of social justice would not claim that social justice 
is involved whenever state coercion is utilized. 
The problem then is which exercises of state 
coercion can be viewed as warranted by a concern with 
social justice and which not. Of course in one sense 
we have already resolved this problem in the first part 
of this section when we considered what sorts of moral 
reasons constitute arguments in support of social 
justice. Obviously it follows from that discussion 
that only state coercion used in behalf of entitlement 
claims can be viewed as undertaken for reasons of social 
justice. However, while dispositive, this is an ad hoc 
response. It requires that each particular state activity 
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be examined to determine its rationale before any judge- 
ment can be made concerning social justice. For that 
reason it would be quite useful if there were some more 
general manner in which we could classify state acti- 
vities (even if only as a rule of thumb).: us to whether 
they involve social justic*e. And it seems. to me that 
such a classification is possible. 
Let us consider first the distinction Ronald 
Dworkin draws between principle and policy. 
22 According 
to Dworkin a principle is something which involves an 
individual right. - By contrast, a policy involves a 
collective goal. Now, principles in that they involve 
individual rights will encompass entitlements. And 
entitlements are the basis of an argument for social 
justice. Conversely, a policy in that it involves some 
collective goal will not be concerned with individual 
entitlements. It follows, therefore, that any state 
coercion used in support of policies, that is collective 
goals, will not be undertaken for reasons of social 
justice. 
Given this, we can conclude--that there-is one 
type of state activity, -buttressed by coercion, which 
will almost inevitably be excluded from the reaim of 
social justice. This activity is the provision of so- 
called public goods and services. Under this heading 
will be included such items as roads and sewers, the 
establishment of a uniform system of weights and mea- 
sures, the provision of postal services, and the regula- 
tion of inter-state commerce. None of these activities 
can fairly be seen as involving individual entitlement. 
Rather, their aim is the provision or assurance of some 
collective goal. For that reason the provision of such 
goods and services cannot be treated as a matter of 
social justice. 
There is, however, a caveat which is in order 
here. It may at first glance seem that the establish- 
ment of a national school system and a national health 
service is done as a matter of public policy and hence 
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that the justification for such institutions is the 
pursuit of a collective goal. But more careful consi- 
deration will readily demonstrate that the ' aim of such 
institutions is the welfare of the individual. Thus, 
the justification for such institutions will almost in- 
evitably be, at least in part, that. they are a matter 
of individual right or entitlement. (For instance 
the y can quite eas ily be seen as relating to develop- 
. mental needs. 
) For that reason the provision of these 
institutions should -at least-prima facie-be-treated, 
at least in part, as a matter of social justice. 
The other category of state activity which on 
general grounds there is a basis to exclude from the 
realm of social justice is what I will call cultural 
activites and facilities. By this I intend state pro- 
visiork of, and funding for such things as symphonies, 
opera and ballet companies, and museums, as well as 
subsidies to the arts, and perhaps also subsidies for 
sports teams and facilities. Funding of this nature is 
most commonly done in the name of some perfectionist 
ideal. Sometimes it is argued that the society in general 
will-. -be- better off because of - the availability-of suchý_ 
facilities. In such circumstances the funding is being 
done not only for perfectionist reasons but also for 
purposes of a common goal. Thus, there is clearly no 
argument for entitlement and hence no case for social 
justice. Alternatively, it can be argued that the par- 
ticular members of the society will be better able to 
realize some ideal of the individual because of the 
availability of these facilities. Here, while the 
emphasis of the argument is on the individual, it is 
nonetheless not an argument of entitlement, but instead 
an argument based on-perfectionist considerations. And 
for that reason social justice will not be involved. 
Some caution, will, however, have to be exer- 
cised in this area. While cultural facilities will 
commonly be justified in terms of perfectionist con- 
siderations, this need not always be the case. It is 
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at least plausible that someone might argue that cultural 
facilities (at least to some limited degree) constitute 
a developmental need. That being So, -it could then be 
argued that there is an entitlement to them. And that 
would be an argument for social justice. 
What this last point brings out is that at 
the end of the day we can never altogether ignore the 
reasons advanced in support of a particular state ac- 
tivity. The nature of certain state activities may be 
such that they will almost always fall outwith the realm 
of social justice. But it is always possible that in 
some way an argument for social justice may be made in 
support of one of these activities. 
The final question to be considered in this 
section is who, if anyone, has an obligation of social 
justice. Or, putting that another way, one might say 
that our final concern is the possible responses which 
can be made to an argument for social justice. Let us 
assume that an argument has beenput forward which meets 
the criteria we have set forth for an argument for social 
justice. That is, someone is arguing that social jus- 
tide requires that we do X, X involving the use of. the 
state coercive machinery. What are the ways in which we 
might respond to that argument? Aside from simply find- 
ing the argument invalid, I believe that there are three 
basic responses which might be made. One might deny 
that there is an obligation of any, sort regarding the 
welfare of one's fellows. Or one might grant that there 
is such an obligation, but hold it to be strictly an 
individual matter with which the state can properly have 
no concern. Finally, one might grant that there is an 
obligation and further grant that in general the state 
may enforce such obligations, One could then either 
yield to the argument made, or else argue that in the 
instant case state coercion is not appropriate. Let us 




The first possible response is to deny that there 
is any obligation of social justice at all. In effect one 
would " 
here be confronting head on and rejecting the argu- 
ment for entitlement. For instance, if the *argument in 
question 'is premised upon need, one could deny that need 
in and of itself constitutes any ground for entitlement. 
Again, if the argument is premised upon a right to cer- 
tain welfare provisions, one could respond by distin- 
guishing positive from negative rights. That is, 
one could respond that the right in question entails 
only that others do not interfere with the one seeking 
to exercise the right, and not that others must posi- 
tively assist in the pursuit thereof. Similarly, if the 
argument for social justice were premised upon duty, one 
could distinguish between positive and negative duties, 
arguing that the duty is only of forebearance and not of 
assistance. .A response of this nature would be quite in 
keeping with Hayei's frequent assertion that the rules 
of just conduct are predominantly negative in form. 
In regard to this type of response, one addi- 
tional point is worth noting-. 0ne-could deny that. there 
is any entitlement to-the provision of welfare, without 
. necessarily condemning 
individual actions directed to 
this end. Thus, while denying any entitlement one might 
yet consider the provision of welfare to be a meritorious 
course of action. To use Fuller's terminology, one could 
treat the provision of welfare as a matter of the moral- 
Ity of aspiration rather than the morality of duty. Or 
more generally speaking, one could argue that the pro- 
vision of welfare is a matter of supererogation. 
23 
One might also respond to an argument for social 
justice by granting that there is an obligation to be 
concerned with the welfare of one's fellows, but adding 
that any such obligation falls strictly on the indivi- 
dual and should not be enforced by the state. There are 
three basic forms such a response might take. First, 
one might argue for the absolute priority of individual 
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liberty over competing moral values. Thus, one could 
hold that however justified (justicized) the case for 
social justice might be, respect for individual liberty 
would preclude any state involvement therein. The es- 
pousal of this form of response would be compatible 
with either a Nozickian minimal state (which Hayek 
explicitly rejects) or an individualist anarchist social 
theory. 
The second form a response of this nature might 
take would be to emphasize the moral merit involved in 
voluntary action. This approach would, for example, 
prize -benevolence over beneficence. It would be com- 
patible with the Kantian idea that an action is genuinely 
moral only if done with the proper motive. The argument 
would be that, desirable though the provision of welfare 
might be, it is even more desirable that any such provi- 
sion be voluntary rather than coerced. 
The final form of response is one which I 
think Hayek would be especially likely to espouse. -Here 
one would not challenge the morality of state enforcement, 
but would instead 'challenge its. practicality or efficiency. 
The a: kgument would be that, 'desirabl'e though the end 
might be, the means, i. e. state action, are unlikely to 
'achieve that end. Hayek's espousal of critical ration- 
alism and his concomitant mistrust of state action 
would fit quite nicely with this sort of response. 
The remaining way in which one might respond 
to an argument for social justice is to grant both the 
ob. ligationof social justice and at least in general the 
appropriateness of state coercion in support thereof. 
As to this latter point, one might consider the state's 
action as warranted by some sort of obligation on 
society in general. Personally, I am with Hayek in 
considering the idea of an obligation on society, as 
distinct from one upon individual members of a society, 
to be utter nonsense. Nonetheless, an argument of this 
sort might be made. The other way to justify the role 
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of the state would be to see the state as merely en- 
forcing an individual obligation. For instance, John 
Finnis holds that distributive justice is an obligation 
. upon the 
individual and that the state becomes involved 
only in the event of recalcitrance by thle individual. 24 
Along this same line one might argue (although Finnis 
himself does not) that state action is a convenient 
mechanism to ensure that this individual obligation is 
fairly anduniversally fulfilled. Harry Lesser, on the 
other hand, argues that the individual has an obligation 
not specifcally to help his fellows but rather 
' 
to see 
that help is provided. It is this obligation which 
warrants action by the state. 
25 
Of course, even if one does grant that the 
state has a role to play in the enforcement of social 
justice, it will not be necessary to accept all such 
calls for state action. One can be selective. For 
example, as was noted in Footnote 21, John Rawls, although 
he otherwise accepts the role of the state in the pursuit 
of s6cial justice, rejects any such actions which are 
based upon perfectionist grounds. It is possible there- 
fore for one to reject particular state actions on-behalf 
of social justice even though in principle one recognizes 
the appropriateness of state action in this area. 
. Now, 
having considered in general terms the 
ways in which one might respond to an argument of social 
justice, -let us conclude this section by considering that 
issue in a more specific context. What I propose to do 
now is to compare the ways in which Hayek and Robert 
Nozick respond to the challenge of social justice. Both 
of these men are very determinedly opposed-to the use of 
state coercion in support of the pursuit of social justice. 
However, the paths by which. they reach this end are quite 
different. And, while a comparison of the two approaches 
is a relatively brief task, it is nonetheless worth the 
effort. 
Hayek's response to social justice is, of 
course, the focus of this dissertation. And, although 
1ý 
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his argument is long and involved, it can ultimately 
be epitomized quite succinctly. Hayek's basic response 
to the challenge of social justice is to deny that there 
is any challenge to which he must respond. Rather than 
responding in one of the ways set out above, he instead 
argues that evocations of social justice fall outwith 
any intelligible realm of discourse. Since there is 
nothing which can be understood, there is nothing to 
which one need respond. Hayek's response reminds one. of 
the way in which Dickens's Nr. -Podsnap would wave his 
hand to figuratively dismiss unpleasant ideas with which 
he did not wish to come to grips. The trouble is that 
hand waving is not a terribly persuasive response to 
ideas which are supported by coherent arguments. 
Robert Nozick, on the other hand, never contends 
that social justice is a meaningless concept. That being 
the case, he does not dismiss social justice out of hand, 
but instead spends a large section of his book attacking 
it head on. His basic approach falls under the second 
type of response which I detailed above. He argues for 
the absolute priority of liberty over any state action 
in support of social justice. And it is important to 
stress that he does argue for this priority. As we shall 
see in the next chapter, although Hayek assumes the ab- 
solute priority of liberty, he nowhere undertakes*to 
defend this position. One may, of course, find Nozick's 
argument unpersuasive or incomplete. But he has at 
least made a coherent argument In response to the chal- 
lenge of social justice. 
Because Nozick's approach is to challenge the 
appropriateness of state action, it is not clear whether 
he would admit that there is any individual obligation 
of social justice. To the best of my knowledge he never 
discusses this issue. Nonetheless the social order 
which Nozick advocates does allow room for concerns of 
social justice. His libertarian utopia is a loose 
federation of communities in which individuals are free 
to organize themselves in any manner they wish, subject 
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only to freedom in emigration and immigration. 
26 Under 
this system those who believe strongly that obligations 
of social justice should be enforced by organized coer- 
cion are free to join together in communities in which 
such an end is pursued. And those who object to such 
organized coercion are free to refrain from Joining com- 
munities of this sort. Although Hayek too espouses the 
value of voluntary associations 
27 
, his belief in sponta- 
neous development as the wellspring of social order 
precludes him from advocating the type of arrangement 
which Nozick envisions. 
As between these two approaches it should be 
clear that I come down on the side of Nozick. The 
advantage of Hayek's approach is that, if successful, 
it precludes ab initio any concern with social justice. 
The disadvantage is that it is an all or nothing 
approach. If the problem refuses to be waved away, and 
I have argued in this dissertation that that is the case, 
then Hayek has nothing else to say in opposition to 
demands for social justice. Nozick, on the other hand, 
although granting the reality of the challenge of social 
justice, -. then confronts. that challenge. head. on. and at7 
tempts to meet argument with argument. If he fails in 
his task, his very failure is apt to suggest alternative 
ways of attack. In short, the fact is that social 
justice does present a real and determinate challenge 
to social theory. And that being so the frontal approach 
, of Nozick offers the greater 
likelihood of success. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
SOCIAL JUSTICE, PRIORITY, AND THE KANTIAN PREMISES 
The third prong upon which Hayek bases his 
critique of social justice is the charge that the pursuit 
of social justice is inimicable to respect for liberty 
and certain other values associated therewith. This 
chaige actually underlies the contention that social 
justice is incompatible with Hayek's social system, in- 
asmuch as the ostensible justification for that social 
system is that it protects and fosters liberty. 
In rega7rd to the alleged conflict between social 
justice and liberty I am of the opinion that Hayek has 
once again cut too wide a swath with his sword. While 
some, perhaps many, actions taken in the name of social 
justice may be incompatible with a respect for liberty, 
I do'not believe that such incompatibility is an inevit- 
able result of pursuing social justice. Thus, the out- 
right rejection of any concern with social justice again 
seems unjustified. But, having made this point, I will 
not carry it any further. 
In this chapter I intend to take a quite 
different type of approach from that I took in the 
preceding chapter. Instead of meeting Hayek's charge 
head on in an effort to demonstrate that it is not 
persuasive, I will come at it obliquely. Let me grant 
him arguendo that the pursuit of social justice is 
inimicable to a respect for liberty. Having done that, 
must I now admit that the pursuit of social justice 
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should be abandoned?. The answer to that question - is 
most assuredly no. 
To demonstrate that two concepts are incom- 
patible is one thing. To decide which of those compet- 
ing concepts must prevail when conflict does occur is 
something all. togeither different. One cannot simply assume 
without any argument that one of those concepts must 
always prevail over the other. And yet, that is what 
Hayek appears to do when he treats the mere existence 
of incompatibility between social justice and liberty 
as a justification for rejecting social justice. 
Whether he realizes it or not, what Hayek 
has is a priority problem between social justice and 
liberty, or, to be moie specific, between a concern 
for welfare and a concern for liberty. Like it or not, 
it is incumbent upon him to demonstrate by argument 
that liberty must prevail. Priority problems can only 
be resolved by argument, not by fiat. Yet, Hayek of- 
fers no express arguments in favor of the priority of 
liberty over concern for welfare. Certainly in The 
Co"qtitution of Liberty he discourses at great length 
upon the value of liberty. However, *to demonstrate 
the value of liberty is not to demonstrate that that 
value is always entitled to take precedence whenever 
any other value proves incompatible therewith. This is 
a quite separate and distinct task, and it is one which 
Hayek nowhere expressly undertakes. 
The key question to be answered then is is 
it possible to extrapolate from what Hayek does say 
a defense for the absolute priority of liberty, which as 
is he takes for granted. My answer to this question 
is "no" - In fact, not only do I think that Hayek's 
thoughts fail to provide a defense for the priority of 
liberty, but I actually think that it is possible to 
draw therefrom the germ of an argument in defense of 
social justice. 
The essence of that putative defense is as 
follows. I believe that notwithstanding the patently 
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seminal role of epistemology in Hayek's social philo- 
sophy, there is underlying that philosophy a hidden 
normative premise. And this premise is the ultimate 
justification for the prescriptive import of Hayek's 
social philosophy. But this premise, although it can 
be seen to justify Hayek's claim for the priority of 
liberty, can also be seen to justify a concern for 
social justice. 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify that 
hidden normative premise, to elucidate its relation to 
Hayek's social philosophy, and to demonstrate how it 
does not resolve Hayek's. priority problem but instead 
plausibly can be seen to offer support for the pursuit 
of social justice. I propose to begin on this task 
by returning once more to Hayek's conception of jus- 
tice for one final analysis. 
A. Intrinsic and Instrumental Goods 
I 
There is one question concerning Hayek's 
conception of justice to which we have of yet given no 
consideration. That is. the question of whether for 
Hayek justice is an intrinsic or an instrumental good, 
and if the latter, to what end it is instrumental. In 
this section I propose to answer the first part of that 
question. I will do so by initially considering in 
general the difference between an intrinsic and an 
-instrumental good, and then by considering how and why 
that difference is significant to a theory of justice. 
Something which is intrinsically good is good 
in and of itself, it is good per. 2e. It is, if you will, 
categorically and not contingently good. By contrast, 
something which is instrumentally good is good only 
insofar as it is a means to something else which is 
good -- either intrinsically or again instrumentally. 
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It is contingently and not categorically good, for 
it is good only because of the 'end' to which it is 
a means. 
At this point a secondary distinction must be 
introduced. When we speak of something being a means 
. O: r an 
instrumental good there are two different ideas 
which can be involved. Something is extrinsically 
instrumental if it is a sufficient means to the de- 
sired end. Holding a ticket on the Edinburgh-London train 
is extrinsically instrumental to my getting to London. It 
is a means to my getting there, but I could get there 
without that means: e. g. by flying or driving. - Some- 
thing is intrinsically instrumental if it is a neces- 
sary means to the desired end. Holding a ticket on the 
Edinburgh-London train is intrinsically instrumental to 
my travelling by that train. I cannot ride the train 
without a ticket. ý This secondary distinction becomes 
relevant when we consider the classification of Hayek's 
conception of justice. 
Another way to look at the distinction be- 
tween intrinsic and instrumental goods is to think of 
things which are instrumentally good as being demon- 
strably good. That is, they can be shown to be good. 
on the other hand, things which are intrinsically good 
are self-evidently good. But let us here be clear 
what is meant by "self-evident". What is not meant is 
the following: 
[T]he self-evidence of a principle 
enta; Lls neither (a) that it is for- 
muldred refliddtively or at all 
explicitly by those who are guided 
by it, nor (b) that when it is 
so formulated by somebody his formu- 
lation will inevitably be found to 
be accurate or acceptably refined 
and suitably qualified, nor (c) that 
it is arrived at even only impli- 
citly, without experience of the 
field to which it relates. 1 
266 
Rather, the meaning is: 
The expression 'self-evident' 
means properly that the proposi- 
tion so called is evident or true, 
bv itself alone; that it is not an in-ference from some proposition other 
than itself. ... By saying that a 
proposition is self-evident, we mean 
emphatically that its appearing so 
to us is not the reason why it is 
true: for we mean that it has 
absolutely no reason. [F-in-al-emphasis 
aaded] 2 
That something is intrinsically (self- 
evidently) good means that no reason can be given why 
it is good. If a reason could be given why something 
was good, then that something would be instrumentally 
and not intrinsically good. If, therefore, justice is- 
an intrinsic good, no reason can be given why it is good. 
The distinction between, intrinsic and'instru- 
mental goods is important when considering a theory of 
justice, because it affects the resolution of priority 
problems. If justice is an intrinsic good -- and 
therefore not susceptible to proof as to its goodness 
then there is no rational way to resolve priority 
problems between justice and competing concepts, such 
as social justice (at least according to Hayek). 
Rational argument requires reasons, and reasons con- 
stitute a because. If we say, "justice is good 
because . .. 
" then the because provides some basis for 
rational discussion. The basis might prove inadequate 
to resolve the priority problem, but at least it pro- 
vides a starting point for di , 
scussion. 
But as an intrinsic good (if it is so) 
justice has no because. It is not good because 
It is simply good in and of itself. That being the 
case, there are no reasons to be offered in support 
of justice and hence nothing to be rationally weighed 
against competing concepts. If justice does compete 
with another concept, such competition must be 
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resolved in some non-rational way, for there is no 
basis on which to argue priority. 
Admittedly, even if justice is an instrumental 
good, any priority problem may (will) reach a point - 
beyond which no further rational argument is possible. 
Then recourse will have to be to non-rational ways. But 
justice as an instrumental good at least defers, and in 
some cases may altogether avoid, the time when such a 
course is necessary. It provides a definite area within 
which rational argument can occur. By contrast, justice 
as an intrinsic good precludes ab initio any rational 
discus sion of priority problems. 
Of course., this conclusion by no means 
constitutes a logically irrebuttable reason for rej ect- 
ing the idea that justice is intrinsically good. If 
there are any intrinsic goods -- and surely in any system 
I 
of morality there must be at least one -- divorce frbm 
rational arguments will attach thereto. Perhaps justice 
is such a good. Fiat justitia, pereat mundus. But 
be that as it may, for Hayek justice is clearly an instru- 
mental good, as the next section will demonstrate. 
B. The Hidden Premise 
It is my contention that not only must Hayek's 
theory of justice be viewed instrumentally, but that 
his entire social philosophy must be viewed that way 
as well. If we read between the lines, we see that 
underlying all Hayek's express statements about justice, 
underlying his entire-social philosophy, there is a 
hidden premise which serves as a validating principle 
for Hayek's entire system. That hidden premise is 
the notion or principle of r6spect for persons. Re- 
spect for persons is the sine qua non for Hayek's 
system. 
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I refer to this Kanýian premise -- for so I 
shall designate it -- as a hidden premise because I 
am aware of only one instance in which Hayek expressly 
refers to it. 
There are undoubtedly many forms 
of tribal or closed societies which 
rest on very different systems of 
rules. All that we are here main- 
taining is that we know of only 
one kind of such systems of rules, 
undoutedly still very imperfect 
and capable of much improvement, 
which makes the kind of open or 
'humanistic' society possible where 
each individual counts. as an indi- 
vidual and not only as a member 
of a particular group, and where 
therefore universal rules of 
conduct can exist which are equally 
applicable to all. responsible human 
beings. It is only if%we accept 
such a universal order as an aim, 
that is, if we want to continue 
on the path which sincethe ancient 
Stoics and Christianity has been 
characteristic of Western civi- 
lization, that we can defend this 
moral system as superior to others -- 
and at the same time Ondeavor to im- 
prove it further b continued im- 
manent criticism. 
ý 
Notwithstanding that there is only this 
single explicit reference to the Kantian premise, the 
premise is latent throughout Hayek! s social philoso- 
phy and especially throughout hip theory of justice. 
It is the prem . ise, itself intrinsically good, which 
constitutes the end towards which Hayek's theory of 
justice is instrumental. And it is, therefore, the 
existence of this premise which constitutes justice as 
an instrumental good for Hayek. 
That respect for persons is a latent premise 
in Hayek's system becomes patently obvious once we 
recognize the normative import*of that system. It 
seems indisputable that, despite Hayek's descriptive 
approach, and despite the seminal role of his 
epistemology, his is ultimately a normative philosophy. 
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Thus, while he speaks as if such notions as cosmos, 
rules of just conduct, and the principle Of Justice 
are matters of fact, he is at the same time maintain- 
ing that such concepts ought to exist in the world. 
Even if such notions have never been instantiated in 
the world -- a statement Hayek would deny -- or even 
if such notions have been instantiated in the world 
in the past but now no longer are -- a statement 
Hayek would ruefully accept -- it remains the case 
that they ought to be instantiated in the world. And 
this ought derives from the Kantian premise. Respect 
for*persons constitutes the first link in Hayek's 
normative chain. It is to his system as the Grundnorm. 
is to Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law. From it hang all 
the other links. 
Consider, for Hayek we ought to respect 
persons simply because we ought to respect persons. 
But, given that we ought to respect persons, it then 
follows (for Hayek) that we ought to value liberty 
or freedom. This because freedom is a, means to 
respect for persons. We cannot respect persons with- 
out at the same time respecting their freedom. Free- 
dom is intrinsically instrumental to respect for 
persons. (It must be stressed that this argument and the 
subsequent ones are arguments which I think can and 
must be inferred from Hayek'sýphilosophy if we are to 
make sense of it. They are, however, never expressly 
made by Hayek himself. ) 
Given that we ought to respect freedom we 
ought also to maintain a cosmos, a spontaneously 
ordered society. And, given that we ought to main- 
tain a cosmos, we ought also to 'structure' society 
by means of general, purpose-independent -rules, i. e. 
rules of just conduct. Only by maintaining a cosmos, 
itself maintained by rules of just conduct, can we 
insure an optimum opportunity for the exercise of 
individual freedom. Thus, for Hayek the cosmos with 
its rules of just conduct is intrinsically instrumental 
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to respect for-persons. By contrast, to maintain 
society as a taxis, a deliberately constructed order, 
structured about specific directives, i. e. rules of 
organization, is to evince a patent disregard for 
individual freedom and hence a disregard for respect 
for persons. 
With Hayek's theory of justice the instru- 
mental link to respect for persons shows through at 
several points. To begin, the rules which the theory 
of justice presupposes are the rules of just conduct. 
And these, as we have just seen, are intrinsically 
instrumental to freedom which is in turn intrinsic- 
ally instrumental to the Kantian premise. 
Then, there is Hayek's basic principle of 
justice: "the principle of treating all under the same 
rules. .4 Hayek never attempts to explain why it is 
that we should be concerned with treating all under 
the same rules. But the Kantian premise can fill 
this gap. If one's aim is respect for personsi treat- 
ing all under the same rules can be seen as a neces- 
sary means thereto. This for two reasons. First, 
to repeat again, the rules of justice are a necessary 
concomittant of freedom, and freedom is a necessary 
concomittant of respect for persons. Second, respect 
for persons entails equal respect for persons; respect 
if it is not equal is not respect at all. Hence, 
unless we utilize rules, and unless we apply them 
equally to all, we are not respecting persons. Hayek's 
principle of justice is, therefore, intrinsically 
instrumental to the Kantian premise, that premise thereby 
providing both the derivation of and the justification 
for the principle. 
The Kantian premise also plays a dominant, 
albeit latent, role in Hayek's rejection of the 
"mirage of social justice". At the heart of that re- 
jection is Hayek's perceived conflict between justice 
and social justice. Justice depends upon rules of just 
conduct. Social justice, on the other hand, depends 
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upon rules of organization, or so Hayek argues. Jus- 
tice leads through rules of just conduct to freedom 
and ultimately to respect for persons. Social justice, 
because it flies in the teeth of rules of just conduct, 
cannot (according to Hayek) lead on to freedom and 
thence on to respect for persons. Social justice must, 
therefore, be rejected. We will, howqVer, see shortly 
that I it is debatable, to say the least, whether social 
justice is, in fact, incompatible with respect for 
persons. But that the argument may be defective, does 
not alter the fact that it is the argument Hayek makes. 
The final way in which the Kantian premise 
fits into Hayek's theory of justice is as important, 
if not more so, than the way the premise is used to 
reject social. justice. There is a seeming anomaly in 
Hayek's theory. For Hayek justice is a system relative 
concept. This is because the substance of justice is 
determined by. the rules of just conduct which it pre- 
supposes, and the rules of just conduct are a contingent 
fact about particular societies. Thus, the rules of. 
just conduct in one society may , and probably will, 
differ from those in another society. It appears, 
however, that justice is satisfied so long as 
15 a society has rules of just conduct, 2) those rules 
are mutually consistent and form a coherent whole, 
and 3) they are applied to everyone. 
And yet, Hayek is prepared to evaluate an 
entire system, to describe it as better or worse than 
other systems. But, if justice is purely s*ystem 
relative, there is no way he can do this. The Kantian 
premise provides a way around this dilemma. It pro- 
vides an external standard for evaluating systems of 
justice. A system of justice is better or worse 
than others depending on how conducive it is to respect 
for persons. To see that this is what Hayek is doing, 
we need only look again at a part of the passage quoted 
at the beginning of this section. 
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It is only if we accept such a 
universal order as an aim, that is, 
if we want to continue on the path 
which since the ancient Stoics and 
Christianity has been characteristic 
of Western civilization, that we 
can defend this moral s stem as 
superior to others 
To sum up, the Kantian premise, the notion 
of respect for persons is an indispensable element of 
Hayek's entire social philosophy and particularly his 
theory of justice. Although the premise surfaces only 
once, its presence is continuously felt. One cannot 
understand Hayek on society or justice without under- 
standing the seminal role of respect for persons. 
C. The Priority Problem 
0 
Having identified the presence and the 
importance of the Kantian premise in Hayek's social 
philosophy, the point to be considered now' is how, if 
at all, that premise relates'* to what I have designated 
as Hayek's priority problem. More specifically, the, 
immediate question to be answered is, does the Kantian 
premise support Hayek's claim that a concern for 
liberty must always take precedence over a concern for 
social justice (or welfare). If it does, then Hayek's 
contention that the pursuit of social justice must be 
abandoned because it is inevitably incompatible with a 
respect for individual liberty will stand proven. 
As far as Hayek is concerned, the-fact that 
respect for individual liberty is intrinsically instru- 
mental to the Kantian premise would conclusively re- 
solve any priority problem. Since one cannot respect' 
persons without respecting their liberty, any value 
which is incompatible with respect for liberty is 
ipso facto incompatible with respect for persons. 
And given that the latter is the basal value for Hayek'9 
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entire social philosophy, there can be no question 
that it- must take priority over any and all competing 
values. 
Of course, while this argument would solve 
the priority problem for Hayek, it would prove un- 
convincing to anyone who did not accept the Kantian 
premise as the ultimate value of their social or moral 
system, Vis-a-vis such people, Hayek would still'be 
left with a priority problem, only it would now be 
shifted to a different level: the question now being 
why respect for persons should be entitled to priority 
over whatever other base value was being espoused. 
How such a priority problem could be resolved 
is, however, a question which we need not consider 
any further. That is because even within his own value 
system I think that Hayek's argument for the priority 
of liberty is open to question. Hayek's argument for 
the priority of liberty over social justice would be a 
persuasive argument (again, within the confines of his 
value system) provided that respect for liberty were 
co-extensive with respect for persons. But that is 
something which Hayek nowhere argues.. 
To be sure, the entire argument based on 
the Kantian premise is a reconstruction; it is never 
expressly made by Hayek. But it is clear from that 
reconstruction that Hayek never gives a first thought, 
much less a second one, to the possibility that in 
addition to respect for liberty there-might be other 
elements involved in the Kantian premise. No, it is 
patently obvious that as far as he is concerned, when 
one speaks of respect for persons one is speaking of 
rational autonomy. To Hayek the important things are 
for a person to be able to make his own decisions, to 
order his own life, and to select his own values. This 
is what liberty is all about. And to ensure this lib- 
erty to an individual is to respect him as a person. 
Nothing which Hayek says, nothing which he argues, con- 
tradicts this conclusion. Quite the contrary. The 
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thrust of his polemic against social justice is that 
liberty is the essence of respect for persons. 
With all due respect to*Professor Hayek, I 
think that his position regarding the essence of the 
Kantian premise is, at the very least, open to debate. 
'Now, books have been written about what is entailed 
6 
by the notion of respect for persons, and the topic is 
far from non-controversial. That being so, it is 
most certainly not my intent here -- in one section of 
one chapter of a dissertation -- to put forward and 
comprehensively defend my own interpretation of respect 
for persons. Fortunately (for me) that is not a task 
which I have to undertake. For my present purposes it 
will be sufficient if I merely demonstrate that the 
y, antian premise is reasonably susceptible to an inter- 
pretation whereby the concerns of social justice are of 
at least equal weight with those of rational autonomy. 
Such an interpretation could take the follow- 
i-ng form. Respect for persons entails two basic ele- 
ments: rational autonomy and a concern for welfare. In- 
asmuch as the distinguishing essence of man is his reason, 
rational autonomy must be considered the higher of the 
two elements, for without liberty reason is but a shadow 
of itself. However, one cannot neglect the element of 
welfare. Man is a rational animal; his rationality 
is embedded in his animal nature. As an animal man has 
certain basic needs which must be met: food, clothing, 
shelter, adequate medical care. Not only are such 
things needed to sustain man's animal nature, but un- 
less such needs are met a man cannot fully exercise his 
rational nature. Of what value is rati6nal autonomy to 
a man Who is ill-fedand: ill -clothed. Moreover, there 
are additional needs which pertain not to mere physical 
existence, but rather to man's efforts to develop his 
existence, 
7 to make something out of his life. In 
this category are such things as education and the 
opportunity for meaningful employment. These needs too 
must be met if rational autonomy is to be anything more- 
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than a mere sham. In short, if our goal is to respect 
persons, it is not enough merely to ensure rational 
autonomy. We are also obligated to see that certain 
basic needs are met, for unless these needs are met, it 
is mere empty cant to say that we have respected persons. 
Now, I certainly do not maintain that I have 
: Ln any sense defended this interpretation of the Kantian 
premise. I have at best given a very brief sketch of 
what such a defense would look like. However, I do 
inaintain that this interpretation is prima facie plaus- 
ible. It is at least as plausible as Hayek's unargued 
position that respect for persons and rational autonomy 
are essentially co-extensive. Given the plausibility 
of this interpretation, and given Hayek's failure to 
argue for his own interpretation, I think. it fair to 
say that we are back to where we began, we have again 
come face to face with the priority problem. 
The significance of this priority problem 
cannot be overemphasized. In my opinion it is the 
crux of Hayek's entire critique of social justice. 
What Hayek is really concerned with is upholding the 
primacy of liberty over a concern for welfare. All 
of his talk about the meaninglessness of social justice 
and its incompatibility with his social system is no 
more than a smoke screen which he uses to avoid meeting 
the real issue head on. Whether Hayek's critique of 
social justice stands or falls depends on whether the 
pr3. Macyo-f7liberty over welfare can be justified. 
Ilayek's failure to undertaký such a justification 
constitutes a crucial and vitiating hole in his critique 




The purpose of this final chapter is to give 
an overall appraisal of Hayek's critique of social 
justice. - The evaluation is concerned with the merits 
of the critique in and of itself and with the signifi- 
cance of the critique in relation to the general problem 
of social justice. Such being the case, there are three 
distinct facets. of Hayek's thought which will be considered 
herein. The first is. the problems which exist in rela- 
tion to specific aspects of the critique of social jus- 
tice---The isecond is problems -involving -thL- substance 
of the critique in general The third, and to my mind 
most important, is a fundamental problem involving the 
general nature of Hayek's critique of social justice. 
The first two of these aspects can be disposed 
of rather quickly as we have already given extensive 
consideration to them during the course of this disserta- 
tion. As far as the specifics of the critique of social 
justice, --if one were to attempt to epitomize the most 
basic' problem presented thereby, one would have to say 
that Hayek's social theory is replete with holes and 
fuzzy edges. Although he attempts to set forth a com- 
prehensive social system, in fact he speaks only in 
the most general terms. -Hence, while such concepts as 
the spontaneous order, rules of just conduct, and 
justice are essential to his philosophy what he says 
about these concepts is far from complete or coherent. 
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Thus, we have seen, for instance, that the 
idea of the spontaneous order, which is absolutely in- 
dispensable to his critique of social justice, is of 
questionable viability even viewed on its own terms. 
Particularly disturbing is Hayek's failure to provide 
a clear. --cut distinction between legitimate adjustments 
of and illegitimate tampering with this order. As to 
the -rules of just conduct, we have seen that there is 
real doubt as to the claim that they arise and are 
developed in a non-volitional manner. Hayek simply 
glosses over some points which are essential if this 
claim is to be maintained. Likewise, the defining 
characteristics of these rules -- generality and purpose- 
independence -- are so vague as to leave in doubt what 
is really required. Finally, there is Hayek's concep- 
tion of jtistice. Notwithstanding the extensive re- 
construction T have attempted thereof, I would have to 
say that what Hayek expressly tells us about justice is 
-a muddled patch-work of ideas whose inter-relationship 
one can at times only guess at. Yet despite the 
wobbly condition of his conception of the social order, 
Hayek would have -us -accept: -that --the pursuit of- social - 
justice should be abandoned because it is incompatible 
with this order. 
As to the problems with the substance of 
Hayek's critique of social justice in general, these 
too can be succinctly epitomized. Hayek seeks to draw 
conclusions which are far broader than those which are 
actually warranted. Either Hayek does not grasp the 
way in which the concept of social justice functions in 
disputes about social theory, or if he does grasp the 
function he chooses to ignore it. 
The essence of Hayek's difficulty is that 
in dealing with social justice he attempts to treat 
as a monolithic concept what is in fact a sort of blanket 
word. As Hayek himself recognizes, the term social 
justice covers a wide variety of appeals which are bound 
together only by a very general common denominator: 
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i. e. a moral concern for the welfare of one's fellows. 
Even granting that only reasons of entitlement will 
qualify as arguments on behalf of social justice, there 
is still an almost unlimited range of arguments which 
can be made in the name of social justice. Hence, the 
mere fact that an appeal is made to social justice tells 
us very little, aside from the basic nature of the appeal 
being made. Only by examining the precise nature of that 
appeal can we learn exactly what it is that is being 
argued. 
.. 
But in his critique Hayek attempts to reject 
in toto any and all appeals which might be made under 
the aegis of social justice. He does this by attacking 
particular conceptions of social justice. That some 
conceptions of social justice are incompatible with 
the spontaneous order, with rules of just conduct, and 
with justice, clearly does' not demonstrate that all 
such conceptions have the same failing. Yet, throughout 
his trilogy the target of Hayek's attack is social 
justice, the mirage of social justice, the pursuit of 
social justice. One can only wonder what Hayek really 
intended as his target. If it was social justice. 'in all 
of its manifestations, then it is certain that he has 
missed his mark. If, on the other hand, Hayek's real 
concern is only those conceptions of social justice 
-which will require the abandonment of the spontaneous 
order, then it is both misleading and irresponsible of 
him to make the claim which he does: to wit, that the 
pursuit of social justice should be abandoned in its 
entirety. 
Harsh though these first two conclusions 
about Hayek may appear, they are mild as compared with 
the third and final one. My primary objection to Hayek's 
critique of social justice is that he does not under- 
stand what is really involved when people argue about 
social justice. Consequently, his critique is radi- 
cally misconceived and regrettably, of only limited value. 
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The essence of the problem of social justice 
is the question of the extent to which it is justified 
to use the state coercive machinery to compel a concern 
for the welfare of one's fellows. And this is unde- 
niably a normative question. It concerns the way we 
ought to behave: what ought our obligations to be to 
our fellows. It is, in short, a matter of substantive 
morality. And it can properly be dealt with only as 
such. That means the arguments both for and against 
must be normative arguments, for that is the only sort 
of argument which is appropriate in the context of 
this question. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
massive corpus of literature on social justice is con- 
cerned almost exclusively with normative arguments. 
The question is always what ought we to do, and the 
arguments consist of reasons supporting or opposing the 
particular course of conduct under consideration. The 
problem of social justice is a matter of values and not 
facts, it is a matter of practical and not theoretical 
reason. One can examine almost anything written on 
social justice and he will fifid 'this -to be the case. 
Almost anything. 
But one will search Hayek's corpus in vain 
if one seeks normative arguments. As we have seen, for 
instance, he does 
* not even attempt to argue the prior- 
ity of individual liberty. What one will find in Hayek 
is an argument which is at heart epistemological. Not- 
withstanding the latent Kantian premise which underpins 
his philosophy, Hayek does not treat social justice as 
a normative problem. Nowhere does he come to grips with 
the sorts of arguments which are made in support of 
claims for justice by need, or justice by desert, or 
an egalitarian-version of justice. Hayek is simply not 
concerned with such arguments. Instead, beginning with 
his theory of critidal rationalism he proceeds to develop 
a social theory which flows from that premise. And on 
the basis of that theory he rejects as meaningless all 
appeals to social justice. 
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The point is, however, that while epistemo- 
logical arguments are relevant to the sorts of normative 
arguments we can make, they cannot altogether replace 
those arguments. At the end of the day we will still 
always be left to decide how it is that we should act. 
And that means that we will still be left with the norma- 
tive arguments. Whether, and to what--extent, we ought 
to concern ourselves with the welfare of our fellows is 
a question which must be answered by precisely the sorts 
of normative arguments that social theorists have been 
making f or years. To reject out of hand the demands of 
social justice is not an - ef f ective way to proceed. One - 
must instead confront the particulars of those demands 
and posit counter -arguments thereto. 
The value of Hayek's approach is that it pro- 
vides, so to speak, the necessary grain of salt which 
must be taken with any such arguments. But in and of 
itself it is insufficient to convince one way or the 
other. Sad to say, despite his extended polemic 
against social justice, Hayek never really deals with 
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